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“Take an old man’s word: there’s nothing worse than a muddle in 
all the world. It is easy to face Death and Fate, and the things that 
sound so dreadful. It is on my muddles that I look back with horror 
-  on the things that I might have avoided...I used to think I could 
teach young people the whole o f  life, but I know better now, and all 
my teaching o f  George has come down to this: beware o f  muddle.”
E. M. Forster, A  Room with a View.
I had read A  Room with a View before coming to Florence to begin life as a 
postgraduate student at the European University Institute, and Forster’s warning 
against muddle came back to me as soon as I started to look at the legal 
literature on the European Union. Words such as sovereignty, legitimacy and 
competence were thrown into the melting pot with little consideration of their 
meaning and significance.
When I turned to legal philosophers who might be able to sort out this muddle, 
it was Kelsen, oddly enough, who offered the right tools. Kelsen’s concern is to 
expose those who, behind the trappings o f fine and emotive words such as 
‘sovereignty’, sought to conceal their own jingoism and prejudice. This concern
1
seems to sit uneasily with Kelsen’s pursuit o f legal philosophy and his 
development of a theory which, he claims, is ‘pure’ -  free from ideology and 
free from politics. Yet the pure theory is not an escape from the knotty 
problems of power, authority, and legitimacy but a response to them. It is a 
response which has its roots in a drive for clarity, honesty, and truth in relation 
to our muddled societies.
This thesis therefore flows primarily from the work on Kelsen contained in 
Chapters Two and Three. It was Kelsen’s emphasis on the necessity, as a 
scientist, of identifying as clearly as possible not only the subject matter of one’s 
study but also the boundaries o f the viewpoint from which that subject will be 
studied, which led me to develop the work on perspectives which ultimately 
shapes the thesis.
The thesis is pulled simultaneously in two directions. It is divided into four Parts 
which are based on, firstly, the organising theme, perspectives, and secondly, the 
three substantive topics: the system, authority, and legitimacy o f the European 
Union. The chapters are organised according to different perspectives, although 
this structure is a means of transport only: the destination is the three concepts 
of system, authority and legitimacy. Our awareness of perspective is only of 
value insofar as it aids our understanding of those topics.
I first turn to Kelsen in an attempt to understand the nature o f the legal system 
o f the European Union and the authority which it has over the Member States 
and their citizens. Each country o f the European Union enjoys a stability and 
strength that can only arise from a long-held custom of acceptance o f the value 
o f national political and legal systems. We are in the habit of obeying the laws 
our governments make, and o f respecting the decisions taken by our judges. 
O ur political and legal authorities have the legitimacy o f long-established 
structures with which we identify ourselves and our sense of community. Our 
societies are like mature trees: we may look to prune here and there, but little 
more.
miHi'imti
The European Union, on the other hand, is historically a mere sapling. Yet the 
fundamental difference between our relationship with our own nation and our 
relationship with the Union lies not solely in the newness within Europe o f the 
latter’s legal and political order, but in the fact that the sapling of the Union is 
consistently ripped up and its roots subjected to frosty scrutiny.
This thesis is, in fact, a root-ripping exercise: on the premise that we must dig 
deep in order to confirm the solidity of the foundations on which we wish to 
build, it examines the deepest roots of the construction that has become the 
European Union. The first step, which must logically precede the questions of 
authority and legitimacy, is to ask whether the law o f the Union may be viewed 
as an independent order.
This question is tackled, using Kelsen’s theory of law, in Chapter Two. 
However, I must flag the process of elimination which led to this choice. As a 
lawyer educated within the English and Welsh legal system, I first turned to the 
legal theory which takes centre place in many courses of legal philosophy in 
those countries: that of H.L.A. Hart. Hart’s theory is considered briefly in 
Chapters One, Two and Three, not only in relation to the perspective o f study 
that he advocates, but in relation to his concept of a legal system. Hart’s ‘rule of 
recognition’ boils down to a social fact, the fact of the habitual practice by a 
significant number of members of a political system in recognising that law may 
be identified by reference to certain criteria. In Chapter One I argue that the 
existence of obligation cannot depend on the existence of social practice. The 
inadequacy o f the reliance on established social practice is put starkly into relief 
when applied to the brand new legal order constituted within the European 
Union.
I therefore go to Kelsen, who identifies the difference between recognising a 
rule as a social practice and recognising a rule as a norm which demands to be 
obeyed. Kelsen rejects the empirical approach of Hart, whose rule of 
recognition is a sociological construct the existence of which is empirically
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verifiable against actual behaviour, in favour of a constructivist approach which 
is to be tested only in relation to its capacity to aid our understanding ot law.
This constructivist approach is the manifestation o f Kelsen’s insistence on the 
scientific, ‘pure’ study o f law. In Chapter One I distinguish three points ot view 
which form the backbone of the rest of the thesis. Firstly, there is the external 
point o f view, the perspective of the outsider, whether anthropologist, 
sociologist, or alien. This is the subject who is concerned to describe the 
behaviour and practices of those studied. Secondly and thirdly there are the two 
points o f view which constitute an ‘internal’ attitude towards the object of 
study. One, the ‘detached normative perspective’, is the scientific point of view 
of Kelsen’s anarchic legal professor, the person who has no interest in 
promoting or applying the laws of the system, but who is able to understand law 
from the perspective o f those who do. The other, the ‘committed normative 
perspective’, is the point of view o f those, such as judges and most citizens, who 
use and are committed to the law and believe that it should be obeyed.
The work on perspective is continued in Chapter Four, where I look more 
critically at their use. There are various pitfalls, not least the tendency to 
mistakenly believe that one’s own perspective is total and one’s understanding 
more ‘correct’ and whole than another’s. In addition, understanding may 
change according to the purpose with which a point o f view is adopted, and by 
the features and experience o f the self. Lastly, understanding has effects on the 
person who seeks to understand: he may too easily change to adapt to the object 
o f study, or the object o f study may reinforce his existing prejudices.
Kelsen is well aware o f the partial nature o f particular perspectives, and it is his 
detached normative point o f view that I adopt in order to consider the legal 
system o f the Union (which, as I explain in Chapter Two, I term for 
convenience ‘the European Community’). Although the idea of a system is in 
some ways technical, it is also at the root of the decidedly non-technical 
concepts o f authority and legitimacy. The Court of Justice claims that the
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Community is an independent legal order. Using the detached normative 
perspective this is not necessarily the case, but Kelsen’s legal theory gives us the 
tools to understand possible bases for this claim. First of all, the formal structure 
of the Community legal order shows a degree of centralisation which places the 
Community between a confederation (a body of international law) and a 
federation (a body of state law). On this test the Community is truly sui generis.
However, Kelsen’s concept o f a norm gives us a second, far more effective way 
of tackling the Community. Norms are linked by a chain of validity; each norm 
is validated by another norm, which in turn can be traced to another norm; this 
chain forms a unity or system if  each norm can be ultimately traced back to the 
Grundnorm. This chain of validity is clearly present within the Union, and also 
allows us to move beyond formal structures and labels such as ‘Community’ and 
‘Union’. A norm is a member o f a legal system simply if its validity is ascribed 
and delimited by another norm.
There are three possible Grundnorms which ultimately validate the EC legal 
order: a norm of international law, a norm of Member State law, or an norm 
which is independent and validates the EC system alone. I argue that the 
strongest case can be put for the hypothesis that the European Community was 
validated by a norm o f international law, but that a ‘revolution’ has taken place 
and that an independent Grundnorm is now presupposed in relation to it. 
However, the nature of the detached normative perspective is that the 
Grundnorm cannot be verified. The Grundnorm is presupposed; it is a fiction. 
It shows us that it is possible to conceptualise an independent Community 
system, but the detached normative view is silent on which hypothesis regarding 
the legal authority of Union law is ‘correct’.
This silence becomes even more notable once I move on to the vexed question 
of sovereignty and the relationship between the international, Member State 
and Community legal systems. In the last paragraph, I used the phrase ‘legal 
authority o f  Union law’. By this term ‘legal authority’ I mean the Kelsenian
5
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theory introduced above: that authority can be tested and measured simply by 
norms’ validation by other norms. The emotive implications of the concept o f 
authority become clearer when we consider that the quick answer to the 
question why we understand our law to be authoritative in the context of our 
nation states is sovereignty: the law has authority because it is created by a 
sovereign body such as a parliament.
In Chapter Three I apply Kelsen’s theory once again, this time to the authority 
of the Union. I take the chain of validity to its logical conclusion and, applying 
this monist theory, set out nine different models of the normative relation 
between the Member State, international and Community legal orders. There is 
only ever one Grundnorm, presupposed in relation to one of the systems, but 
which ultimately validates all three. Again, however, Kelsen enables us to see 
the alternatives at the root o f any claim to sovereignty, but is silent as to the 
legitimacy of the selection of one particular alternative.
So legal validity and the idea that authority can be established legally (and, by 
implication, neutrally) take us only part of the way toward understanding 
legitimacy as justified authority. The application of Kelsen’s theory helps us 
clarify the question; but, as MacCormick comments, “at the interface of law and 
politics, Kelsen’s austerity is unproductive”.1 So, then, I move on in Chapter 
Four to take a closer look at the interface of law and politics to which Kelsen 
has brought us, and to consider more carefully in what way the law of . the 
European Union can be said, from any perspective, to be legitimate.
The first problem to overcome in this context is that ‘authority’ and ‘legitimacy’ 
as terms are bandied about with little analysis of what either might mean. 
Authority, I argue, is the right to rule: it is distinguishable from brute force or 
the power to command by its claim to have the right to issue obligating 
commands. I distinguish various kinds o f authority which may constitute a
1 MacCormick, Questioning Sovereignty, p.23.
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judgment o f ‘legitimacy’, including social, legal and normative justifications of 
authority. Social legitimacy, for example, is the legitimacy conferred upon a 
regime by power: a political system may be said to be legitimate if it is 
supported by enough people to be effective in its enforcement o f rules. It is the 
third concept of legitimacy, however, which I choose to focus upon in relation 
to the legitimacy of the Union. Normative legitimacy is the idea that authority 
may be justified if it is exercised in accordance with particular values or 
principles.
In order to examine this idea, I use Ronald Dworkin’s theory of law as 
integrity, for Dworkin’s work is based upon the claim that only a community 
which accepts the political principle of integrity can claim genuine authority 
and legitimacy. Dworkin’s work is therefore founded upon the idea that 
authority, to be justified (and thus legitimate), must meet certain criteria. 
Dworkin views political authority as deriving from a particular form of 
community which can support its members’ use o f authoritative standards for 
the maintenance of its communal life.
Applying Dworkin’s theory to the European Union it is clear that on 
Dworkin’s test the authority o f the Union cannot be described as justified. 
Dworkin demands a level of coherence and cohesion that are not fulfilled 
within Europe, particularly since the extension by the Treaty o f Amsterdam of 
the concept of ‘flexibility*, which is in direct conflict with Dworkin’s emphasis 
upon integrity within a legal order. The Union does not give integrity and 
coherence the overwhelming importance that Dworkin ascribes to them; it does 
not wish to impose unity where to do so would be to ride rough-shod over 
difference.
This conclusion, however, leads me to look more closely at normative 
legitimacy. Clearly, once we leave behind Kelsen’s ‘neutral’ and detached legal 
science we enter the messier realms of values, moral and political, which do not 
lend themselves to neat models of validity. Many o f the criticisms of Dworkin
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are based upon the argument that he takes the perspective o f the Herculean 
judge and claims that what is essentially a theory of legal reasoning is a theory7 of 
law. Criticism of Dworkin on the basis that he claims too much for Judge 
Hercules does not, however, diminish the force o f his theory o f legal reasoning. 
Given the complexity of the purposes which may conceivably be contained 
within the committed normative perspective from which a consideration of 
normatively justified authority must begin, one solution is to work from the 
point o f view of a clearly identified subject. In Chapter Five it is the perspective 
of the European Union judge which is adopted.
Chapter Five looks at the question of the legitimacy o f decisions made by judges 
within the Union, focusing particularly on the judges of the European Court of 
Justice. Having rejected, in Chapter Four, Dworkin’s claim to offer a theory of 
law, I use his concept o f law as integrity as a theory of adjudication, a program 
of decision-making which looks to both judge and law in its concern for 
legitimacy. The question o f the legitimacy of a decision of a court is based on 
the question of what the law is, and there has been argument over the yean that 
the European Court of Justice has made decisions which are ‘wrong in law* and 
therefore illegitimate. I argue that, just as in questions of sovereignty, questions 
of the correctness and legitimacy of decisions of European judges can only be 
tested by honesty and clarity in the choices which are made in establishing the 
criteria according to which a decision is judged to be correct. Some critics of 
the Court of Justice believe that certain of the ECJ’s decisions are ‘wrong’ 
because they do not correspond with their criteria of correct decision-making — 
but they fail to elaborate or justify their criteria. Any judgment o f correctness 
needs a normative yardstick, criteria against which one may decide that a 
judgment is correct.
The Court of Justice has developed the ‘teleological* approach to decision­
making, which emphasises the principles and purposes underlying the law. 
Dworkin’s ‘program o f adjudication*, I argue, gives a sophisticated account o f 
legal reasoning according to which the approach of the Court of Justice cannot
be judged to be ‘activist’ or ‘illegitimate’. However, Dworkin’s work gives too 
much weight to integrity, requiring the judge to look for a rational and 
coherent whole* Referring back to the criticisms of Dworkin’s approach to 
authority discussed in Chapter Four, I argue that while Dworkin gives useful 
guidance in the process o f rational decision-making, ultimately there is a variety 
of incompatible right answers and that the morally soundest solution is 
preferable to the most coherent.
In the Union integrity may take second place to establishing co-ordination, 
especially where integrity would require silencing many different voices in order 
to achieve the one voice with which Dworkin’s personified community speaks. 
The certainty of rules becomes more precious than the flexibility of principles 
where authority is fragmented and rules are based on political compromise and 
co-operation rather than a background scheme of principle.
Thus from the legitimacy of the decisions o f the European Court o f Justice I 
move on in Chapter Six to consider the legitimacy of the European Union. I 
argue that no political organisation is legitimate in itself; it can only be justified 
through its capacity to fulfil the tasks which are the reason for which people 
choose to act together rather than alone. A community exists to enhance the 
opportunity for every one of its members to have the best life possible: the 
authority o f the Member States and the Union is only legitimate to the extent 
that it furthers the common good. And this argument brings the thesis full circle 
to the ‘central case’ discussed in the first chapter, the central case o f the 
practically reasonable perspective, from which we can attempt to establish the 
conditions under which people can flourish.
It is from this point o f view that I consider the ideals of community and of 
participation which may further these conditions within the Union. Again, 
Dworkin is used as a springboard, this time for a discussion of the ways in which 
a political community may come together in a way which justifies the authority 
it exercises over its members. I look at the minimum conditions for a European
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demos, the inter-relation between multiple political communities, types o f 
democracy and the nature and definition o f collective action.
However, although all these ideals must be considered with an eye on the 
opinion of those who, looking at the roots of the authority o f the Union, find 
nothing more than myth. I find that the constitutional mythology of the United 
States has begun to be mirrored within Europe too, and I consider Schlag’s view 
that the idea of legitimacy and our attempts to justify authority are no more 
than empty circles.
Yet even Schlag concedes that any sort of communal life at all may necessarily 
be a construction based on myth. As I try to show right from the start of the 
thesis, understanding is a constructive activity: our choices in understanding are 
the foundations and building blocks of what we then call ‘reality’. While we 
may sometimes wish to listen to the sceptic arguing that the promise to deliver 
an examination between ideal and reality is never fulfilled, and that our concepts 
and justifications are no more than myth, we should also be ready to contribute 
to the lives of our communities and try to use our ideals to construct the best 
reality we can. This thesis is essentially an attempt to clear away some of the 
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Any study of the law of the European Union takes up a particular perspective, 
or perspectives, although few writers do so explicitly. One recent exception is 
Diarmuid Rossa Phelan, who settles himself firmly into what he calls an ‘order 
approach’ to EU law: “ [t]he focus is on how the three legal orders o f public 
international law, European constitutional law, and national law...describe 
themselves internally. . .”.1 Rossa Phelan contrasts this approach with other 
perspectives, amongst which he lists theoretical points of view: “this ‘order 
approach’ is an extension in the context of relations between legal orders o f the 
internal approach to law, and is humbler than considering the other perspectives
1 Phelan, Revolt or Revolution: The Constitutional Boundaries of the European Community, p.3.
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listed but has the advantage of trying to avoid the debates which surround 
perspectives of justification...and legal theories”.2
This thesis, rather rashly, given Phelan’s view, does not limit itself to Phelan’s 
perspective but merrily leaps into the debates surrounding others. However, 
notwithstanding Phelan’s “anti-theory” stance,3 his own ‘order approach’ is 
situated squarely within legal theory. As MacCormick says, Phelan “chooses to 
ignore the extent to which his own position and approach belong firmly within 
theory; his way of dealing with the situation is not really to abandon theory, but 
to abstain from argument with theoretical positions other than his own”.4
1.1 Three perspectives
In fact, Phelan’s ‘internal to the legal order’ perspective is one of three 
perspectives (perspectives of legal theory) that will each be distinguished and 
discussed in this chapter, and then employed throughout the thesis. It will be 
given the somewhat unwieldy name of the committed, normative perspective. This 
point o f view, however, will be argued to be not exclusive, but complementary 
to the other two, termed the detached, normative perspective and the external 
perspective respectively. Phelan rightly recognises that his order approach is 
concerned with questions o f legitimation and legitimacy of the legal orders he 
studies; law, being normative, requires justification for its authority, and each of 
the three perspectives set out here offers a different angle from which to go on 
to study the legitimacy and authority of the law o f the European Union.
In this chapter I explore these different perspectives. I show how the use of each 
perspective will automatically give rise to a particular type o f understanding of 
law, and that without a recognition of theorists’ use of different perspectives,
2 Ibid., pp.3-4.




their arguments can never meet or properly engage. I take a look at the types of 
people who might use a particular perspective» and introduce some of the 
characters whose points of view will structure the rest of the chapters in this 
thesis» such as the legal scientist, critic, and judge.
1.2 The external perspective
All the theories considered in this thesis take as their starting point the 
(“perfectly correct”)5 appreciation of the fact that “where there is law, there 
human conduct is made in some sense non-optional or obligatory”.6 As Joseph 
Raz says, *‘[a]ll laws are created by human actions, but human actions are facts 
and they belong to the realm of the ‘is’, whereas laws are norms and belong to 
the realm o f the ‘ought’”.7 Law, in other words, is normative; any theory of law 
must offer an explanation of this property.
Theoretical accounts of the law vary, however, in the explanations they offer 
for the normativity of law, just as they vary in their accounts o f other features of 
law. These variations in description derive from differences of opinion amongst 
descriptive theorists about “what is important and significant in the field o f data 
and experience with which they are all equally and thoroughly familiar”.8 Finnis 
points out the ‘obvious question’ which these differences of opinion provoke: 
“From what viewpoint, and relative to what concerns, are importance and 
significance to be assessed?”9
One viewpoint will be termed the external perspective, which is the perspective of 
the outside observer. From the external point of view, the account of law that is
5 CL, p.82.
6 Ibid.
7 Raz, The Authority <fLawt p.124.
8 John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights, p.9.
9 Ibid.
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given will be restricted to the outward manifestations of its existence: such an 
observer “is content merely to record the regularities of observable behaviour in 
which conformity with the rules partly consists and those further regularities, in 
the form of the hostile reaction, reproofs, or punishments, with which 
deviations from the rules are met”.10 Hart’s reductive description of the external 
point o f view is, however, misleading: this point o f view is also the perspective 
of the sociologist, the anthropologist, and other schools of thought which study 
law as a social phenomenon as opposed to strictly normative.
Hart is however criticising Austin’s attempt to give an account of the 
normativity of law from this external point of view. Austin defines the notion of 
a legal obligation in terms o f the likelihood that one may come to harm - “a 
punishment or ‘evil’ at the hands of others in the event of disobedience”.11 In 
effect he treats the idea of obligation as being reducible to prediction, so that 
normative statements about the law (statements of duty and obligation) become 
assessments of the chances of incurring a sanction. According to Austin, in any 
society where there is law, therefore, there will exist a general habit o f 
obedience.
Neil MacCormick adopts a well-known example of Hart’s in order to 
demonstrate the inadequacy o f this view:
“By observation we discover that 99 per cent o f car drivers stop their cars in 
front of red traffic lights. At the same time, the same observations disclose 
that 95 per cent o f car drivers play car radios when stopped at traffic lights. 
Here we have two habits -  a habit of car-stopping and a habit of radio­
playing. As we all know, however, we have only one rule. It is a rule that
10 CL, p.89.
11 CL, p.83, and seej. Austin, The Province of Jurispmdettce Determined, Lecture One.
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one must stop at red traffic lights. It is not a rule that one must play a car 
radio when stopped at a traffic light”.12
An analysis of law as a normative phenomenon which confines itself to the 
external point of view thus produces serious distortions. Legal theory must take 
account of a second point of view, the point of view of the participants: ” [w]e 
either have to be, or to put ourselves by sympathetic imagination in the shoes 
of, insiders to the practice in order to account for matters otherwise 
inexplicable”.13
As is well known, Hart, concerned to refute theories of law which described 
law in purely behavioural terms, drew a distinction between what he called the 
internal and external aspect of rules. While a social rule has an external aspect 
which it shares with a social habit (the regular uniform behaviour which an 
observer can record) it also has an internal aspect, which is the understanding of 
a member o f a group that the behaviour in question is a general standard which 
should be followed by the group as a whole.14 His fundamental (and persuasive) 
objection against the predictive, purely external account of law, is that failure to 
fulfil the obligations imposed by law is not simply the ground for a prediction 
that sanctions will follow, but is a reason or justification for such reaction.15 It is, 
after all, perfectly possible that a person may ignore a legal obligation but will 
not suffer a sanction for his disobedience. This does not afFect the fact that he 
had and has an obligation, however; “the statement that an individual has an 
obligation under some rule and the prediction that he is likely to suffer for 
disobedience may diverge”.16






Hart’s strategy is therefore to adopt, at least ostensibly, the ‘internal point of 
view’ as his perspective on law, and therefore attempts to account for the 
obligatory nature o f law in terms of what people believe to be reasons for 
action. I say ‘ostensibly’, however, because I will argue that while Hart’s 
distinction between an external and an internal perspective is important, and 
shall be adopted in a modified form here, in discussing the normativity of law 
Hart himself falls back into a reductive position, and on to the external point o f 
view.
1.3 T h e ‘internal point of view’
Hart’s theory of law is dependent upon an account of normativity which Raz 
calls the “practice theory o f norms”.17 For Hart, the key to the obligatory 
nature of law is to be explained by the existence of social rules. To say that 
someone has or is under an obligation implies the existence of a social rule 
(although the inverse is not the case: the existence of a rule does not necessarily 
imply an obligation).18 When do social rules exist? Briefly, according to Hart, 
the existence of social rules depends on the behaviour of the group to which the 
rule belongs. Rules are understood to impose obligations when there is an 
insistent general demand for conformity and when there is great social pressure 
brought to bear against those who deviate or threaten to deviate from them .19 
Social rules, therefore, are practices.
In the case of law, we therefore say that a legal rule is valid (that it imposes 
obligations) when it satisfies all the criteria provided by a particular rule of the
17 Raz, Practical Reason and Norms pp.49-58, Ronald Dworkin calls this the ‘social rule theory’ 
and gives a useful summary o f  Hart’s position: “Duties exist when social rules exist providing 
for such duties. Such social rules exist when the practice-conditions for such rules are met. 
These practice-conditions are met when the members o f  a community behave in a certain 
way; this behavior constitutes a social rule, and imposes a duty...The existence o f  the social 
rule, and therefore the existence o f  the duty, is simply a matter o f fact” (TRS, pp.49-50).
18 CL, pp.85-6.
19 CL, p,86, and see generally pp.82-91.
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system which Hart calls the ‘rule of recognition’.20 The rule of recognition is 
different from the other rules (which it identifies) in that there is no rule 
providing criteria for the assessment of its own legal validity. The rule of 
recognition is, says Hart, neither valid nor invalid; it is simply accepted and used 
for the identification of the other rules of the system. The existence of the rule 
of recognition depends on an external statement of fact, in that it exists only “as 
a complex, but normally concordant, practice of the courts, officials and private 
persons in identifying the law by reference to certain criteria“.21 All legal rules 
are therefore practices.
An immediate and fundamental objection can be brought against this theory of 
Hart’s, and Dworkin, MacCormick and Raz all do so.22 They all query Hart’s 
first step, his thesis that the existence of an obligation necessarily implies the 
existence of a social rule. It is not true, they argue, that all appeals to obligation 
are appeals to a social rule. Take the example of a vegetarian: she may argue that 
it is wrong to eat meat and that there is a general obligation not to kill animals 
for food, but she will acknowledge that (at least in Western societies) there is no 
social rule to that effect.
As a possible response to this criticism, Dworkin suggests that Hart could 
weaken his version of legal obligation to mean that it is simply sometimes the case 
that someone who asserts a duty should be understood as presupposing a social 
rule that provides for that duty.23 It would be the case if the community were 
“by-and-Iarge agreed that some such duty does exist“.24 However, even in this 
weakened form the social rule theory is not plausible. Firstly, it distorts people’s
20 See CL, Ch. 6.
21 CL, p.110.





understanding of obligations that arise under ‘concurrent morality’. A 
community “displays a concurrent morality when its members are agreed in 
asserting the same, or much the same, normative rule, but they do not count 
the fact o f that agreement as an essential part of their grounds for asserting that 
rule”.25 For example, people may believe that they should not lie, and that they 
would have this duty even if most other people did lie. When they speak of a 
duty not to lie, it would be wrong to suppose them to be appealing to a social 
rule not to lie, since its existence is not necessary to their claim.26
Secondly, the social rule theory fails to explain the account that people give o f 
their obligations even under ‘conventional morality’, the morality that a 
community displays when its members are agreed on a duty but that duty is 
only maintained so far as that agreement continues. It is not adequate because 
“it cannot explain the fact that even when people count a social practice as a 
necessary part of the grounds for asserting some duty, they may still disagree 
about the scope of that duty”.27 Hart’s view is that a rule is constituted by being 
generally accepted by the officials of the system and obeyed by the bulk of the 
population, but this test presumes too much. This can be clearly seen in the case 
of the European Union, where the scope of various criteria which could be said 
to belong to the rule o f recognition is not clear (for example, the power o f the 
Member States to amend the Treaties in a way not provided for by the processes 
contained in the Treaties themselves).28 Since two people whose rules differ 




27 Ibid., p.54, and compare Raz, Practical Reason and Nomts, pp.57-8.
28 $ee da Cruz Vilaça and Piçarra, “Y a-t-il des limites matérielles à la révision des traités 
instituant les communautés européennes?”.
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that if  a duty is controversial it is no duty at all29 - which is to weaken the social 
rule theory to a form in which it becomes practically meaningless.
Dworkin argues that Hart’s theory captures the truth that a social rule plays a 
crucial role in the justification o f normative claims, but that it then makes the 
mistake of concluding that the social practice constitutes the rule which the 
normative judgment accepts. Instead, the social practice helps to justify a rule 
which the normative judgment states.30 The problem at the root o f Hart’s 
practice theory of rules is that he fails to make the distinction that Kelsen draws 
between validity (normativity) and effectiveness. In avoiding the thesis that 
validity is entirely independent of effectiveness he goes to the opposite extreme 
and concludes that validity and effectiveness are the same.
There is clearly a relation between the ‘ought’ and the ‘is’ of the legal norm in 
that the norm must be created by an act “which exists in the reality of being”.31 
However, as we have seen, norms may exist without being effective, which, in 
Haitian terms, means that norms (obligations and duties) may exist even if  there 
is no social rule to that effect. As Kelsen says, the validity of a legal norm is not 
identical with its effectiveness: the effectiveness of a rule or legal order is not, 
contrary to Hart’s view, the reason for the validity of the norm, although it may 
be a condition for it.32 Hart is guilty of moving from the ‘is* of the acceptance, 
or effectiveness, of an obligation, to the ‘ought’ contained within it. His theory 
of norms as practices may serve to identify the system to which a norm belongs, 




32 PTL, pp.211-3. Kelsen argues that the validity o f  a norm (‘ought’) can only be another 
norm, not the fact o f  compliance, or an act o f  will, or any other ‘is’ (see PTL pp.4-10).
33 See Raz, Practical Reason and Nomts, p.175.
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To recap, then, we have seen that Hart drew a distinction between two possible 
points o f view from which to approach the study of law. To take the internal 
perspective is to be a participant in the group and to regard law as a reason for 
actions. To take the external perspective is to restrict oneself to behavioural 
accounts of law or descriptive accounts o f people's beliefs and attitudes toward 
the law. Hart, in attempting to explain the obligatory nature of law, in effect 
took the latter perspective; his explanation of obligation in terms of the 
acceptance and use o f the rule o f recognition ultimately failed.
Dworkin’s response to Hart’s failure here is to embrace the first, internal 
perspective. He argues that the social scientist who wishes to study law (as 
opposed to the various opinions that people have about the law) must use the 
methods the participants use, and view the law from their perspective; “he 
must, that is, join the practice he proposes to understand”.34 For Dworkin, the 
primary internal point of view is that of the judge, which, he believes, should be 
adopted as the point of view of legal theory: “any judge’s opinion is itself a 
piece of legal philosophy, even when the philosophy is hidden.. Jurisprudence is 
the general part of adjudication, silent prologue to any decision at law”.35
Dworkin is correct to emphasise the importance of the internal point of view. 
However, he is wrong to argue that it is the one and only perspective that 
should be adopted in the theoretical study of law. I will later argue that it is a 
mistake to adopt one point of view as exclusively correct, and that the different 
possible viewpoints should be recognised as complementary, each offering 
particular benefits and insights. For the moment, however, I will discuss a third 





which Hart and Dworkin present us. This position gives rise to what I will call 
(following Raz) ‘detached normative statements’.36
1.4 The detached normative perspective
Raz’s vegetarian friend helps us understand the nature of detached normative 
statements.
“If I go with a vegetarian friend to a dinner party I may say to him, ‘You 
should not eat this dish. It contains meat’. Not being a vegetarian I do not 
believe that the fact that the dish contains meat is a reason against eating it. I 
do not, therefore, believe that my friend has a reason to refrain from eating 
it, nor am I stating that he has. I am merely informing him what ought to be 
done from the point of view of a vegetarian. O f course the very same 
sentence can be used by a fellow vegetarian to state what ought to be done. 
But this is not what I am saying, as my friend who understands the situation 
will know”.37
Detached normative statements are thus statements o f the reasons there are from 
a certain point of view - here, the point of view of a vegetarian.
A person making detached normative statements does not accept the volitional 
aspect that is part of the Hartian internal point of view. It is MacCormick who 
identifies two components, cognitive and volitional, of the internal
36 The jump from 'point o f  view’ to ‘statement’ is easily explained: a point o f view can be 
characterised by the statements about obligation a person w ho accepts or is using that point 
o f view will make. For example, a person who adopts the internal point o f  view with regard 
to the obligation not to lie, might say that “you ought not to lie”. A person adopting the 
external point o f  view might say “you believe that you ought not to lie”, or maybe “there is 
a rule that you ought not to lie”. See Raz, “The Purity o f  the Pure Theory”, at pp.90-9. 
Raz’s terminology for these statements changes: in The Authority of Law, for example, he 
writes o f ‘statements from a point o f  view’ (see pp. 156-157). I find this label confusing and 
prefer ‘detached normative statements’.
37 Raz, Practical Reason and Norms, pp. 175-176.
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perspective.38 The cognitive element is the understanding o f the pattern or 
patterns of behaviour that community obligations create, and the volitional is 
the act of will of fulfilling the obligation, the preference for conformity to the 
pattern as a standard.39 To approach law from the detached point o f view entails 
a suspension of the volitional element - the friend in no way endorses the 
vegetarian’s commitment to the obligation not to eat meat -  while fully 
appreciating in the cognitive sense the commitment to the obligation that those 
with the internal point of view have.
The possibility of this third perspective introduces some confusion into Hart’s 
terminology. It is actually a further point of view contained within Hart’s 
category of the ‘internal’ perspective, the other being the fully volitional and 
cognitive. Hart’s term ‘the internal point of view’ will thus be discarded. All 
three points of view have now been introduced, and I will clarify the way in 
which they will be classified. Firstly, the external, which, as we have seen, has 
neither the cognitive nor the volitional element: it can only go so far as to 
describe people’s beließ and attitudes toward their legal obligations. Secondly, 
people who make committed normative statements are those who accept the 
bindingness of the law and endorse it; they have the ‘full-blooded’ approach to 
norms.40 The third point o f view is that of the person who makes detached 
normative statements:41 statements of what should be done according to a 
particular cognitive understanding of law.
38 See MacCormick, Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory, p.288, and H .L.A. Hart, p.33.
39 MacCormick, H.L.A. Hart, p.38.
40 See Raz, The Authority of Law, p.154 and p.159.
41 MacCormick’s terms this point o f  view the ‘hermeneutic’ perspective: see his discussion at 
pp.38-40 o f  H.L.A. Hart, and his discussion o f the internal aspect o f norms in the Appendix 
to Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory (pp.275-292). I prefer to stick with the term “detached 
normative statements” because Dworkin’s thesis that explanations o f law must take the point 
o f view  o f  the participants (i.e. the committed normative point o f  view) has also been  
labelled ‘hermeneutic’ -  see Marmor, Interpretation and Legal Theory, pp.43-44.
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It is important to see that the first two points of view are basic types. However, 
as Raz argues, the third is not collapsible into them .42 Detached normative 
statements “simply state what one has reason to do from the legal point o f view, 
namely, what ought to be done if legal norms are valid norms...They are like 
statements made on the assumption that something is the case, for example, that 
a certain scientific theory is valid, which are not conditionals of which the 
assumption is the antecedent, nor do they presuppose that the theory is true“.43 
This description of detached normative statements finds echoes in Kelsen’s 
doctrine of the basic norm, and Raz acknowledges his debt to Kelsen in 
identifying and developing the understanding of this third perspective.
The implications of the third perspective can be seen in Kelsen’s example o f an 
anarchist law professor: “Even an anarchist, if he were a professor of law, could 
describe positive law as a system of valid law, without having to approve o f this 
law”.44 Detached normative statements are to be distinguished further from 
committed normative statements in that they are scientific as opposed to 
personal: whereas norms judged as normative from a personal point of view are 
those endorsed and adopted as just, norms can also be judged as normative, even 
by the same person, from the scientific point of view which makes no such 
moral judgment. This alters the impact of the Hart-Dworkin debate on the 
nature of legal obligation that we looked at earlier.
We saw that Dworkin objected to Hart’s account o f the normativity o f law. 
Dworkin sets out his opposition to Hart (and also to positivism, since he takes 
Hart to be the target in his “general attack on positivism”)45 in terms o f three 
different theses regarding the idea of a fundamental test for law. (i) The first 
thesis holds that in a legal system some social rule or set of social rules exists
42 Raz, Practical Reason and Norms, pp. 172-175.
43 Ibid., p.175.
44 PTL, p.218n., and see Raz’s discussion in The Authority of Law, pp.155-156.
45 TRS, p.22.
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within the community of its judges and officials, which rules settle the limits o f  
the judge’s duty to recognize any other rule or principle as law .46 (ii) According 
to the second thesis, in every legal system some particular normative rule or 
principle, or complex set of these, is the proper standard for judges to use in 
identifying more particular rules or principles o f law.47 (iii) The third thesis 
holds that in each legal system most of the judges accept some normative rule or 
theory governing their duty to count other standards as legal standards.48
Dworkin believes the dispute between himself and Hart (himself and positivism) 
to hang on the first thesis: Hart proposes it, he denies it. However, the fact that 
the arguments Dworkin offers for rejecting Hart’s version of positivism are 
convincing does not mean that Dworkin’s ‘rights thesis’ is the only alternative. 
Dworkin is committed to some version of the second thesis, that there is some 
normative, not social, rule or principle used in identifying other legal 
obligations. Yet this thesis can also be accepted by Kelsen, whose pure theory, 
he tells us, is a theory of legal positivism.49
It may help to set out a summary of the basic tenets traditionally associated with 
positivism. Raz identifies three major theses, which may be termed the semantic 
thesis, the moral thesis and the sources thesis:50
“First is the reductive semantic thesis which proposes a reductive analysis o f  
legal statements according to which they are non-normative, descriptive 
statements of one kind or another. Second is the contingent connection 
thesis according to which there is no connection between law and moral
46 TR S, pp.59-60.
47 T R S, p.60.
48 Ibid.
49 PTL, p.106.
50 Cf. Raz, The Authority of Law, p.37, and “The Purity o f  the Pure Theory”, pp.8t-2. As 
Hart says, there are several meanings o f  positivism “bandied about” in contemporary 
jurisprudence. He, in contrast with Raz, identifies five (in Essays in Jurisprudence and 
Philosophy, at pp.57-58). See also Dworkin’s list in T R S (p.17).
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values. Third is the sources thesis which claims that the identification of the 
existence and content of law does not require resort to any moral 
argument”.51
The first thesis, which includes the Hartian social rule thesis that Dworkin 
argues against, is however rejected by Kelsen.
Kelsen’s account of normativity is very different from the theory of ‘social 
normativity’ offered by Hart.52 He adheres to what Raz calls a ‘justified’ 
concept of legal obligation, according to which legal standards o f behaviour are 
norms only if and in so far as they are justified,53 a concept which corresponds 
to Dworkin’s second thesis. This is possible because Kelsen’s fundamental test 
for law (the Grundnorm) does not dissolve, unlike Hart’s Rule of Recognition, 
into the external point of view. However, neither does it take Dworkin’s 
perspective of the committed participant. Instead, it offers a detached normative 
viewpoint from which to understand law.
Kelsen agrees with Dworkin that from the point of view of the participants, law 
ought to be conceived as justified, or moral.54 Kelsen’s Grundnorm is not a 
doctrine of recognition; it is not a positive but a presupposed norm, which is only 
presupposed if we wish to interpret law (as social practice) as normative.55 There
51 Raz, "The Purity o f the Pure Theory”, pp.81-82.
52 Raz’s term ‘social normativity’ is summarised by him as the view that standards o f behaviour 
“are social norms in so far as they are socially upheld as binding standards and in so far as the 
society involved exerts pressure on people to whom the standards apply to conform to 
them” (The Authority of Law, p.134). This essentially corresponds to Hart’s position, although 
in the light o f  the criticisms considered above, which argue that it fails to explain the nature 
o f a legal obligation, it would seem to be somewhat o f  a misnomer to label it the social 
conception o f  the normativity o f law.
53 Raz, The Authority of Law, p.134. Kelsen’s views on the normativity o f law are restated but 
also reconstructed by Raz (in The Authority of Law, Chapters 7 and 8, The Coticept of a Legal 
System, pp.45-50, and in "The Purity o f  the Pure Theory”). The presentation o f them here 
draws heavily upon Raz’s work.
54 See Raz, The Authority of Law, p.138, and cf. Marmor, Interpretation and Legal Theory, p.42.
55 PTL, pp.199-200. Kelsen’s doctrine o f  the Grundnorm is discussed in greater detail below.
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is no necessity to presuppose the Grundnorm: an anarchist, for example, 
reasoning in his personal capacity, would in fact refuse to presuppose it. For 
him, there is no difference between the commands of a gangster and the 
‘obligations’ imposed by law: they are both to be interpreted as simply power 
relations (that is, “relations between commanding and obeying or disobeying 
human beings’’)56 - in other words, interpreted sociologically, not juristically.57 
If an individual does presuppose the Grundnorm, however, that individual 
interprets it not only as normative but also as just.
Yet the anarchist may also be a law professor, and in his professional capacity he 
can presuppose the Grundnorm in a special, scientific way. This scientific point 
of view is, for Kelsen and Raz, the point of view of legal theory, and it is here 
that Dworkin diverges from them. While Dworkin identifies the point of view 
o f the legal theorist with the committed point of view, Kelsen and Raz turn to 
the third possibility, the possibility of making detached normative statements 
about the law. The legal theorist, along with the legal practitioner and law 
professor acting in their professional capacities, can make legal judgments that 
do not have moral (volitional) force.58 It is in this way that legal theory is able 
to offer a ‘value-free’ account of law, based on the positivist sources thesis and 
the moral thesis, while at the same time explaining its normativity.59
To anticipate later chapters slightly, the justified account of normativity found 
in Raz’s reconstructed Kelsen allows, for example, an account of the authority 
o f the European Union from the detached point of view. It is possible to view 
the relationships between the international, Member State and Union legal 
orders not just from the committed point of view of a participant in one o f
5 6 PTL, p.218.
57 Ibid., and see GTLS, p.413.
58 Cf. Raz, The Concept of a Legal System, p.236; Practical Reason and Norms, p. 177; The 
Authority of Law, p. 142; “The Purity o f the Pure Theory”, p.90.
59 Dworkin does not accept this claim however; his arguments against the positivist ‘value- 
free’ approach to law will be considered below.
28
those orders, but also to step back to the professional perspective of legal science 
and view them neutrally. The Kelsenian third class o f legal statements allows 
legal theory to step back from the fray and set out the competing interpretations 
of legal practice without competing itself.
Another strength of Kelsen’s approach is that different points of view are 
understood to be complementary. He himself demarcates his own field of 
inquiry as ‘normative jurisprudence’, by which he means “cognition directed 
toward a legal ‘ought’“, as opposed to ‘sociological jurisprudence’, which is 
“cognition directed toward an actual ‘is’’’.60 But “sociological jurisprudence 
stands side by side with normative jurisprudence; neither is able to replace the 
other because each deals with different problems’’.61 Cotterrell for one applauds 
the clear, rigorous manner in which Kelsen recognised the partial nature of his 
own perspective, and the way in which he “came to accept sociology of law as a 
parallel but quite distinct enterprise of inquiry about the legal field, alongside 
what he viewed as legal science - the normative analysis of legal doctrine guided 
by the concepts of the pure theory of law”.62
The relation between different viewpoints is, however, not one of complete 
autonomy. Kelsen points out that sociological jurisprudence (which would 
correspond to our ‘external point of view’) presupposes normative jurisprudence 
(corresponding to the detached normative viewpoint):
“Only by referring the human behavior to law as a system of valid norms, to 
law as defined by normative jurisprudence, is sociological jurisprudence able 
to delimit its specific object from that of general sociology; only by this 
reference is it possible to distinguish sociologically between the
60 Kelsen, What is Justice?, p.269.
61 Kelsen, ibid. See also the general discussion in GTLS, pp. 162-178.
62 Cotterrell, The Politics of Jurisprudence, p.230. See also Raz, “The Purity o f  the Pure 
Theory”, pp.80-81, where he especially approves Kelsen’s insistence on the autonomy and 
distinctiveness o f  normative concepts.
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phenomenon of legal and the phenomenon of illegal behavior, between the 
State and a gang of racketeers”.63
Similarly the detached normative point of view is dependent upon the existence 
of the committed normative point of view. This relation of dependency 
between perspectives, and particularly the detached and committed perspectives, 
will be discussed below. First, we must return to Dworkin’s view that the 
detached view is in any case not possible and that legal theory cannot be 
uncommitted.
1.5 Dworkin’s rejection o f the detached 
normative perspective
Dworkin does distinguish between the external point of view “of the sociologist 
or historian”64 and the internal point of view of the participants o f law .65 He 
accepts that “ [b]oth perspectives on law, the external and internal, are essential, 
and each must embrace or take account o f the other” 66 He himself takes up the 
internal, participant’s point o f view: he “tries to grasp the argumentative 
character o f our legal practice by joining that practice and struggling with the 
issues o f soundness and truth participants face”.67 This is all well and good: as 
Hart puts it, his ideas “are o f great interest and importance as contributions to 
an evaluative justificatory jurisprudence”, contributions which Hart is “not 
concerned to dispute”.68
63 GTLS, p.177, and see p.178: “sociological jurisprudence presupposes the juristic concept o f  





68 CL, Postscript, at p.241.
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What Hart is concerned to dispute» however, and what will be disputed here, is 
Dworkin’s claim that positivist legal theory can be illuminatingly re-stated as an 
interpretive theory.69 Dworkin argues that since legal practice is argumentative, 
“every actor in the practice understands that what it permits or requires 
depends on the truth of certain propositions that are given sense only by and 
within the practice’*.70 He therefore proposes a theory of law as interpretation, 
in which people try and understand law “in its best light“.71 However, 
interpretation is not limited to the participant but extends also to the legal 
philosopher:
“General theories of law...must be abstract because they aim to interpret the 
main point and structure of legal practice...But for all their abstraction, they 
are constructive interpretations: they try to show legal practice as a whole in 
its best light, to achieve equilibrium between legal practice as they find it 
and the best justification of that practice. So no firm line divides 
jurisprudence from adjudication or any other aspect of legal practice’’.72
So a positivist theory of law becomes, for Dworkin, a concept o f law based on a 
particular normative political theory which must be tested for its interpretive 
power just as his own theory of law as integrity must be tested.73
Dworkin therefore refuses to distinguish between the interpretation of ‘the law', 
in the sense of a particular body of law, and the interpretation of ‘law’, in the 
sense of the general concept o f law.74 Marmor adapts Raz’s example o f the 





73 See Dworkin, “A Reply by Ronald Dworkin”, in Cohen (ed.), Ronald Dworkin and 
Contemporary Jurisprudence, at pp.254-256.
74 See Finnis, “O n Reason and Authority in Law’s Empire", at p.368.
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that there is controversy amongst vegetarians whether fish should or should not 
be eaten, and that this controversy is due to different conceptions vegetarians 
hold on the requirements o f vegetarianism. Dworkin “would argue that both 
the participants and the theorists would have to decide what vegetarianism 
‘really requires’, that is, in such a way as to present it in its best light”.75 He 
denies, in other words, that the theorists could take a different point o f view 
from that of the committed, normative viewpoint o f the participants.
This position, however, is not plausible, and I will set out three arguments to 
that effect. As a preliminary though it must be clarified that Dworkin’s claim 
that the participants in a social practice must offer competing interpretations o f 
that practice is not at issue here. In fact it will later be argued that Dworkin has 
much to offer as far as his account develops our understanding of the 
committed, normative perspective on law. W hat is at issue is Dworkin’s 
argument that jurisprudence, or legal theory, is best regarded as an interpretive 
activity which approaches law from the same point of view as a participant.
Michael Moore attacks Dworkin on his ‘metaphysical’ flank. He argues that 
Dworkin’s interpretive claim about jurisprudence “is intimately connected to 
his ultimately antimetaphysical stance; and both fail for the same reason”.76 
Dworkin, he argues, adopts Richard Rorty’s understanding of the internal and 
external points of view. Rorty argues that philosophy has no privileged position 
from which it can judge the culture within which it is situated; it occupies no 
“Archimedean point from which to survey culture”.77 Furthermore, no 
discipline can occupy such a position - its standards will always be internal. “It is 
impossible”, Rorty tells us, “to step outside our skins - the traditions, linguistic 
and other, within which we do our thinking and self-criticism - and compare
75 Marmor, Interpretation and Legal Theory, p.50f referring also to Dworkin, LE, p.64.
76 Moore, “The Interpretive Turn in Modem Theory: A Turn for the Worse?“, p.942.
77 Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, 1979, quoted by Moore, op. cit., p.953.
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ourselves with something absolute”.78 It is these arguments that Dworkin relies 
upon when he claims that each interpretive practice must be judged internally.79 
Moore suggests, however, that Rorty’s arguments are unavailable to Dworkin, 
who is considering law, not philosophy:
“The plausibility o f Rorty’s use of the ‘impossibility of the external’ 
argument depends wholly on Rorty’s application o f it to our knowledge as a 
whole. Once Dworkin applies the argument to discrete interpretive practices, 
it loses that plausibility”.80
Dworkin, argues Moore, must abandon his conclusion that external criticism of 
claims made within interpretive practices is senseless.81
Raz and MacCormick similarly criticise Dworkin’s interpretive claim about 
v jurisprudence, although on different grounds. Dworkin tells us that in 
interpreting law (whether as participants or as legal theorists) we must construct 
the theory of political morality that best fits and justifies our legal practices. 
MacCormick, suggesting that this theory might be termed a theory of 
‘institutional morality’, replies that Dworkin has failed to adequately reply to a 
crucial question. “Put with more rhetorical force than grammatical elegance, the 
question is: what is institutional morality the morality q/?”82 The “soft 
underbelly” of Dworkin’s thesis is that “if we have to refer to certain 
institutions so as to filter out of background morality a set of principles which 
‘fit’ the said institutions in the sense of giving their best possible justification, 
then it follows that some procedure must exist identifying the institutions
78 Richard Rorty, Consequences of Pragmatism, 1982, quoted by Moore, op. tit., p.953.
79 See Moore, op. tit., p.953.
80 Moore, op. tit., p.954.
81 Ibid.
82 MacCormick, An Institutional Theory of Law, p.179.
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independently of either background morality or a fortiori institutional 
morality”.83
Raz suggests that Dworkin’s theory as presented in A Matter of Principle implies 
the acceptance of “something that is at least like the Rule of Recognition as a 
necessary means for the identification of legal sources”.84 And in fact, in Law's 
Empire Dworkin introduces the concept o f the ‘preinterpretive stage’, in which 
“the rules and standards taken to provide the tentative content of the practice 
are identified”.85 Yet the only criterion for identification he offers is that “a very 
great degree of consensus is needed”.86 Dworkin fails to recognise that the 
identification of law at the preinterpretive stage does not entail the 
interpretation of the law as a specific legal culture but relies on an understanding 
of the concept of law which is detached from that committed viewpoint.
The incompatibility between Dworkin’s interpretive claim about jurisprudence 
and his characterisation of the ‘preinterpretive stage’ can be seen in his 
discussion of wicked law. He says that a person does not have to deny that the 
Nazis did have law, even if his interpretation of his own law is based on some 
feature the Nazi regime wholly lacked, because he would be able to mean only 
that it was law in the ‘preinterpretive’ sense.87 If  he then goes on to say that 
Nazi law was “not really” law, he is using ‘law’ in a different way: “he is not 
making that sort o f preinterpretive judgment but a skeptical interpretive 
judgment that Nazi law lacked features crucial to flourishing legal systems whose 
rules and procedures do justify coercion”.88 Yet what is this but the use of two 
different perspectives from which to view law? Dworkin describes the
83 Ibid., p.180.






preinterprerive judgment about Nazi law as meaning that the Nazi system "can 
be recognized as a strand in the rope, one historical realization of the general 
practices and institutions from which our own legal culture also developed”.89 
This is precisely the sort of judgment which is detached from a particular legal 
culture and which should be distinguished from the interpretation offered by 
the committed perspective on law.
MacCormick concludes that Dworkin’s interpretive approach turns out to need 
completion rather than abandonment o f the analytical inquiry o f the 
positivists,90 and Hart joins him, arguing that Dworkin’s characterization o f legal 
theory as a normative justificatory enterprise "unfortunately conceals the fact 
that there is a standing need for a form of legal theory or jurisprudence that is 
descriptive and general in scope”,91 which need Dworkin’s underdeveloped 
‘preinterprerive stage’ fails to satisfy. Suppose we concede Dworkin’s thesis that 
interpretation should strive to present its object in the best light. It may be true 
that for the participants in a practice like law this would mean ‘morally’ best - 
but this is because the participants must regard law as a reason for their actions. 
This does not necessarily hold for legal theory: assessing ‘the best" depends upon 
the purposes of the theory.92
This becomes clear once we consider Hart’s emphatic denial that his theory 
ever makes any claim to identify the point and purpose of law and legal 
practices as such,93 contrary to Dworkin’s presupposition that the point and
89 LE, p.103.
90 MacCormick, An Institutional Theory of Law, p.186.
91 Hart, "Comment", p.36, and see generally pp.36-40.
92 See Marmor, Interpretation and Legal Theory, p.57, and cf. Moore, “The Interpretive Turn in 
Modem Theory: A Turn for the Worse?", pp.947-948, where he argues that while legal 
practice is interpretive because o f  the moral fact that there is some set o f  values served by 
granting authority to past political decisions, jurisprudence is not because there is no point 
making the practices o f  judges authoritative for legal theorists. See also the discussion o f  the 
committed normative viewpoint below.
93 CL, Postscript, p.248.
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purpose of law and legal practice is to justify the collective force o f the state 
(coercion).94 As we saw above» Hart declines to dispute what he sees as the parts 
of Dworkin’s theory which contribute to a type o f legal theory with aims that 
are not his own (evaluative justificatory jurisprudence). Thus the third argument 
against Dworkin’s conflation o f the points of view of the legal theorist and 
participant focuses upon the different sorts of intellectual enterprise in which 
writers such as Dworkin and Hart are engaged. This argument is summed up by 
John Finnis:
“[T]he objective and methods of a general descriptive and analytical 
jurisprudence such as Hart’s or Raz’s are to be clearly distinguished from the 
objective and methods of a ‘legal theory’ as conceived by R . M. Dworkin... 
[Dworkin’s] debate with ‘positivists’ such as Hart and Raz miscarries» 
because he fails to acknowledge that their theoretical interest is not» like his» 
to identify a fundamental ‘test for law’ in order to identify (even in the most 
disputed ‘hard’ cases) where a judge’s legal (moral and political) duty really 
lies, in a given community at a given time. Rather, their interest is in 
describing what is treated (i.e. accepted and effective) as law in a given 
community at a given time...”.95
It is precisely the possibility of differing projects within legal theory which 
Dworkin ignores: in denying the availability of the detached normative point o f  
view, he obscures the differing purposes that legal theory may serve.
However, although Dworkin’s exclusive adoption of the participant’s 
committed, normative point of view as the point of view o f legal theory must 
be rejected, this does not detract from its importance as one o f the three 
perspectives from which to approach law. In fact, the committed, normative 
perspective is arguably the most important of them all. As we saw, the external
94 SeeLE, p.97; cf. p.117.
95 Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights, p.21.
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viewpoint presupposed the existence of the detached, normative viewpoint. But 
the detached, normative viewpoint in turn presupposes the committed - after 
all, it must be detached from something. It is time to look more closely at this 
‘full-blooded’ perspective,
1.6 The committed normative perspective
The committed, normative statement is the primary kind of legal statement, 
upon which the detached, normative statements of legal science are parasitic.96 
Although normative language is used in both, it is in the committed statements 
that the idea of an obligation is expressed in the way to which we are most 
accustomed, since committed statements “are those of ordinary people who use 
normative language when stating the law because they believe or purport to 
believe in its binding force”.97 In Hartian terms, the committed normative 
viewpoint is the viewpoint of those people who hold a “ reflective, critical 
attitude”98 toward the law; people who accept the law as providing a guide for 
their conduct.99 This attitude is manifested in the use of law as a common 
standard o f behaviour, criticism (including self-criticism), demands for 
conformity, and in acknowledgments that this criticism and these demands are 
justified.100
As we saw above, this reflective, critical attitude comprehends both a cognitive 
and volitional commitment.101 I will divide the discussion into two types of 
situation in which both the cognitive and volitional commitment are present.
96 See Raz, The Authority of Law, pp. 158-9; Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights, p.14 and 
pp.235-6; MacCormick, H.L.A. Hart, p.39 and Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory, p.292.
97 Raz, “The Purity o f the Pure Theory”, p.90.
98 CL, p.55.
99 CL, Postscript, p.242.
100 CL, p.56.
101 MacCormick, H.L.A. Hart, p.33.
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The first is that of the individual who looks to norms of law as reasons for 
action. The second is that o f the judge who interprets and applies the law. As 
will be seen, both the individual and the judge are seeking justification o f their 
decisions and actions, but the nature of that justification is not necessarily the 
same in both situations.102
1.6.1 The individual
By ‘individual’, I mean the person who is looking at the law from a personal, as 
opposed to professional, point o f view. For the individual, the choice to ‘join 
the practice of law’, as Dworkin puts it, is far riskier than the choice made by 
the legal theorist; jurisprudence, in fact, is only a reflection upon choosing, 
while the choice that the participants themselves make is a choice “to authorise 
or withhold, or to risk or accept, coercion - and take the consequences**.103 
Thus it is perfectly possible not to ‘join the practice* - Kelsen’s examples o f the 
anarchist104 and the communist are instances of individuals who refuse to accept 
the authority and normativity o f law:
“A Communist may, indeed, not admit that there is an essential difference 
between an organization o f gangsters and a capitalistic legal order which he 
considers as the means o f ruthless exploitation...He does not deny that the 
capitalistic coercive order is the law of the State. What he denies is that this 
coercive order, the law o f the State, is objectively valid”.105
102 This is also another point o f  contrast with the point o f  view of the legal theorist or the  
lawyer, who need not necessarily justify any real decision or action. See Nino, “A  
Philosophical Reconstruction o f  Judicial R eview ”, p.814.
103 Finnis, “On Reason and Authority in Law’s Empire”, p.357.
104 See Kelsen, GTLS, p.413; What is Justice?, pp.226-7. The anarchist law professor is 
discussed above; here w e are discussing the anarchist in his personal, not professional, 
capacity.
105 Kelsen, “Professor Stone and the Pure Theory o f  Law”, p.1144.
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Since for an individual to accept the law as imposing obligations upon her 
entails incorporating the law into her personal morality, or personal scheme of 
reasons for action, it is clear that a communist or a person who believes the law 
to be iniquitous will refuse to do this.
Hart, however, disagrees that an individual’s committed, normative perspective 
on law entails a moral commitment. He points out that participants may accept 
obligations for many different reasons, such as “deference to tradition or the 
wish to identify with others or in the belief that society knows best what is to 
the advantage o f individuals”.106 Thus when the question arises why people 
have accepted law as a guide to their conduct, Hart sees “no reason for selecting 
from the many answers to be given a belief in the moral justification of the rules 
as the sole possible or adequate answer”.107 For Hart, committed normative 
statements are normative only because they express a willingness to be guided in 
a certain way.108
Raz objects to Hart’s position here on the grounds that much legal discourse is 
not about one’s own obligations but also about the rights and duties of others.
“While one can accept the law as a guide for one’s own behaviour for 
reasons o f one’s own personal preferences or o f self-interest one cannot 
adduce one’s preferences or one’s self -interest by themselves as justification 
for holding that other people must, or have a duty to, act in a certain way. 
To claim that another has to act in my interest is normally to make a moral 
claim about his moral obligations”.109
106 CL, Postscript, p.257.
107 Ibid.
108 Raz, "The Purity o f  the Pure Theory”, p.92.
109 Ibid., pp.92-93.
39
Raz, therefore, finds it “ impossible to resist the conclusion that most internal or 
committed legal statements, at any rate about the rights and duties o f others, are 
moral claims”.110
There are two further arguments which may reinforce Raz’s hesitant conclusion 
here. The first expands upon Raz’s concern about the effect o f the acceptance 
of law upon the rights and duties of others, and explains why, without 
challenging Hart’s understanding of the normativity of law, an individual’s 
acceptance of the law includes a moral commitment. Hart’s account o f law as 
being constituted by social rules and his doctrine of the rule of recognition 
include the claim that the law only imposes obligations if it is effectively 
accepted as common public standards of behaviour by its officials. This 
condition does not only entail acceptance by ‘officials’; it entails acceptance by 
‘enough’ individuals to maintain the general effectiveness of the law. So an 
individual’s commitment to the law is not the simple expression of a preference 
that extends only to herself. Her commitment becomes part o f the 
underpinnings of the law as a body of obligations which will be enforced against 
the other members o f the community, whether they accept it or not. As such it 
is a moral judgment that their behaviour (and her own) should conform to the 
obligations of law rather than other obligations that they (or she) feel could also 
be binding upon them.
The second argument is independent o f the effect upon others of one’s 
commitment to law. People who accept the law as valid accept the law’s claim 
to priority: they will view law as providing reasons for actions that override o r 
exclude other reasons for action.111 The law can be said to have a ‘peremptory’
110 Ibid., p.93. Raz is careful to add in a footnote that he is “not saying that people that make 
such statements have the moral beliefs they express. They may be insincere”.
111 See Raz, Practical Reason and Nonm, pp. 141-146, where he discusses the way in which th e  
law excludes the application o f  extra-legal reasons in deciding what, according to law, ought 
to be done.
nature:112 as Finnis puts it, the law "anticipates and seeks to capitalize upon, 
indeed to absorb and take over, the ‘good citizen’s’ schema of practical 
reasoning, and to give it an unquestioned or dogmatic status”.113 However, in 
doing so, it will almost inevitably compete or even come into conflict with 
other normative systems which claim to impose obligations on individuals, such 
as norms of religion or, more generally, morality. The individual, in viewing 
the law as normative and its prescriptions as obligations to be obeyed, excludes 
any other norm, such as norms of morality, which claim to govern behaviour 
which is simultaneously governed by law. So the commitment to law is moral, 
since it may involve the rejection of certain norms of morality; at the least it will 
alter the way and the extent to which morality may have an effect upon that 
individual’s behaviour.114
Hart’s argument that people accept the law for many different reasons does not 
refute the argument that their acceptance is nevertheless essentially moral. He 
simply supplies examples o f cases in which people make moral decisions without 
considering the moral reasons for making them, or in which their moral 
decisions are morally objectionable. This may become clearer if we imagine the 
many situations in which a legal norm might impose an obligation which many 
people would find evil. There may be, for example, a law which forbids 
employers to hire people of a certain race. An employer in this situation may 
accept this law because she stands to make a profit in doing so, or for whatever 
other reason. Moral reasons why she should not accept this law might not even 
cross her mind. However, her failure to consider moral reasons for accepting the 
law, or her abdication from moral reasoning, do not alter the moral nature of
112 MacCormick, "Comment" p . l l l .
113 Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights, p.318.
114 A similar argument is also put by MacCormick, albeit in slightly different terms: "There is 
a necessary connection between law and morality: they connect by virtue o f both being 
modes o f exercise o f practical reason” ("The Separation o f  Law and Morals", in George 
(ed,), Natural Law Theory, p.120).
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her decision: she has rejected or ignored morality in acting in a way that 
morality may claim to forbid.
Therefore the individual who makes the volitional commitment to law does 
make a moral commitment. The law becomes embedded in the moral beliefs of 
that person and to accept the law means to accept it as just. It is in this sense that 
Kelsen says that the communist denies that the law is ‘objectively valid’: he 
denies the ‘ought’ of the legal norm. From the point of view o f an individual 
the law is an ideology, although it differs from other ideologies in that it 
corresponds to certain facts o f reality - the effectiveness of the system o f law as a 
whole. (In this way, Kelsen suggests, “the law may be considered as the specific 
ideology of a certain historically given power”.)115 Accepting the law as valid 
entails adopting the law as part o f one’s personal ideology or morality.
This means that from the individual’s committed point of view, morality and 
law must form one, consistent, unified order:
“To consider law and morality from one and the same point of view as valid 
orders, or, what amounts to the same thing, to accept law and morality as 
simultaneously valid system, means to assume the existence o f a single system 
comprehending both”.116
While a jurist can ignore morality and a moralist can ignore positive law, an 
individual, who must decide what she ought to do, cannot treat both morality 
and law as two different valid systems, since both systems are related to the same 
object - her conduct117 - and they may both make conflicting claims upon her 
behaviour. If law prescribes conduct A for her, and her moral beliefs prescribe
115 Kelsen, What is Justice?, p.227. Kelsen also discusses the idea o f law as an ideology in PTL, 
pp. 104-7, where he is careful to point out that the Pure Theory, however, takes an anti- 
ideological stance (p.106). Cf. Tur, “The Kelsenian Enterprise”, p.179, and Raz, The 
Authority of Law, p.136.
116 GTLS, p.374.
117 See GTLS, p.399.
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conduct non-A, it is logically impossible for her to treat both law and morality 
as normative.118 As Kelsen says, no one can serve two masters.119
To the individual, therefore, legal and non-legal norms will all form part o f her 
personal normative system, based upon her personal point of view.120 It may be 
true that she thinks that some of the norms which she believes to be valid 
conflict, and she feels herself to be tom between two opposing obligations, but 
this is not a normative but a psychological fact.121 In accepting law as a guide for 
her conduct and a basis for criticism, the individual makes a moral commitment 
which joins law and morality into the one body of norms which she accepts 
impose obligations upon her, and which justify her acts when she behaves in 
accordance with them.
1.6.2 The judge
The judge, also, must give decisions and apply the law in a way which is 
justified because in accordance with her obligations. However, the question of 
the nature of the obligations to which the judge is subject is hotly contested. 
Clearly there are differences between the situation of the individual interpreting 
the law as normative and deciding what she personally must do, and the 
situation of the judge interpreting the law as normative and deciding what the 
parties to a case must do. One obvious difference is that the judge’s 
interpretation is authentic, in that it creates law, while the individual’s choice is 
not: it always runs the risk of being found erroneous by the judge.122
118 See GTLS, pp.407-8; What is Justice?, p.284.
119 PTL, p.329. See also Dworkin, “Comments on the Unity o f  Law Doctrine”, p.201, who  
defends Kelsen against Hart on this point.
120 See Raz, The Authority of Law, p.143.
121 See GTLS, p.375, and Raz, The Authority of Law, p.138.
122 PTL, pp.354-355.
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Kelsen describes the process o f interpretation of the law as being divided into 
two stages. First comes the “cognitive ascertainment of the meaning of the 
object to be interpreted”, which in the case of law is “the ascertainment of the 
frame which the law that is to be interpreted represents, and thereby the 
cognition of several possibilities within the frame”.123 Kelsen’s position is that 
every law-applying act is partly determined by law and partly undetermined;124 
it is the determinate law which provides the ‘frame* within which the law is 
indeterminate. This stage reflects the normative detached perspective, which as 
cognition of law without volition must exhibit all possible meanings o f a legal 
norm, without deciding between the possibilities exhibited by it.125
The judge, however, must choose: “the creation o f an individual norm, within 
the frame of a general norm in the process o f applying the law, is a function of 
the will”.126 The judge, like the individual, makes the volitional step that is part 
of the committed normative point of view. Kelsen argues that this volitional 
step is constrained by the frame identified at the cognitive stage, but that in 
choosing between different meanings of a legal norm within that frame, the 
judge turns to political norms: inside the frame the judge’s task “is not cognition 
of positive law, but of other norms that may flow here into the process o f law- 
creation - such as norms of morals, ofjustice, constituting social values...” .127
Kelsen’s account of the way in which , a judge goes about making a decision is 
controversial, but his contention that the judge in interpreting the obligations 
that the law imposes eventually must turn to norms which are not legal 
highlights the fulcrum of the debate about the nature o f the judicial 





127 Ibid., p.353, and see Kelsen, What is Justice?, p.368.
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says, between different possibilities that may be open to her. But is the judge 
free, as the individual is, to consider what her obligations are ‘all things 
considered? When the individual justifies her actions, she will refer to her 
‘personal normative system’, which may well contain norms of morality as well 
as of law. However, we intuitively revolt against the idea that the judge (who, 
after all, could be an anarchist friend of Kelsen’s law professor) looks in this way 
to her personal moral beliefs to justify her decision.
We revolt against this idea because the judge’s endorsement o f the law as 
normative is not the endorsement simply of one more individual: in her role as 
a judge, she is making a public and authoritative claim to its correctness. The 
difference between morality as manifested in legal practice and morality as 
displayed in moral life lies, MacCormick tells us, “in the elements of publicity, 
authority, and determinacy special to law”.128 However, in the judge’s 
endorsement of the law as justifiably imposing obligations upon its subjects, the 
question remains as to the nature of the commitment the judge is making: to 
what extent (if at all) is she making a moral claim similar to that o f  an 
individual?
Hart again says that the commitment to law is not moral. He recognizes that his 
Rule of Recognition, if it is to exist at all, must be regarded by the courts “ from 
the internal point of view as a public, common standard of correct judicial 
decision, and not as something which each judge merely obeys for his part 
only”.129 However, in his opinion, “when judges or others make committed 
statements of legal obligation it is not the case that they must necessarily believe 
or pretend to believe that they are referring to a species of moral obligation”.130 
Relying on his view that rights, duties and obligations have different meanings
128 MacCormick, "The Separation o f  Law and Morals", p.119. MacCormick refers to 
‘practical reason* rather than morality; I will return to the concept o f practical reason later, 




in moral and legal contexts, he argues that judges speak in a technically confined 
way: judicial statements of a subject’s legal duties set out the action that is 
‘owed’ by the subject but “have nothing direcdy to do with the subject’s 
reasons for action”.130 31
However, just as Hart’s thesis was rejected in relation to the individual, it should 
also be rejected in relation to the judge. He seems to confuse the question of 
the norms according to which a judge should make a decision and the question 
of whether or not to view the norms as imposing obligations. Judges do not 
necessarily deny that there may be reasons outside the law which bear on an 
individual’s action; they may even believe that there are other reasons which, all 
things considered, justify his action. However, they may condemn it because 
theirs is a judgment from the legal point of view only, which is the point of 
view from which laws are exclusionary reasons (in that all non-legal reasons are 
disregarded except where the law permits people to act on non-legal reasons).132 
In this sense it is true that judges do not make moral decisions, meaning 
decisions according to the criteria o f ‘all things considered’.
However, the judge must make a preliminary decision whether or not to take 
up the legal point of view, and this decision, I would argue (following in 
particular MacCormick’s reasoning),133 is not morally neutral. The decision to 
accept the legal point o f view entails a commitment to the ‘peremptoriness’ of 
law, a commitment to treating as wrong what law characterizes as wrong 
conduct, “even if in a concrete case the soundest moral judgement might be
130 Hart, Essays on Bentham, p.161.
131 Ibid., pp.266-267, and see MacConmick, "Comment'’, p . l l l .
132 See Raz, Practical Reason and Nonns, pp. 170-171. Cf. Finnis, Natural Law and Natural 
Rights, pp.314-320, where he draws a very similar distinction between what he terms the 
legal sense and the moral sense o f ‘legally obligatory*.
133 See in particular MacCormick, “Comm ent”, and “The Separation o f  Law and Morals” . 
See also Postema, "The Normativity o f  Law", w ho also argues against Hart’s understanding 
o f  the obligation o f the judge.
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that, all things considered, there was nothing wrong either in doing the deed 
the law characterizes as wrong, or in breaking the law by doing that deed".134
Again Hart argues that judges may have many different motives for making that 
commitment, motives which have nothing to do with the belief in the moral 
legitimacy of the authority whose enactments they identify and apply as law.135 
Again, this is not to be doubted. MacCormick, however, explains why this does 
not detract from the fact that the judge is making a moral commitment:
*‘[T]he judicial pretension to justification in administering the law as distinct 
from the mere justification by the fact that it is law one is administering 
amounts to a pretension to having some justifying reason for one’s judicial 
commitment, even though one’s actually motivating reason were immoral or 
amoral or a mere unthinking acceptance of a traditional practice”.136
The judge who adopts the legal point of view regards herself as justified, or at 
least claims to be justified, in acting on some reasons (legal reasons) to the 
exclusion of others (non-legal reasons).137 These legal obligations, however, do 
not just share a common normative vocabulary with obligations of morality, but 
also a common point, or set of concerns - the way in which we are to live. 
Therefore, “whoever purports to exercise legal authority, whether as lawmaker 
or as judge, has to do so at least upon a colourable claim of doing so reasonably, 
that is, in accordance with some conception of justice and the public good”.138
Thus Dworkin’s account of adjudication rightly extends to a consideration of 
the wider question of the relationship between the way judges make their 
decisions and the nature o f the political community to which they belong. The
134 MacCormick, “Comment", p . l l l .
135 Hart, Essays on Bentham, p.265,
136 MacCormick, “Comment", p.112.
137 See Raz, Practical Reason and Norms, p.144.
138 MacCormick, “The Separation o f  Law and Morals", p.120.
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commitment to law which the judges make, he argues, is only justified if the 
legal and political practices of the community satisfy certain conditions which 
confer authority upon the law and legitimate the community’s use o f  force 
against its members. Dworkin’s theory and the perspective of the judge are 
therefore gateways into a discussion of authority and legitimacy in the European 
Union.139
1.7 The central case
Clearly, not every individual will conscientiously consider and weigh the 
relative merits of every possible legal, religious, or moral norm in building up 
their ‘personal normative system’, just as not every judge will conscientiously 
assess the reasonableness o f her commitment to the law. However, this truth 
becomes less important if we consider more carefully our approach to the 
evaluation and description of law, with the help o f Finnis. In drawing this 
discussion of the committed, normative viewpoint to a close, it is time to 
introduce an argument made by Finnis which draws together the loose threads 
in the transition from external viewpoint, to the detached and then to the 
committed normative viewpoint that has been made during this chapter. As we 
saw, the external viewpoint presupposed the existence of the normative 
viewpoints, and within the category of the normative viewpoint, the detached 
presupposed the committed, which is the ‘paradigm’ perspective on law. This 
movement may be said to find its conclusion in Finnis’s concept of the ‘focal 
meaning’ or ‘central case’ of the normative point of view.
The ‘focal meaning’ stands in contradiction to the assumption upon which 
Kelsen proceeded, that a definition of law should extend to all states o f affairs 
which could be reasonably termed ‘law’, as the lowest common denominator. 
Finnis takes the opposite approach: the state o f affairs referred to by a theoretical 
concept in its focal meaning is called by Finnis the central case, and the central
139 See Chapter Four infra.
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case is the mature example of those states of affairs as opposed to the 
underdeveloped, the flourishing rather than the corrupt, the sophisticated not 
the primitive, the ‘fine specimen’ rather than the deviant case.140 However, by 
what criteria, Finnis asks, “is one meaning to be accounted focal and another 
secondary, one state of affairs central and another borderline?“141 We have here 
returned to the problem posed at the beginning of this chapter, for this question 
is simply a reformulation of it: from what viewpoint, and relative to what 
concerns, are importance and significance to be assessed?
We saw how Hart tries to take what he identifies as the ‘internal point of view’ 
of the participant in legal practice, and how Kelsen more successfully adopts the 
detached, normative viewpoint. Finnis, however, argues that “all this is unstable 
and unsatisfactory because it involves a refusal to attribute significance to 
differences that any actor in the field (whether the subversive anarchist or his 
opponent the ‘ideal law-abiding citizen’) would count as practically 
significant’’.142 In his view, there is “no good reason for this refusal to 
differentiate the central from the peripheral cases of the internal or legal point of 
view itself \ 143 Kelsen and Raz’s anarchistic law professor and Hart’s self- 
interested participant are clearly only watered-down instances of the normative 
point o f view.
For Finnis, the conclusion that we should draw is clear:
“If there is a point of view in which legal obligation is treated as at least 
presumptively a moral obligation..., a viewpoint in which the establishment 
and maintenance of legal as distinct from discretionary or statically customary
140 Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights, pp. 10-11.
141 Ibid., p . l l .
142 Ibid., p.13,
142 Ibid., p. 13 (emphasis in the original). The reference to the ‘ideal law-abiding citizen’ comes 
from Raz, Practical Reason and Norms, p.148.
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order is regarded as a moral ideal if  not a compelling demand of justice, then 
such a viewpoint will constitute the central case of the legal viewpoint” .144
The central case of the legal viewpoint is therefore that perspective which looks 
to the presumptive requirements o f practical reasonableness, by which Finnis 
means “reasonableness in deciding, in adopting commitments, in choosing and 
executing projects, and in general in acting”.145 There is one further 
qualification to make, however: since some people’s views about what practical 
reasonableness requires will be more reasonable than others’, the central case 
viewpoint “is the viewpoint o f those who not only appeal to practical 
reasonableness but also are practically reasonable” .146
Thus even Dworkin’s use of the committed point o f view falls short o f the 
central case of the legal viewpoint, as defined by Finnis, since Dworkin’s theory 
draws back from a wholehearted embrace of practical reasoning. Although, 
Finnis notes, Dworkin is willing “to endow his term or concept, interpretation, 
with much of the richness of practical reasoning’s creative engagement with 
goods...and ends or purposes”^ 47
“[interpretation resists being taken for the whole of practical reasoning; or, 
perhaps more clearly, practical reasoning - e.g., political praxis - resists being 
rendered as ‘interpretation o f  a practice’. Adjudication and juristic 
interpretation resist being taken for the constitutive and legislative moments 
in the life of the law; those moments resist being understood, through and 
through, as interpretative”.148
144 Ibid., pp.14-15.
145 Ibid., p.12, and see Ch. V on the “basic requirements o f  practical reasonableness”.
146 Ibid., p.15.
147 Finnis, “O n Reason and Authority in Law's Empire”, p.359 (emphasis in the original).
148 Ibid., p.363.
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In the end, therefore, interpretation shows itself to be more passive and 
derivative than practical reasoning, which, in reasoning towards choice and 
action, is active and creative.149
Finnis* defence o f his ‘central case* o f viewpoint from which to approach law is 
persuasive. However, Finnis does not deny the utility of other types o f 
viewpoint, such as that o f descriptive social science. There is, he writes, “a 
movement to and fro between, on the one hand, assessments of human good 
and of its practical requirements, and on the other hand, explanatory 
descriptions o f the human context in which human well-being is variously 
realized and variously ruined”.150 This, however, is not to obscure the fact that 
“the point of reflective equilibrium in descriptive social science is attainable 
only by one in whom wide knowledge o f the data, and penetrating 
understanding o f other men’s practical viewpoints and concerns, are allied to a 
sound judgment about all aspects o f genuine human flourishing and authentic 
practical reasonableness”.151
The central case does not detract from the fact that the individual (as 
citizen/subject), the judge, the legal theorist and the sociologist may all have 
very different practical perspectives, the study of which is precluded by the 
importance o f the central case. The three perspectives identified at the 
beginning of the chapter are therefore safe, with the caveat that all three must 
be held up for inspection against the criteria of the central case of the 
committed, normative point of view. All these points o f view will be employed 
and compared in the following chapters.
149 Ibid., p.358.











Hans Kelsen is not likely to appear on undergraduate reading lists as a post­
modernist thinker, yet in this chapter I argue that his concept of a Grundnorm, 
the norm at the apex of the chain o f norms that makes up a legal system, offers a 
perspective from which all other perspectives become visible. Kelsen’s theory 
offers what can best be described as a postmodern philosophy of European 
Community law: a theory whose leitmotif is indeterminacy and which easily 
accommodates the nature o f the European Union as a polity which “defies both 
a readily identifiable textual identity and a readily determinable political 
determination”.1
I argue that Kelsen’s theory is to be understood as a constructivist theory, which 
builds a framework of concepts useful only in order to organise what we are
1 Ward, “Identity and Difference: The European Union and Postmodernism”, p.15.
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attempting to understand. In contrast to empiricists such as Hart, whose ‘rule of 
recognition’ is a sociological construct the existence of which is empirically 
verifiable against actual behaviour, Kelsen offers a theory which is no more and 
no less than an ‘aid to thinking’, to be evaluated only against its usefulness in 
illuminating actual behaviour. As such, it can expose the indeterminacy at the 
heart of the Union.
The approach here is to take up the Kelsenian detached normative point of 
view and consider the European Community as a legal system. (I will explain 
later why I use the term ‘Community’ in this chapter rather than ‘Union’.) The 
first section introduces the constructivist approach which is at the basis of 
Kelsen’s theory of law. The second takes a look at the description of the 
Community as an ‘autonomous legal order’. It argues that the question of its 
effective independence is not determined and suggests that Kelsen’s theory of 
legal system can accommodate this uncertainty and provide a tool with which to 
comprehend Community law as a system.
2.1 Approaching Community law
Once upon a time the sun rose in the morning and set in the evening. The 
earth was the centre of all creation, and around it, giving life and sustenance to 
the creatures upon it, circled the sun. Stars, galaxies, the universe, all that exists 
to survey and understand, were measured and examined in relation to this focal 
point: the planet earth.
The sun still ‘rises’ in the morning and ‘sets’ in the evening. However, our view 
of the world has changed; it no longer rests upon the earth as our single, taken 
for granted, point of reference. We have been able through physics to test our 
initial model o f the universe, find it wanting, and change it accordingly. But the 
initial, inadequate, model was a necessary starting point, and when we revise it 
we are improving our theoretical model; what we seek is a ‘best* model for 
making intelligent what we observe. W e never observe without some implicit
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conceptual model, though at any given time the element of choice o f a 
particular theory is easily overlooked.
We cannot empirically test the nature of the Community legal order. W e 
therefore choose concepts and theories that allow us to impose order upon it, to 
enable us to understand what we see. However, these choices are often hidden, 
as are the values on which those choices are made. To debate the concepts of 
autonomy and sovereignty within Community law is therefore not to discuss 
facts but to challenge interpretations. The categorical language used to describe
i
Community law tends to obscure the process of theory-building standing 
behind it, however, and the choices underlying those theories are doubly 
cloaked. The aim of Kelsen’s theory of law is to “unveil its object”,2 and to 
apply his method to Community law is to turn the spotlight upon these hidden 
layers in our understanding.
2.1.1 T o  kn ow  and describe C om m unity law
There are many different questions that can be asked about Community law. Is 
the law in a certain field coherent? How should it develop? Why does it further 
one policy and not another? In comparison with these the ambition to simply 
‘know’ and ‘describe’ Community law may appear not only modest but overly 
narrow:3 after all, law is a dynamic entity which has far-reaching social, 
economic, political effects, and we should debate how it ought to be.
However, this is all well and good as long as beliefs about the way Community 
law should be are not dressed-up as descriptions o f the way the Community is. 
Unfortunately the two projects are often muddled in together, resulting in a 
critique impoverished and muddied by its foundation upon so many 
unarticulated descriptive assumptions.
2 Kelsen, GTLS, Preface, p.xvi.
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The difficulties are multiplied since the way in which one can go about 
describing law is contestable. However, in the case of the Community one 
particular approach is the best, and actually visibly (although possibly 
unconsciously) employed within it. This is the ‘constructivist’ approach, which 
is heavily influenced by Kant’s work on epistemology.
t r 'i
Roger Cotterrell explains constructivism:
“Concepts need to be formed in advance - a priori - in order to organise 
empirical evidence. The previously established concepts not only determine 
what is empirically relevant but also reflect a view of why it is relevant. The 
theory aiming at a scientific explanation of any object o f knowledge cannot 
take its concepts from observed experience but must deliberately construct 
concepts as a means of interpreting experience, o f imposing order on it’’.3 4
Every attempt to ‘know’, every science, must therefore create its own 
conceptual apparatus.
European Community law can therefore be ‘known’ by constructing a 
framework of concepts, a theory, to allow us to organise what we observe into 
an intelligible structure. This is exactly what has happened in Community law: 
concepts such as ‘legal order’, ‘constitution’, ‘supremacy’, ‘sovereignty’, 
‘competence’, and many others, have been employed by those engaged in the 
Community to give a coherent account of the law. Yet as Cotterrell noted 
above, these previously established concepts do not only determine what is 
empirically relevant but reflect a view of why it is relevant.
Our choice o f concepts and thus our choice of theory becomes crucial. This is 
because these concepts and theories do not exist in a vacuum. A theory is a tool
3 To ‘know ’ and ‘describe’ law are given by Kelsen to be the exclusive purpose o f  his theory 
o f law: PTL, p. l .
4 Roger Cotterrell, The Politics of Jurisprudetice p.86. Cotterrell terms this approach 
‘conceptualism’, but ‘constructivism’ has been preferred here.
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which is available to be used for good or ill just as any other tool. Yet it is not 
in the nature o f the tool itself to determine the use to which it will be put.
For example, the concept of a legal order was used early on by the Court o f 
Justice. In the often-quoted words o f the Court in the Van Gend en Loos case, 
“the EC Treaty has created its own legal system...The Treaties are not just 
international agreements”.5 To characterise Community law as an order of law 
not only determines the importance of the unifying and systemic elements 
within it but also emphasises the view that Community law is to be 
distinguished as an independent whole, as opposed, for example, to an 
understanding which equates it with international law.
The importance of our choice of concepts and the separation of the concept 
from the decision to adopt it is reflected in another characteristic of 
constructivism: its constitutive nature. The constructivist approach does not 
only describe the law but also has a constitutive character - “it ‘creates’ its object 
insofar as it comprehends the object as a meaningful whole”.6 Without theory 
there is no European Community law, because it is theory that gives us 
concepts such as ‘obligation’, ‘duty’, ‘validity’, which we must have in order to 
know what ‘law’, and ‘Community law’ is.7
To know and describe Community law then it is necessary to take two different 
angles, and employ both a constructive and deconstructive approach. Since 
claims already exist regarding the nature of ‘Community law’, one task is to 
strip away those claims to their conceptual bones, and, further, cleave those 
concepts from the actual decision (articulated or not) to adopt them. The
5 Case 26/62, [1963] ECR 1, at 12.
6 PTL, p.72.
7 To say that theory ‘creates’ its object is not to say that it creates law in the way that law is 
created by a legal authority. This ‘creation* has a purely epistemological character. See PTL, 
p.72.
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second task is to evaluate the concepts that have been adopted and to ask it' 
others may be more appropriate.
2.1.2 E valuating the concepts
A theory or description of Community law based on constructivism makes no 
claim to be derived from or to reflect actual practice or empirical ‘reality' in the 
Community. Kelsen nowhere suggests that his general theory of law can be 
tested in the light o f experience. The correctness of his theory is to be evaluated 
only according to its usefulness in organising and illuminating what we know 
about Community law.
It is another type of theory that is to be evaluated according to the accuracy of 
its portrait of observable reality - a theory which stands in contradistinction to 
the constructivist. ‘Empiricism’ is the name given by Cotterrell to the idea that 
theory is:
“a direct representation of empirical reality, with its concepts derived from 
observation of and generalisation about that reality and so corresponding 
with it and testable for truth against it".8
This is the approach to theory adopted by Hart, whose ‘model of rules’ has been 
variously invoked as the foundation for a theoretical understanding of EC law.9
However, Hart’s empiricism is problematic in the context of the European 
Community. At the birth and during the first years of a new legal order, there is 
not the luxury o f time to develop a theoretical framework “by examining an 
institutional reality represented by this legal order".10 In fact, there is no
8 Cotterrell, The Politics of Jurispnidetice., p.85.
9 See MacCormick, “Beyond the Sovereign State”, and Jones, “The Legal Nature o f  the 
European Community: A Jurisprudential M odel Using H.L.A. Hart’s Model o f  Law and 
Legal System”.
10 Bengoetxea, “Institutions, Legal Theory and EC Law”, p.201.
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‘institutional reality*, only the reality created by our choice of the framework o f 
concepts we assemble in order to interpret this new entity. In the EC this is 
demonstrated by the use, in the debate regarding the nature of the Community, 
of concepts transposed from another age, including that of a legal system.
The concept o f a legal system implies a coherence and unity unfamiliar to the 
‘empirical reality* o f Community law. Yet it is in these terms that Community 
law is described by the Court of Justice. However, concepts cannot stand alone; 
the concept of a legal system is meaningless without an accompanying theory o f 
system, of legality, of a law, and so on. In Kelsen’s theory concepts such as that 
o f a legal system are given their place in this supporting web and provide a 
coherent and extensive theory against which to test the utility of the claims and 
concepts made and used in Community law.
2.1.3 T he law  o f  the C om m unity  or the law o f  the Union?
I have begun this chapter using the label ‘Community1 rather than ‘Union’ legal 
order. This needs some justification: we are no longer subject to the authority 
of a European Community but to that of a Union. I must address a question 
that immediately arises: which law is the object o f my inquiry? The law of the 
European Community or the law of the European Union?
In 1993 the ‘European Communities* were replaced by the ‘European Union*. 
The structure resulting from Maastricht has been described as a temple resting 
upon three pillars. The first pillar is the European Community (based on the 
three original European Communities); the second is the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP); the third Cooperation in the fields ofjustice and Home 
Affairs (CJHA). Curtin, in 1993, refers to this arrangement as being less 
architecturally stable than might appear: she describes the connection between
the pillars as a “loose, tarpaulin-like structure...suspended artificially and 
tenuously above both the loose pillars and the Community as such”.11
Writing several yean later, in 1999, Curtin (with Dekker) notes that European 
legal circles have stubbornly resisted the idea that the European Union 
constitutes a new entity that exists above and beyond the European 
Communities. She argues that many legal books still refer to European 
Community law, and that the CFSP and CJHA are treated as residual subjects.12 
She claims that “a majority of scholan who specialize in European law 
recognize the existence of the European Union as an international organization 
or entity r»i generis existing side by side with the European Communities, but 
deny its unitary structure”.13 The legal system of the European Community, as 
the first pillar, is thus viewed as independent from the other Union pillars. The 
Community is seen as a supranational entity, while the other Union pillars are 
intergovernmental.
Curtin and Dekker document different views on the question: some authors 
deny the existence of the European Union as a subject o f international law at 
all; others argue that the EU has grown into an international legal entity with a 
single legal system that knits together the three pillars.14 They themselves defend 
the thesis that the Treaty on European Union and the evolving legal practices 
since 1993 “indicate that the legal system of the European Union as such is 
developing as an institutional unity”.15 This conclusion is, however, qualified: 
“this unitary institutional legal system creates spaces for developing a variety o f 
sub-legal systems, not only within the Union itself but also within the three
11 Curtin, “The Constitutional Structure o f  the Union: A Europe o f  Bits and Pieces”, p.23.
12 Curtin and Dekker, “The EU as a ‘Layered’ International Organization: Institutional Unity  
in Disguise”, p.83.
13 Curtin and Dekker, op. tit., pp.83-4.
14 See Curtin and Dekker, op. tit., pp.84-5.
15 Curtin and Dekker, op. tit. p.86.
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‘pillars’”.16 The institutional legal system of the HU is therefore ‘unitary’ but also 
‘complex’.
It is clear from Curtin and Dekker’s writing that there is no clear legal picture o f 
the European Union and no consensus of opinion. The Treaty of Amsterdam 
has blurred the line between the Community pillar and the rest of the Union 
even further by, for example, giving the Court of Justice jurisdiction over 
matters falling within the third pillar. To constrict oneself to an analysis only of 
the European Community seems myopic and inaccurate, yet it is also clear that 
the European Community can be distinguished from the other elements of the 
Union. I have in the end used the label ‘Community’ in this chapter, and the 
label ‘Union’ in the subsequent chapters on authority and legitimacy. I have 
done this for clarity’s sake, and also because, as Curtin notes, the ‘tradition’ 
amongst the writers of legal textbooks is to adopt this distinction between the 
Community and Union.
It will become clear, however, that the Kelsenian model of legal system I discuss 
in this chapter and Chapter Three does not confine law within a particular 
boundary, whether state, community or organisation. Laws are defined as such 
according to their relationship with other laws: ultimately, the distinction 
between the laws of the Community and the laws o f the Union has only 
organisational value. Therefore while I use the term ‘the Community legal 
system’, since the majority o f Union norms are to be found under the label of 
the Community pillar, this includes norms that may fall under the other pillars 
of the Union (and, in fact, within the systems o f the Member States). In this, 
narrowly normative, sense (not to be confused with the organisational sense), I 
agree with the thesis that the Union and Community are essentially one system.
16 Ibid.
2.2 Community law: an ‘autonomous legal order’?
t r
The Court of Justice views Community law as forming “an autonomous legal 
order”.17 Yet “the very notion of order is an interpretative notion”:18 on what 
basis is this interpretation of Community law given? In Kelsen’s work can be 
found two possible approaches with which to analyse the Community’s claim to 
autonomy. One focuses on the formal structure of the Community, attempting 
to place it among the categories of unitary State, federation, confederation and 
so on. The other is to use Kelsen’s theory of legal system.
2.2.1 T h e form al character o f  the C om m u n ity  as an international 
structure
Under the rule o f general international law that treaties should be obeyed, 
bodies o f ‘particular’ international law may be created. The Community was set 
up by international treaties and could be viewed as a body of particular 
international law. Kelsen lists several such bodies, which he describes as 
“communities not having the character of states”,19 which may be communities 
of individuals (such as the Roman Catholic Church), or communities o f states 
(confederations, such as the United Nations).
Kelsen’s view is that “every treaty concluded by two or more states constitutes 
an international community”,20 although he is careful to distinguish between 
the nature of the community formed by a treaty establishing a confederation and 
the community formed by a treaty establishing a federal state.21 The first is an 
international, the second a national community. Although both are set up by
17 Case 26 /62 , Van Gend en Loos, [1963] ECR 1.
18 Bengoetxea, “Institutions, Legal Theory and EC Law”, p.203.
19 PIL, p.251.
20 PIL, p.262.
21 PIL, p.262ff. i
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means of a treaty, the treaty of the federation stipulates the constitution of the 
new community, and thus the “community has the character of a state, and the 
constitution the character of national law”.22
The test for the transformation of a community set up under international law 
which takes on the character of a state, with its accompanying independent 
claim to validity, is the degree of the community’s centralization. A federal state 
“presents a degree of centralization that is still compatible with a legal 
community constituted by national law, that is, with a state, and a degree o f 
centralization that is no longer compatible with an international legal 
community, a community constituted by international law”.23
A confederation can thus be identified from three typical characteristics. Firstly, 
its members, as opposed to the central organ or organs, have unrestricted 
competence in foreign affairs (although they may have certain obligations under 
the constituent treaty). Secondly, there is little centralisation o f executive 
power, particularly military power, A confederation will not have its own police 
or armed forces. This entails that war and sanctions are or would be waged and 
executed using the resources of the member states. Thirdly, the central norms of 
the legal order affect only states; individuals are affected only indirectly, through 
their own national legal order.
Is the European Community an international community or a community such 
as a federal state, which has the character of a state? Robert W. Tucker, revising 
and editing Kelsen’s 1952 work Principles of International Law, argues that it is a 
part of international law, a confederation. Writing in 1966, he rejects the view 
that the treaties constituting the European Communities have resulted in a
22 PIL, p.260.
23 PIL, p.262. A legal community may, for example, be validated but not constituted by 
international law. See below for a discussion o f  the possibility that a State legal order is 
validated by international law. However, such an order is not constituted by international law, 
since it has a prima facie claim to autonomy and validity that renders it independent from 
the international legal order.
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federation, or partial federation. Although he describes the Communities as 
having reached “an unusual degree of centralization over certain functions 
traditionally within the domestic jurisdiction of states“,24 in his view that level 
of centralization is not that of “even a partial federation, let alone a 
federation“.25
Tucker gives a number of grounds for his view. He accepts that the norms of 
the Communities do impose obligations directly upon individuals, and that the 
third characteristic o f a confederation is, in this case, closer to that of a 
federation. However, he lists four aspects of the High Authority which 
demonstrate to him the confederal nature of the Communities. Firstly, the High 
Authority has no powers of enforcement. Secondly, it has no competence to 
execute sanctions. Thirdly, the Communities have no police or military forces. 
Lastly, and “perhaps most important“, the treaties place no substantial limitation 
on the contracting parties’ competence in foreign affairs, other than certain 
limitations on economic relations resulting from specific obligations o f  the 
treaties. The Member States thus retain full international personality.
In the well-known Van Gend en Loos26 case of 1962 the Court of Justice 
emphasises the breaking away of the Community from the Member States, but 
seems to offer an endorsement o f Tucker’s view. The Court follows the 
arguments o f the Commission that the Treaty establishes a legal system, not 
merely mutual commitments between states.27 It concludes that “the 
Community constitutes a new legal order o f international law for the benefit o f 
which the states have limited their sovereign rights, albeit within limited fields, 
and the subjects o f which comprise not only Member States but also their
24 PIL, p.264, footnote 89.
25 PIL, p.265, footnote 89.
26 Case 26/62, [1963] E C R  1.
27 Arguments and observations o f the Commission, at p.7.
6 6
nationals*".28 This language fits precisely with Tucker’s ‘Kelsenian* analysis o f the 
European Communities. Although the direct effect o f Community norms 
pushes the Community along the spectrum towards the category of centralised 
federation, it is still a part of international law: the Community may be a new 
legal order but nevertheless remains a legal order o f international law.
Today, however, the Court refers no longer to a ’legal order of international 
law* but simply to a ‘new legal order’.29 So is Tucker’s ‘Kelsenian’ 
characterisation o f the Communities still valid today? Briefly, the Community 
does have powers of enforcement: under Article 226 o f the EC Treaty, the 
Commission can bring proceedings against a defaulting state in the European 
Court. The Community also has power to execute sanctions, under Article 228 
of the EC Treaty. With regard to the Member States’ competences in foreign 
affairs, the Community has enlarged its own competence to the extent that 
“ [the] Court o f Justice can prevent [the Member States] from accepting 
particular rules in an international agreement“.30
However, even with the developments in the Community, it still has no police 
force or army o f its own - a lack which Tucker, following Kelsen, considers 
definitive as excluding the possibility that a community could be constituted by 
anything other than international law. He reiterates that “while the degree o f 
centralization is decisive in determining whether a community of states 
constitutes a federal state, this centralization must comprise the competence 
formerly possessed by the component states in foreign and military affairs’’.31
Yet although the formal degree o f centralization of the EC is that o f a 
confederation, the Community is alleged to have its own constitution and the
28 At p. 12.
29 See, e.g., Re the Draft Treaty on a European Economic Area, Opinion 1/91 (First EEA Case), 
[1991] ECR 6079, para. 21 o f the judgment.
30 Schermers, “Commentary on Opinions 1/91 and 1/92”, p,1004.
31 PIL, p.265, footnote 89,
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internal claim to validity which, for Kelsen, corresponds only to a nation state. 
It is this incongruity which suggests that Kelsen’s spectrum o f legal communities 
may have to open up to accommodate a new category: a community which is 
not constituted by international law but that is not a federation. However, we 
are jumping ahead: it is alleged that the Community is an independent legal 
order, but is this so in terms of Kelsen’s theory? Kelsen’s theory of legal system 
offers a new tack with which to approach this question.
2.2.2 C om m unity law: a legal system?
Any concept of a legal order must rest on a theory o f its constituent parts and o f 
the order-creating relationship between them. Kelsen describes a legal order as a 
system of norms which regulate human behaviour through the medium of 
‘coercive acts’ (sanctions).32 From this description can be teased out three 
strands in Kelsen’s theory of a legal order: the concept of a norm, of a system 
(the unifying relationship between the norms), and of a sanction.
2.2 .2 .1  B ypassing ‘norm* and ‘sanction’
I want to focus particularly on the second strand, the nature o f a system, but first 
I must acknowledge the controversy surrounding both the concept of ‘norm’ 
and ‘sanction’ as found in Kelsen’s work. The European Community lawyer 
will most probably wish to denounce any suggestion that Community law is to 
be equated with ‘norm’, which smacks of a bygone (possibly imaginary) era in 
which law was a clear-cut, rigid set of rules. How can the general principles o f 
Community law, its underlying values, the ‘ethical core’ o f EC law, be 
accommodated within the concept of a norm?
This question deserves a far more detailed response than that which can be 
offered here, but I would like to quickly turn it on its head before moving on. 
Legal systems may contain principles, values, or ‘ethical cores’, but they are
32 PTL, pp. 30-31.
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“governed by juridical norms”.33 Any theory which aims particularly to focus 
on the principled, value-orientated side to law must also provide for the 
obligatory, normative character o f law.
Dowrick, in his consideration of Kelsen’s and Hart’s models of law as applied to 
the European Communities, rejects them on the basis that they ignore the 
presence of principles. Dowrick prefers Ronald Dworkin’s rights-based theory 
which, o f course, is built up around a critique of Hart’s concept o f law.34 The 
existence of the values and principles in European Community law is obviously 
an important part of the Community order, and Ronald Dworkin’s theory has 
also been cited elsewhere as providing the basis for a rights-based, Kantian 
theory o f Community law.35
It may be that on a constructivist evaluation Dworkin’s theory does provide a 
more illuminating tool with which to understand Community law. However, 
one might object that Dworkin’s theory does not so much subvert as 
presuppose central elements in positivistic analyses of law, of which Kelsen’s is 
one. Neil MacCormick argues that Dworkin’s reliance on “constitutive and 
regulative rules”36 to define a legislature “takes us right back either to Kelsen’s 
conception of norms of competence...or Hart’s conception of primary 
rules...” .37 Therefore, there is a question mark over Kelsen’s concept of a norm, 
but it cannot be dismissed a priori.
33 Ward, “Making Sense o f Integration: A Philosophy o f  Law for the European Community”, 
p.132.
34 Dowrick, “A Model o f the European Communities’ Legal System”.
35 Coppel and O ’Neill, “The European Court o f  Justice: Taking Rights Seriously?”; Ward, 
“Making Sense o f  Integration: A Philosophy o f Law for the European Community”.
36 Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, p. 101, quoted in MacCormick, “Jurisprudence 
and the Constitution", p.23.
37 If, as Dworkin’s theory requires, we must refer to a set o f institutions in order to “filter out 
o f background morality a set o f  principles which ‘fit’ the said institutions..., then it follows 
that some procedure must exist for identifying the institutions independently o f either
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2 . 2 . 2 . 2 Law as system: the chain o f  validity
The norms of which a legal system consists are described by the statement 
“something ought to be”, as opposed to “something is”.38 A norm is not just a 
subjective command but has an objective meaning which, since an ‘ought* 
cannot be derived from an ‘is*, can only be conferred upon it by another, 
higher, norm;39 the higher norm confers validity upon the lower. It is this 
conferral o f validity that relates and unifies all the norms o f a particular legal 
system.
The problem of the identification of a norm cannot be separated out from the 
identification of the body of norms to which it belongs. For example, a norm 
may be valid because it has been issued by a legislator. However, that legislator 
must be a competent legislator, and that competence is only conferred by a valid 
norm. Therefore there is a ‘chain of validity’:40 the reason for the validity of any 
norm is a ‘higher’ norm, which in turn is validated by a higher norm, and so on. 
However, the search for validity does not go on indefinitely. It ends with a 
norm which is the highest norm, the ‘basic norm*.41 A plurality of norms thus 
forms a unity, a system, if the validity of the norms can be traced back to a 
single norm as the ultimate basis o f validity.
background morality or a fortiori institutional morality”; see MacCormick, “Jurisprudence 
and the Constitution”, p.24.
38 The statement “something ought to be” describes a norm while the statement “something 
is” describes an existent fact (PTL pp.5-6).
39 Only in this way can the command o f  a gangster be distinguished from the command o f  a 
tax-man.
40 The term ‘chain o f  validity’ is not used by Kelsen but I have adopted it from Raz, The 




Normative relations in Community law
A theory of legal system as including a hierarchy of norms is to be found deeply 
embedded in the life of the Community, from standard textbooks on 
Community law,42 to the European Court of Justice and the founding Treaties. 
The 'chain o f validity’ refers back to the dynamic nature of a legal order,43 
meaning that the validity o f its norms is dependent solely on the act of creation, 
and this is mirrored in the Court’s understanding of Community law as 
organised as a “system of sources”.44
However it must be emphasised here that the chain of validity between the 
norms of a legal system is not to be equated with a schematic representation of a 
legal system arranged into a hierarchy of types of sources. Confusion on this 
score is all too easy, as is shown by the language used in the debate regarding a 
hierarchical schema for the Community legal order. Proposals for the 
introduction of a “hierarchy of legal acts”45 stood alongside proposals for a 
“hierarchy of norms”.46 However, as Joseph Raz puts it, “a law is not identical 
with a statute”;47 similarly, a norm is not identical with a regulation.
Kelsen sets out the structure of a national legal order, listing the constitution, 
legislation, custom and so on as different levels of hierarchy.48 However this is 
not a blueprint for a legal order, as shown by his discussion of the case o f the
42 See, for example, Hartley, The Foundations of European Community Law, Ch.4.
43 Kelsen draws a distinction between a dynamic and a static legal order. In the latter, validity 
is dependent on content, in the former, on creation. See PTL pp. 195-198.
44 Variola v Amministrazione italiana delle Fitiatize, Case 34/73 [1973] ECR 981, paragraph 8 o f  
the judgment.
45 Draft amendment to the EEC Treaty, proposed by the European Parliament, 18 April 1991, 
OJ C l29, 20.5.91, p.136, at p.138.
46 Draft amendment to the EEC Treaty, proposed by the Commission, EC Supplement 2/91  
p. 117, at p. 121.
47 Raz, The Concept of a Legal System, p.71.
48 PTL, p.221.
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United Kingdom, which would not fit his schema.49 Whereas the hierarchical 
chain of validity linking norms is an essential criterion for the existence of a 
legal system, the hierarchical organisation of sources o f law is merely one 
possible characteristic of a legal system.
This point is not appreciated by Dowrick, who concludes that since the 
European Communities’ legal sources do not fit the plan suggested by Kelsen, 
there is no hierarchy between Community law norms. It is arguable whether 
the Community legal order can be organised hierarchically in terms of its 
sources,50 but even if it cannot, as the most extensive study concludes,51 
Kelsen’s criteria for the existence of a legal system remain unaffected.
The view that the validity o f a norm of Community law is ascribed and 
delimited by a higher norm is in fact enshrined in the Treaties and seen clearly 
in cases in which the question of legality is raised. Direct challenges to 
Community acts, for example, can be made under Article 230 of the EC 
Treaty, which provides four grounds of review: (i) lack of competence; 
(ii) infringement o f an essential procedural requirement; (iii) infringement of the 
Treaty or any rule of law relating to its application; and (iv) misuse of powers. 
Cases citing Article 230 (Article 173 before the TA amendments) are explicitly 
brought together under the heading ‘legal basis’, and indeed “every legislative 
measure adopted by the Community institutions should have a legal foundation 
in a Treaty provision, or in an earlier legislative measure itself based upon a 
Treaty provision’’.52
49 GTLS, p.124.
50 Lasok and Bridge, Law and Imtitutiom of the European Communities.
51 Gerd Winter (ed.), Sources and Categories o f European Union Law: A  Comparative and Reform 
Perspective.
52 Bradley, “The European Court and the Legal Basis o f Community Legislation”, p.379. 
Article 253 o f  the EC Treaty provides that legislation must state the reasons upon which it is 
based.
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Thus all challenges regarding the validity of Community acts regress back to the 
Treaty, to compatibility with its norms. In fact, all four grounds o f review may 
be reduced to the third, given a wide enough interpretation: the norms o f EC 
law are valid if their claim to validity can be traced back to ‘higher’ norms - 
norms of the Treaty or, as Article 230 says, “any rule of law relating to its 
application”. Clearly the institutions of the Community view the validity o f EC 
norms in a way consistent with Kelsen’s theory, ascribing validity only if  the 
norm has been created in accordance with another, higher norm.
How far does this view square with Kelsen’s understanding of the chain o f 
validity? He traces a norm of national law back to its root in the basic norm.53 
He takes as an example the hanging of one man by another. This is a legal act if 
it is undertaken in response to a judicial decision which prescribes the execution 
of such a punishment. Why is the judicial decision valid? Because it is an 
application of a criminal law containing norms under which the death penalty 
may be inflicted under certain conditions. This criminal law may have been 
created by a legislature, which is authorised by norms in the national 
constitution to create such general norms.
If we ask from whence is derived the validity of the constitution, we arrive at 
the historically first constitution, which contains norms which do not derive 
their validity from any other norms; it will have been created in a 
‘revolutionary’ way, either by a breach of a former constitution, or in the sense 
that it is applicable to territory formerly not under the sphere of validity o f  a 
constitution. This is the point at which a binding norm must be presupposed as 
conferring validity upon the norms of the constitution, and this norm will be 
the Grundnorm.
In the same way, a norm of Community law can be traced back to its origins. 
As a starting point we may take the decision o f the Commission in 1991 in
53 PTL, pp. 199-201.
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which it refused to allow the take-over of DeHavilland by Aerospatiale and 
Alemia.54 The decision contains a legal norm which forbids the take-over. This 
decision is legally valid because it is an application of a regulation under which 
the Commission can block take-overs given certain conditions.55 The regulation 
was issued by the Council, which is authorised by the Treaties to create such 
general norms.56
The chain of validity becomes more difficult to trace once the validity o f the 
EC Treaty itself is questioned. It must first be clarified that the EC Treaty, as a 
“certain solemn document”,57 would fall within Kelsen’s category o f formal 
constitution.58 In terms of the hierarchical structure o f the legal order, however, 
the constitution must be understood in the material sense, that is, as “the 
positive norm or norms which regulate the creation of general legal norms” .59 
Whereas in most States the formal constitution will contain the mass of the 
norms o f the material constitution, the norms of the material constitution of the 
Community are particularly diffuse and spread between the various Community 
Treaties, Conventions and even decisions of the Council.60
To ask why the norms of the material constitution are valid is to arrive at the 
apex of the chain o f validity. At this point there are three possible sources of the 
authority o f the norms of Community law. They may be valid: (i) because o f a
54 See (IV/M 53) OJ 1991 L334/42.
55 Regulation 4064/89/EEC  (Merger Control Regulation, OJ 1989 L395), under Article 2 o f  
the EC Treaty.




60 For example, the Decision to Replace Financial Contributions from Member States by the 
Communities’ O w n Resources, 21 April 1970, and the Decision on Direct Elections to the 
European Parliament, 20 September 1976, which, Dowrick notes (“A Model o f the 
European Communities’ Legal System”, p.181), rank with general provisions o f  the basic 
Treaties as major constitutional provisions.
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norm of international law, in which case Community law is a pan of 
international law; or (ii) because o f a norm of a Member State legal system, in 
which case Community law is a part of that legal order; or (iii) because a 
Grundnorm may be presupposed in relation to the Community legal order 
which gives it an internal claim to validity.
2.2.2.3 A  G rundnorm  o f  C om m unity  law? N ine hypotheses
The chain of validity of the norms of a legal system ends at the point at which it 
reaches a norm which seems not to derive its validity from any other norm. It is 
the Grundnorm, or basic norm, which confers validity upon this norm. In a 
national legal order, for example, the validity of the constitution may rest on an 
historically older constitution. Eventually we reach the historically first 
constitution, which contains norms that do not derive their validity from any 
other norms.
There are different ways in which we can interpret these norms. They could be 
viewed as normative because they are in accordance with some ethical, 
religious, or otherwise meta-legal norm. Or alternatively, they may not be 
interpreted normatively at all: ‘law* could be viewed as structuring a series of 
power relationships - in other words, it could be interpreted sociologically, not 
juristically.61 However, the concept of the basic norm allows natural law to be 
rejected as the basis of positive law while still understanding the positive law as 
“a valid system, that is, as norm, and not merely as factual contingencies o f 
motivation”.62 In order to interpret law normatively without reference to meta- 
legal authorities, the basic norm that “one ought to behave as the constitution 
prescribes”63 is presupposed.64
61 PTL, p.218.
6 2 IPLT, p.58; PTL p.202, p.218.
63 The basic norm in the case o f  a national legal order may be formulated as follows: 
"Coercive acts sought to be performed under the conditions and in the manner which the
75
The concept of the basic norm is an epistemological tool only: it may but need 
not be presupposed. It is a cognitive, not normative, concept; Kelsen’s theory 
nowhere prescribes that the Grundnorm ought to be obeyed. Kelsen merely 
notes that it is presupposed: “the basic norm makes conscious what most legal 
scientists do, at least unconsciously, when they...consider as law exclusively 
positive law”,64 5 accepting a normative legal order “without basing the validity 
of this order upon a higher, meta-legal norm, that is, upon a norm enacted by 
an authority superior to the legal authority”.66
The basic norm is presupposed when the custom through which the 
constitution has come into existence, or the constitution-creating act, is 
interpreted objectively as a norm-creating fact. In this sense, “the basic norm 
determines the basic fact of law creation and may in this respect be described as 
the constitution in a logical sense o f the word”.67 If the Community’s legal 
order, then, is autonomous, a basic norm is presupposed in relation to its 
material constitution, validating Community law not as a part o f international 
law, or Member State law, but in its own right.
However, there are two complications to the alternative ways in which the law 
of the Community may be interpreted normatively. Firstly, it is perfectly 
possible to argue that the Community was once part of international law, for 
example, but now is an independent legal order. This is so because the 
Grundnorm can change, as highlighted by the case in which the existence (and 
the validity) of an entire legal order is in question. This occurs in the case o f a 
revolution, which in its broader sense refers to every case in which “the valid
historically first constitution, and the norms created according to it, prescribe. (In short: One 






constitution is changed or replaced in a manner not prescribed by the 
constitution valid until then”.68 A large part of the law o f the original 
constitution may be said to ‘remain valid’, but in fact this is misleading. The 
content of these laws remains, but the reason for their validity, in fact the reason 
for the validity o f the whole legal order, has been changed.69 The basic norm no 
longer is presupposed in relation to the old constitution but instead to the new: 
it is through the new constitution that the norms of the legal system are 
validated.
Secondly, Kelsen distinguishes the highest norms o f a legal system as either 
being contained in a written or unwritten constitution. As such, there can be 
two kinds o f Grundnorm: firstly that which validates the constitution 
promulgated by the ‘founding fathers’ and secondly that which validates the 
norm-creating effect of custom within the legal order.70
Even if the Treaties were equivalent to a written constitution for the 
Community, Kelsen notes that even a written constitution may not be the 
constitution in the ‘material’ sense (which comprises all the highest sources 
authorised by the Grundnorm) if it does not stipulate custom as a source of 
law.71 Since custom is a source of Community law but is not specified as such in 
the Treaties, the Community would be placed into the category of ‘customary 
constitution’. This distinction, however, means simply that the chain of validity 
moves from the Grundnorm, to custom, to the Treaties (referring to the 
material constitution contained within them). If custom were to be expressly 
stipulated as a source of Community law, the places of custom and the Treaties 




71 GTLS, p.126; PTL, p.221-224.
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Therefore, not separating out the two different types of basic norm, there are 
nine possible hypotheses regarding the validation and the authority o f 
Community law:
HI: The Community legal order is and always has been validated by a basic 
norm presupposed in relation to it.
H2: The Community legal order was initially validated by its basic norm; a 
‘revolution’ has taken place, and now Community law is validated by a norm o f  
international law.
H3: The Community legal order was initially validated by its basic norm; a 
‘revolution’ has taken place, and now Community law is validated by a norm o f 
a Member State legal order.
H4: The Community legal order is and always has been validated by a norm o f 
international law.
H5: The Community legal order was initially validated by a norm o f 
international law; a ‘revolution’ has taken place, and now Community law is 
validated by a basic norm presupposed in relation to it.
H6: The Community legal order was initially validated by a norm of 
international law; a ‘revolution’ has taken place, and now Community law is 
validated by a norm o f a Member State legal order.
H7: The Community legal order is and always has been validated by a norm of 
a Member State legal order.
H8: The Community legal order was initially validated by a norm of a Member 
State legal order; a ‘revolution’ has taken place, and now Community law is 
validated by a basic norm presupposed in relation to it.
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H9: The Community legal order was initially validated by a norm o f a Member 
State legal order; a ‘revolution* has taken place, and now Community law is 
validated by a norm of international law.
These nine hypotheses could be said to underlie - or at least be compatible with 
- the various judgments regarding the juridical nature of the Community legal 
order.
M odel 1: E C  law as part o f  the law  o f  the M em ber States 
(hypotheses 3 , 6 and 7)
The case for the first model, EC law as part o f the law of the Member States, 
stems from the origin o f the Community as a creation of states. Under this 
model, a Member State has power to make international agreements and create 
new norm-creating bodies outside itself; the norms issued under those 
agreements and by those bodies remain part of that state’s law. In each Member 
State, therefore, Community law is understood as part o f its own legal system.
It is clear that the perspective of the Court o f Justice is strongly against this 
model o f the Community. In Costa v ENEL72 the emphasis of the judgment is 
to clarify the independence of the Community from the legal orders o f the 
Member States. It first asserts that the EEC Treaty, “by contrast with ordinary 
international treaties*’, has created “its oum legal system’’.73 The Court then 
explicitly describes the law stemming from the Treaty as an “independent 
source of law’’, which cannot be “overridden by domestic legal 
pro visions... without being deprived of its character as Community law and 
without the legal basis o f the Community itself being called into question” .74 
The Court thus declares the autonomy of the Community legal order as




compared with the interna] legal orders of the Member States early on in the life 
of the Community.
As Neil MacCormick puts it, the perspective o f the judges of the Court o f 
Justice “on the law they administer is, and perhaps necessarily, that o f a single 
legal system with a single and common ground of validity. They do not 
conceptualise Community law as a set o f commonly agreed norms that belong 
strictly to as many legal systems as there are Member States..., having no special 
systemic validity o f their own”.75 Effectively, the Community system does not 
accept its foundation upon a norm of a Member State.
The hypothesis that Community law has at any time formed part of Member 
State law (which would, by excluding international law, mean one single 
Member State) certainly does not reflect Community practice up to now. The 
flip side of this model would be Schilling’s claim that “the Member States, 
individually, must have the final word on questions concerning the scope of the 
competences they have delegated to the Community”.76 As Weiler and Haltem 
point out, however, this would be a “pragmatic nightmare” and in fact “the 
High Contracting Parties established such elaborate provisions for centralized 
judicial review in order to, among other reasons, escape the pragmatic 
nightmare...” .77
Whatever the arguments for and against adopting this hypothesis, it is clear that 
although it raises its head in particular, one might say peculiar, cases,78 it would 
be misleading in the extreme to say that it gives the most useful tool with which
75 MacCormick, “Liberalism, Nationalism, and the Post-Sovereign State”, p.148.
76 Schilling, “The Autonomy o f the Community Legal Order - An Analysis o f  Possible 
Foundations”, p.407.
77 Weiler and Haltem, “The Autonomy o f  the Community Legal Order. -  Through the 
Looking Glass”, p.433.
78 See, for example, the Brunner decision: Judgment o f  Oct. 12, 1993, BverfG, 89 BVerfGE 
155 (Brunner v  Treaty on European Union); English translation [1994] 1 CM LR 57-108.
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to describe the workings of Community law. Particularly by ignoring the 
Member States* use of international law, it misleads rather than illuminates.
M odel 2: E C  law  as part o f  international law  (hypotheses 2 , 4, 
and 9)
Given the strength of claims that “[a]t least at its inception, the European 
Community was a creature of international law’*,79 H4 is to be preferred over 
H4 and H9. As part of the system of international law, the authority of 
Community law would rest upon the norm of international law which provides 
that treaties contain legally binding norms: the norm pacta sunt servanda. The 
Community would therefore be a community o f international law, what Kelsen 
terms ‘particular international law*, like communities such as the United 
Nations, and would be subject to the same rules of amendment and 
interpretation.
However, the Court of Justice has consistently held that the Treaties are not 
mere international agreements80 and will not be interpreted as if they were.81 
Development o f the doctrines of direct effect and supremacy of Community 
law are referred to as the hallmarks o f the so-called ‘process of 
constitutionalization’ of the Treaties. In Easson’s words, “[w]hat are in their 
initial conception multipartite treaties have been transformed into constitutional 
documents”.82
The constitutionalization debate is, in terms of the nine hypotheses, the debate 
between H4, that the Community is and always has been validated by a norm of 
international law, and H5, that the Community legal order was initially
79 Schilling, op. at., p.403.
80 E.g. Van Gettd,, Case 26/62, [1963] ECR 1; Costa v ENEL, Case 6 /64 , [1964] ECR 585.
81 See, e.g., Polydor, Case 270/80, [1982] E C R  329.
82 Easson, “Legal Approaches to European Integration: The Role o f  the Court and Legislator 
in the Completion o f  the European Common Market”, p.103.
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validated by a norm of international law; a ‘revolution’ has taken place, and 
now Community law is validated by a basic norm presupposed in relation to it. 
The arguments will be considered in more detail below, but it suffices to say at 
this point that the only conclusion can be that the question is open to debate. 
One author considers the Treaties to be a constitution, another that thev remain 
international treaties.
The indeterminacy is such that even the same ‘speaker’ can change opinion. 
Schilling cites the German Federal Constitutional Court (the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht) as “ [balking] at the claim o f the ECJ that the 
European Treaties are the constitution of an autonomous legal order”,83 yet the 
same court twenty years earlier describes the Community legal order as “an 
independent system of law flowing from an autonomous legal source” .84 It is 
uncertain whether the Community remains based upon a norm of international 
law, or whether there has been an effective change to the highest norms of the 
system rendering the Community autonomous.
According to Schilling, his conclusion, that international law is still the basis o f 
the Community order, is “based upon the Kelsenian approach”.85 Entirely 
contrary to this is the thrust o f this thesis, which argues that Kelsen’s theory 
demands no leaps into one camp or the other. In fact, it is suggested below that 
a ‘Kelsenian approach’ offers a way to accommodate the state of indeterminacy 
that is to be found regarding the “is” or “is not” question o f the Community’s 
autonomy.
83 Schilling, "The Autonomy o f  the Community Legal Order - An Analysis o f  Possible 
Foundations", p.397, referring to Brunner.
84 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft v EVGF , decision o f  the Bundesverfassungsgericht, 29 May 
1974, [1974] 2 CM LR  at 549, para. 19 o f the judgment.
85 Schilling, op. cit.t p.398.
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M odel 3: C om m u n ity  law as an independent system  (hypotheses  
1, 5 and 8)
Although the debate has focused most sharply on the ‘constitutionalization’ 
process within the Community, which argument matches the fifth hypothesis 
(H5), there is also support for the view that the Community is and always has 
been an autonomous legal order; that it is and always has been validated by a 
basic norm presupposed in relation to it. Joxerramon Bengoetxea, for example, 
describes the Treaties as “performative-constitutive speech acts which institute 
their own authority by the mere formal act by which they come into being“.86
However, to characterise the Community legal system as enjoying, in Schilling’s 
words, an ‘original constituent autonomy’,87 obscures the early interpretation 
and effective nature of the Treaties as no more than international agreements 
and not a constitution.88 The Community may have had characteristics unusual 
to a community of international law but its original internationalism is evident 
in the attitude both of the Community institutions themselves and o f the 
Member States.
The question o f the autonomy of the legal order is focused upon H5, that the 
Community legal order was initially validated by a norm of international law; a 
‘revolution’ has taken place, and now Community law is validated by a basic 
norm presupposed in relation to it. As noted above, the basic norm can change 
if the legal order of a community is changed in a way not anticipated or 
prescribed by the first order itself To show that the basis of the authority o f the 
Community order has changed and that a basic norm is now presupposed in 
relation to it, it is therefore necessary to demonstrate that three limbs of this test
86 Bengoetxea, “Institutions, Legal Theory and EC Law”, p.207.
87 Schilling, op. a t pp.390-395.
88 E.g. Pescatore notes two occasions on which the Treaties were amended through 
international law as opposed to the procedures prescribed within them: Pescatore, L'ordre 
juridique des Communautés europeêtines, pp.62-63.
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are fulfilled: firstly that the Community legal order has changed, secondly that it 
has changed effectively, and thirdly that that change has taken place in a manner 
not anticipated or provided by the original order.
Has the Community legal order changed?
This question immediately raises another: to what extent must the legal order be 
different in order to judge that it has ‘changed’? On Kelsen’s discussion o f 
revolutions, it would seem that it has ‘changed’ if new norms of the order are 
no longer compatible with the old Grundnorm: a new Grundnorm must be 
presupposed in relation to those new norms. Therefore the Community legal 
order has changed if there are now norms which are incompatible with the 
understanding of the Community as resting on the norm o f international law 
which validates treaties. Thus norms o f Community law which exclude or 
directly contradict the norms o f international law regarding the interpretation 
and operation of treaties would be evidence of a ‘revolution’ in Community 
law.
It is important to emphasise that these tests differ in certain respects from the 
arguments adduced in favour o f the process of constitutionalization of the 
Treaties. Discussing the juridical nature o f the Community, Jacqué puts the 
debate in terms o f ‘international treaty or constitution’.89 However, the concept 
of ‘constitution* used in contradistinction to ‘treaty’ resembles more closely not 
the ‘logical constitution* as Grundnorm but Kelsen’s category of written 
constitution.
In this context, the constitution is to be understood in the ‘logical sense* o f 
Kelsen’s various senses of the word, by which is meant simply the norm or 
norms that determine how the general norms of the legal order that constitute
89 Jacqué, “Cours généralde de droit communautaire”, p.256: “Il n’est pas indifférent de savoir 
si l’on doit qualifier le Traité de traité international ou de constitution.”
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the Community are to be created.90 In this sense, every constitutive charter of 
an international charter is a constitution, and that is in fact how Kelsen describes 
the charter of the United Nations.91
The issue here is therefore not a choice between international treaty and 
constitution, but whether that ’logical constitution’ is composed of a norm of 
international law, or by a Grundnorm, a norm not of any positive legal system 
but a norm presupposed in relation to Community law in order to comprehend 
it as a normative order. It asks whether the highest norms of the Community, 
those regarding the validity of Treaties, have changed from norms of 
international law regarding the legality of all treaties, to a norm which presumes 
the Community to be valid on its own terms.
Jacqué, in his discussion of the process of ‘constitutionalization*, concludes that 
the term ‘constitution’ must entail a certain level of content, that it must be the 
“porteuse d’un projet social, d’un idéal de société”.92 It could be argued that 
Kelsen’s theory relating to changes in the Grundnorm also requires this 
understanding o f constitution, since in a typical revolution the ‘projet social’ is, 
clearly, changed, and a new constitution inaugurated. However, the present 
reading o f Kelsen’s theory on this point relies on his extremely broad definition 
of a revolution as any process in which the valid constitution is amended or 
replaced in a way that it itself did not provide for. This definition, it is 
suggested, would include a quiet change in the Community’s constitutive 
norms, without demanding a reconsideration of the Community’s ‘projet 
social’.
It is also true, however, that the concept of a constitution normally includes the 
claim to autonomy or presupposition of independence that is embodied in
90 PTL, p.198.
91 Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations, p,330.
92 Jacqué, “Cours généralde de droit communautaire”, p.267.
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Kelsen’s theory by the concept of the basic norm. The claim to autonomy is 
usually made in terms of the claim to a constitution.
Since Van Gend93 the Court has developed its vision of the Community to the 
extent that the Treaties are now understood to be a “constitutional charter o f  a 
Community based on the rule of law”, establishing a new legal order, as opposed 
to a ‘standard’ international treaty (the EEA Agreement) of a ‘normal’ 
intergovernmental character’.94 It would seem that in the eyes of the Court o f  
Justice, the Community is no longer constituted by international law but has a 
claim to autonomy and validity independent of any legitimation by norms o f  
international law.
This claim regarding the constitutional nature o f the Treaties has been 
repeatedly made since the first use o f the phrase ‘constitutional charter’ by the 
Court in its judgment in Les Verts.95 Neither are the claims of independence 
restricted only to the ECJ. The German Federal Constitutional Court 
(Bundesverfassungsgericht), for example, describes Community law as an order 
which “is neither a component of the national legal system nor international 
law, but forms an independent system o f law flowing from an autonomous legal 
source”.96
There are also strong arguments to show that the Community operates without 
reference to norms of international law.'As Jacque points out, the constitutional 
(for our purposes, changed) nature of the Treaties shows itself in the exclusion
93 Van Genâ, Case 26 /62 , [1963] E C R  1.
94 Opinion 1/91, 14 December 1991, [1991] ECR 1-6079, para. 21 o f  the judgment.
95 Les Verts-Parti Ecologiste v European Parliamentt Case 294/83, [1986] E C R  1339, para. 23 o f  
the judgment.
96 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft v EVGFf decision o f  the Bundesverfassungsgericht, 29 May 
1974, [1974] 2 C M LR  at 549, para. 19 o f  the judgment.
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of rules of international law in the case of their revision.97 Under international 
law, the parties to a treaty may revoke or change it at any time, even 
disregarding provisions within the treaty establishing a special procedure to be 
followed.98 If the procedures provided in the Community treaties99 are binding 
on the Member States, who could not therefore amend or revoke them in the 
way provided by international law, it would suggest that the Community legal 
order has changed.
Pescatore points out that the Treaties have in fact been revised without recourse 
to the prescribed procedures, in accordance with international law: firstly in the 
Treaty of 27 October 1956, regarding the return of the Saar to Germany, and 
secondly in the Convention on Certain Institutions Common to the European 
Communities, signed at the same time as the EEC and Euratom Treaties.100
However, both these cases occurred early on in the history of the Community. 
Since then, the Court of Justice has put its opinion on the side of the mandatory 
nature of the Treaty amendment procedures. In Defrenne, the Court says that, 
apart from expressly recognised exceptions in the Treaty itself, the EC Treaty 
“can only be modified by means of the amendment procedure carried out in 
accordance with Article 236”.101 The Council has expressed the same 
opinion.102 Since under international law such a restriction would be illegal, it 
seems that the Community legal order now contains norms incompatible with a
97 Jacqué, “Cours générale de droit communautaire”, p.269: “Le caractère constitutionnel des 
traités se manifeste essentiellement dans l’exclusion du jeu des règles de droit international en 
ce qui concerne la révision des traités”.
98 Under the Vienna Convention on the Law o f  Treaties, signed on 23 May 1968.
99 The procedure laid down by the Treaties regarding their revision is to be found in Article 
48 o f the TEU, which has replaced the Article 236 procedure through the amendments 
made by the TEU and TA.
100 pescatore, L'ordre juridique des Communautés européennes, pp.62-63.
101 Defrenne v Sabena, Case 43/75 [1976] E C R  455, at para. 58 o f  the judgment. Article 236 
o f the EC Treaty has been replaced by a similarly worded Article 48 in the TEU.
102 Reply o f  the Council to written question 398/77, OJ C 270, 10 November 1977, 18.
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Community basic norm of pacta sunt sewanda and has therefore changed. 
However, is this change a ‘revolutionary’ change?
Has the change in the Community legal order taken place in a manner not 
anticipated or provided for by the original order?
This test means that the changes in the Community order must be illegitimate 
in terms of the international legal system. Norms which would prevent 
amendments being made to the Treaties outside the provisions of those Treaties 
themselves are in direct contradiction to the norms o f international law 
contained in the Vienna Convention regarding the amendment and annulment 
of treaties. Therefore, assuming that the Community legal order now contains 
those norms, there has been a revolutionary change which is illegal from the 
viewpoint of international law. Is this change effective, however?
Has the Community legal order changed effectively?
It is this question that can be answered neither in the positive nor in the 
negative. According to Kelsen, a norm is effective if, firstly, it is obeyed, and, 
secondly, if not obeyed, the sanction is applied by the official whom the norm 
directs to apply it.103 It would initially seem that the norms in question are 
obeyed and will continue to be obeyed. With regard to Article 236, for 
example, Cruz Vilaça and Piçarra conclude that “l’article 236 constitue pour les 
Etats membres une disposition indubitablement obligatoire” and that “les Etats 
membres ne peuvent, d’un commun accord, se prévaloir des principes relatifs à 
la révision des traités en droit international pour méconnaître les limites 
formalles et processuelles à la révision du traité prévues à l’article 236”.104 Jacqué
103GTLS p.62, PTL p.116.
104 da Cruz Vilaça and Piçarra, “Y a-t-il des limites matérielles à la révision des traités 
instituant les communautés européennes?”, p.16.
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also notes that “rattachement au respect de la procédure de l’article 236 parait 
général”.105
However, they also note that “malgré tout, une décision unanime des Etats 
membres réunirait, de facto, les conditions pour mettre un terme à la 
Communauté européenne et à son order juridique ou pour en modifier 
radicalement sa nature”.106 There has been no opportunity to verily, since the 
development of express norms limiting revision of the Community treaties, that 
a breach of those limits would give rise to a sanction. Arguments that the 
Community is effectively autonomous are met with arguments that it is 
effectively a part of international law: the question o f effectiveness is not 
resolved.
2.3 Indeterminate autonomy: embracing
difference through fiction
Harris notes that in these cases, in which “a revolution is literally in balance”, 
the question whether the Grundnorm has or has not changed “is nevertheless 
‘objective’ in the same way that any judgment about future matters of fact is 
objective”. However, “[n]o such judgment can be made with certainty and 
many such judgments turn out to have been wrong”.107
If the Community were to have a Grundnorm presupposed in relation to it, the 
form of the Grundnorm would validate the norm-creating effect o f custom.108 
Kelsen does not give a suggested form of a Grundnorm which is presupposed in 
the case of a national legal order whose constitutional norms have been 
established by custom, but following that of international law, it would have the
105 Jacque, "Cours generalde de droit communautaire”, p.272.
106 da Cruz Vila^a and Pi^arra, op. cit., p.37.
107 Harris, "When and Why Does the Grundnorm Change?” p.122.
108 This is so in the absence o f a written constitutional norm validating custom as a source o f  
law: see infra p. 19.
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form: “ Coercive acts ought to be carried out under the conditions, and in the 
manner, that conforms with the custom constituted by the actual behaviour o f  
the members o f the Community“.109 Yet in the absence o f a decisive resolution 
of the question o f effectiveness, it is precisely this ‘actual behaviour’ that is 
indeterminate.
For the Hartian this is a problem. O n Hart’s theory, Community law does not 
exist as a legal system without a ‘rule o f recognition’, which is a rule which 
provides “authoritative criteria for identifying primary rules o f obligation’’.110 
This rule o f recognition exists as a matter o f fact: it exists “as a complex, but 
normally concordant, practice o f the courts, officials, and private persons in 
identifying the law by reference to certain criteria’’.111
The existence o f the rule of recognition is therefore subject to a sociological 
test. A body of law exists as a system only if there is actual and observable 
acceptance of a particular rule which describes the criteria that must be used to 
identify the rules o f that system. There are two ways in which such an empirical 
test is inappropriate for the Community. Firstly, only massive and detailed 
sociological research could give any inkling of the criteria employed by each 
official o f the Community system. Secondly, to require ‘concordant’ practice is 
to chase a chimera through the Community, in which the officials of the system 
may not even know upon which fundamental criteria they should identify 
Community norms.
109 Kelsen’s suggested Grundnorm o f  international law is: “Coercion o f  State against State 
ought to be exercised under the conditions and in the manner, that conforms with the 
custom constituted by the actual behaviour o f  the States” (PTL, p.216). Kelsen also suggests 
that custom is created by an act o f will “individual or collective” (pp.225-226), which Harris 
interprets as authorising the population at large “to fashion the ultimate norms o f the 
constitution in any way which meets with general approval”: Harris, “When and W hy Does 
the Grundnorm Change?", p . l l l .  Harris thus formulates the Grundnorm o f the United 
Kingdom (which has no written constitution) as: "Coercive acts ought to be applied only 
under the conditions and in the ways customarily recognised as constitutional from time to 
time by the population at large” (p .l l l ) .  Harris’ interpretation has been followed here.
110 CL, p.97.
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Hart’s idea of a single rule containing criteria o f recognition may have been 
adequate for 1950s Britain, in which there was little uncertainty about the 
criteria o f recognition of the system’s norms. Although Hart offers no detailed 
empirical evidence to demonstrate that the grand part of English officials 
identify the norms of the English legal system on the basis o f generally accepted 
practice such as that ‘whatever the Queen in Parliament enacts is law’, his 
assertion that this was so was accepted since for all intents and purposes this was 
what happened. With the advent and development o f the Community, 
however, this complacency can no longer be accepted. Apart from the myriad 
opinions on the nature of the Community legal order, the effect of Community 
law directly into the systems of the Member States renders each official a 
member of not just one legal system, but two, compounding the problem o f 
empirical substantiation.
Perhaps this is only a practical objection to Hart’s theory and should not be 
exaggerated. However, there are more fundamental objections to the nature o f 
the rule of recognition as an empirical criterion. The ‘identity crisis’ of the 
Community legal order arises because officials know that they cannot 
capriciously decide to accept particular criteria of recognition. In Harris* words, 
“ [ojfficials accept rules as members of their systems, not because they choose to 
recognize them, but because they are bound to recognize them”.112 This must 
apply to the rule o f recognition just as to every other rule of law. Yet what is to 
be done in a situation of indeterminacy such that it is not clear what rule the 
official is bound to recognize?
The Community official, on Hart’s theory, must simply choose: he must apply 
either the norms of international law, or a norm which prescribes that ‘whatever 
is enacted under the Treaties is law’, otherwise there is no Community legal 
system. Thus it becomes clear that Hart’s theory equates the choice of a norm 1
111 CL, p.107.
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with the validity, or binding force o f a norm: the official is forced into 
concluding, illogically, that ‘this norm is recognized, therefore it ought to be 
recognized’. As was argued in Chapter One, Hart implausibly reduces the 
normativity (the authority) o f law to the mere fact o f its effectiveness.
Kelsen’s theory of legal system avoids the difficulties associated with the 
‘identity crisis’ since, for him, there is no necessity to identify an actual 
fundamental rule of the legal system which provides that system’s unifying 
criterion of validity. This is because the Grundnorm is not a sociological entity: 
“no amount of empirical enquiry can establish that it does or does not exist as a 
psychological or sociological phenomenon”.12 13
As opposed to the rule of recognition, which must be open to sociological 
proof, the content o f the Grundnorm does not have to be subject to a process o f 
verification.114 O n the contrary, it is “an aid to thinking” 115 that is to be 
understood as a fiction: “the presupposition of the basic norm is a typical case o f 
a fiction in the sense o f Vaihinger’s Philosophic des Als-Ob”.116
A fiction in this sense “is characterized by its...containing contradiction within 
itself’.117 It is not “a presupposition about reality which is in principle 
verifiable”, it is “a construct which is ‘o f service to discursive thought’” .118 As 
such, the uncertainty as to the efficacy o f the various possible highest norms o f 
the Community legal order does not undermine or refute Kelsen’s theory o f
112 Hams, Law and Legal Science, p.74.
113 Harris, “When and W hy Does the Grundnorm Change?“, p.117, footnote 57a.
114 See Hughes, “Validity and the Basic N orm ”, particularly pp.699-701, for an opposing 
view.
115 Kelsen, “The Function o f  a Constitution”, p.117.
116 Kelsen, “O n the Pure Theory o f  Law”, p.6.
117 Kelsen, “The Function o f  a Constitution”, p,117.
118 Harris, Law and Legal Science, p.79, referring to H. Vaihinger, The Philosophy of *As I f  
(1924), pp.85-90.
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legal system. In fact, it has the beneficial effect of spotlighting the real 
battleground of the Community ‘revolution’: the parliaments and governments 
and people of Europe. Do wrick complains that “the absence of a clearly 
recognised basic norm only serves to highlight the various sources o f EC law 
and their rivalry for supremacy”.119 But this is precisely the strength of the 
Grundnorm analysis: it is futile to offer a theory that ignores the difference, 
diversity, and indeterminacy that permeate Community law.
This is true as much for the subject o f the next section, the relationship between 
the Member State, international and Community legal orders, as for the 
independence of the Community legal system. Kelsen's theory of legal system 
allows us to proceed as if the European Community were an autonomous legal 
order, a basic norm presupposed in relation to it. Yet the theme of diversity 
continues, as Kelsen offers again an angle from which to embrace a plurality o f 
visions of the authority of the Community legal system.












In the last chapter, I tried to show how the existence of the European 
Community as a legal system or as an autonomous legal order is not an 
empirically verifiable fact, but a particular understanding that is the result of a 
decision to adopt a particular point of view. The detached normative 
perspective showed us how various hypotheses about the source of the 
Community’s independence and authority cannot, from that perspective, be 
resolved without personal choice. In this chapter I consider further the authority 
of European Community law and the implications o f Community authority for 
the classic theory of Member State sovereignty. I shall continue to refer to the 
Community rather than the Union although, as I hope to have shown in 
Chapter Two, the chain of norms does not respect organisational labels.
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3.1 Authority and sovereignty
One of the fundamental qualities o f law is that it is, or at least claims to be, 
authoritative. W e may have various reasons for action, but a reason which is 
legal is a reason which claims precedence over the others. To say that the law 
has authority means that it is normative; it imposes obligations upon its subjects. 
To have authority, suggests Kelsen, is to have “the right or power to issue 
obligating commands“.1
Why is our law authoritative? The answer to this question, posed in the context 
of the traditional nation State, is sovereignty. The law has authority because it is 
created by an authority - the sovereign. The ‘sovereign’ may be a monarch, or 
parliament, or any other particular institution, or it may be a specific collectivity 
such as the people or the nation. Whatever or whoever the holder o f 
sovereignty is finally determined to be, sovereignty refers, in a loose sense, to 
the ultimate source of authority within the State.2
Anzilotti contrasts this ‘internal’ concept of sovereignty with the ‘external’, by 
which is meant that a sovereign State has over it no other authority than that o f 
international law.3 Both the internal and external concepts o f sovereignty are 
connected, however, since sovereignty refers to that area o f conduct in which 
the State is autonomous;4 if in fact there is some form of international authority 
to which the State is subject, both its external and internal sovereignty will be 
limited to that extent.
1 GTLS, p.383. The concept o f authority is discussed more fully below, in Chapter Four.
2 See de Witte, “Sovereignty and European Integration: The W eight o f  Legal Tradition", 
pp.146-7. D e W itte clarifies that this is a ‘loose’ definition because it may not correspond to 
the understanding o f  sovereignty used within a particular State (p.147).
3 Anzilotti, Individual Opinion in the Austro-German Customs Regime case, PCIJ Ser. A /B  
no.41 (1931), 57, cited by de Witte, op. cit., p.146.
4 See CL, p.217.
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Clearly, the European Community is an authority external to the Member 
States, an authority which has an impact on their sovereignty. As the debates on 
the expansion of the Union and on the process of monetary union demonstrate, 
one of the most sensitive issues within the European Union is the protection o f 
national sovereignty in relation to the phenomenon of increasing power at the 
European level. However, it cannot be doubted that the Member States no 
longer have the traditional sovereignty of action they once enjoyed. As 
Marquardt puts it, “ [t]he Member States have all accepted a regime in which 
the national government is no longer the supreme law-making authority within 
the state and national authorities can find themselves without authority to act in 
the face of superior Community law...Despite frequent invocation of the 
rhetoric of national parliamentary sovereignty, especially in Britain, it is already 
gone in its absolute form”.5
The British experience is a good example of the effect that the competing 
authority of European Community law has had upon the Member States’ 
traditional doctrines of sovereignty. In the United Kingdom, the classic 
statement of the doctrine o f the sovereignty of parliament comes from 
Blackstone: ‘‘True it is, that what the parliament doth, no authority upon earth 
can undo”.6 Parliament, in Dicey’s words, has the right to “make or unmake 
any law whatever”.7 However, since the judgment o f the House of Lords in the 
Factortame case,8 true it is no longer; the House in this case upheld the 
supremacy of European Community law over later British statutory law. 
According to Wade, the result is that “while Britain remains in the Community 
we are in a regime in which Parliament has bound its successors successfully,
5 Marquardt, “Subsidiarity and Sovereignty in the European Union", p.634.
6 Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Law of England, Vol. I, Book 2, p. 161, discussed 
in Craig, “Public Law, Sovereignty and Citizenship", pp.320-324.
7 Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, p.40,
8 R v Secretary of State for Transport ex parte Factortame Ltd (No. 2), [1991] 1 All ER. 70.
99
and which is nothing if not revolutionary”.9 In Wade’s opinion, the “only 
remnant of the old unqualified sovereignty is Parliament’s ability to legislate in 
deliberate breach of the Treaty” .10
What does legal theory make of these changes? Austin’s theory of law, for 
example, gives the concept o f a sovereign pride of place. He defines law as a 
species of command, supported by the threat of sanctions, and issued directly o r 
indirectly by the sovereign of a political society. This sovereign, according to  
the interpretation of Austin given by Hart in his well-known critique o f  
Austin’s theory,11 must be identifiable as a particular person or group of persons 
(Austin himself identified the electors as constituting the sovereign body).12 
MacCormick has shown how implausible this concept o f law is in the context 
of the overlapping Member State and Community legal systems, in which even 
widening the theory to accommodate shared delegation o f power by a group o f  
sovereigns fails to satisfactorily explain the source of authority in the 
Community.13
In Austin’s defence, it must be noted that Hart and MacCormick’s 
interpretation o f his work as demanding that law stem from identifiable 
individuals or persons has not gone unchallenged: Cotterrell, for example, 
argues that although Austin writes of the sovereign as a person (for example, an 
absolute monarch) or a body of persons (for example, the electorate o f a 
democracy), he “always means by the sovereign the office or institution which 
happens to hold supreme authority; never the individuals who happen to hold 
that office or embody that institution through their relationships at any given
9 Wade, “Sovereignty — Revolution or Evolution?“, p.571. For a detailed examination o f  the 
future o f  the British doctrine o f parliamentary sovereignty after the Factortame judgment, see 
also Craig, “Sovereignty o f  the United Kingdom Parliament after Factortame
10 Wade, "What has Happened to the Sovereignty o f  Parliament?”, p.3.
11 See CL, chapters 2 to 4.
12 See CL, p.72.
13 MacCormick, “Beyond the Sovereign State”, pp.4-5.
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time”.14 According to Cotterrell, Austin’s sovereign is an abstraction, simply the 
“location o f the ultimate power which allows the creation of law in a society”.15
This abstract conception of sovereignty is far more promising, but is still tainted 
by the problems inherent in Austin’s over-simplistic characterisation of law as 
constituted by orders backed by threats and sustained by a habit of obedience. 
Whatever the merits of Hart’s interpretation of Austin’s concept of sovereignty, 
his critique of Austin’s general theory does accurately pinpoint its failure to 
account for the ‘internal point of view’ and the normativity -  and authority - o f 
law.16 To understand sovereignty entails understanding the nature of the 
authority o f the law-makers. Within legal philosophy this requires that our 
theory of law is able to distinguish between two contrasting things: on the one 
hand, large-scale voluntary co-operative organisations, and on the other, 
systematic control by gangsters.17 Austin’s theory fails in this respect: his 
commands and sanctions would be consistent with ‘sovereign’ gangsters.
Austin’s mistake is to ground sovereignty in the political ‘fact’ of the seat o f 
power within a State. Sovereignty becomes simply the power to command, and 
therefore sovereignty, as the expression of power, is prior to the law. But this, as 
Kelsen argues, is “ in truth nothing other than the expression of the facticity o f 
the law”:18
“Physical power, a mere natural phenomenon, can never be ‘sovereign’ in 
the proper sense of the word. Only a normative order can be ‘sovereign’, 
that is to say, a supreme authority, the ultimate reason for the validity o f
14 Cotterrell, The Politics of Jurisprudence, p.67.
15 Ibid.
16 See the discussion infra., Chapter One.
17 This point is put with great clarity by Anscombe in “On the Source o f  the Authority o f the 
State”, p.143.
18 Kelsen, Il problema della sovranità, at p.47. For a discussion ofK elsen’s critique o f Austinian 




norms which one individual is authorised to issue as ‘commands’ and other 
individual are obliged to obey”.19
Sovereignty and authority, which are normative, cannot be so reduced to a set
of factual conditions. Instead, sovereignty should be redefined as the ultimate
0
source of legal authority within a state: “la souveraineté est un caractère de l’Etat 
parce qu’elle est un caractère du droit” .20
If Kelsen’s view that sovereignty must be analysed with reference to its 
connection to law and legal authority is accepted, the most difficult issue in the 
Community context becomes that of the relationship between the legal orders 
of the Member States, European Community and international community. 
The older problem of the relationship between the international and national 
legal orders is traditionally resolved through the adoption o f either the ‘monist’ 
or ‘dualist’ doctrines. Under the dualist conception, the international and 
national legal systems are considered to be independent and separate. Norms o f 
international law, such as those of an treaty, are not valid within the national 
legal order until they have been explicitly incorporated into domestic law. The 
monist view, on the contrary, perceives national and international law to be one 
unified system, and so norms o f international law are immediately valid within 
the national order.
Kelsen argues that a monistic construction is ‘inevitable’ -  a position which 
initially seems glaringly mistaken given the express adoption in many countries 
of a dualist approach. Here however we are not discussing the choice between 
monism and dualism within a particular legal system, but the theoretical 
problem of the relationship between any two or more legal orders which 
normatively overlap (by which is meant that norms from both systems may
19 GTLS, p.383.
20 Kelsen, “Les rapports de système entre le droit interne et le droit international public", 
p.255.
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claim to regulate the same behaviour o f the same people at the same time). 
Kelsen is speaking not of organisational but of cognitive unity. Referring to the 
European Community, Neil MacCormick expressly contrasts Kelsen’s monistic 
theory with a “pluralistic or polycentric approach” based on Hart's theory o f 
law, claiming superiority for the latter.21 It will be argued here, however, that 
Kelsen’s monist theory is compatible with the individuality and autonomy of 
the Member States’ legal orders, and that his model offers, paradoxically, far 
more scope for a pluralistic approach to the relationship between the 
international, national, and Community legal orders.
3.2 Relationships between legal orders: Hart
Various authors have suggested that an approach based upon Hart’s concept of 
law offers the best theory of the way they interact. MacCormick, for example, 
has argued that a Haitian approach has the advantage of “ [relativising] questions 
of system and validity, without excluding possibilities o f interaction and 
overlapping between systems”.22 Hart’s theory is said to give the basis for a 
pluralistic conception of law as system, as opposed to Kelsen’s monistic model; a 
conception which “allows of the possibility that different systems can overlap 
and interact, without necessarily requiring that one be subordinate or 
hierarchically inferior to the other or some third system”.23
21 MacCormick, “Beyond the Sovereign State”, p.9
22 MacCormick, “Beyond the Sovereign State”, p.6. It must be said immediately that 
MacCormick has since changed his position to a form o f  Kelsenian monism, a shift which is 
discussed below. However, Hart’s theory o f  law has been variously invoked and the 
preference for Kelsen’s theory here expressed cannot be justified without a consideration o f  
Hart. MacCormick’s original Hartian analysis is used as a subject for critique here since it 
remains the most fully developed with regard to the relationship between legal orders. See, 
for other Hartian analyses, Jones, “The Legal Nature o f  the European Community: A  
Jurisprudential Model Using H.L.A. Hart’s Model o f Law and Legal System”; Starr, “Hart’s 
Rule o f Recognition and the EEC”.
23 MacCormick, ibid, p.8.
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In Hart’s theory, the validity and authority of laws is founded upon the rule ot 
recognition, which contains the “authoritative criteria for identifying primary 
rules o f obligation” .24 MacCormick develops his argument for a Haitian 
approach to Community law by giving the oudines o f two possible rules o f  
recognition, one for the law o f the UK and the other for the law of the EC. He 
writes:
“[F]rom the point of view of UK law (and mutatis mutandis for other 
Member States), the grounds of validity of Community law in a UK 
setting...may be different from those that validate the same rules in 
specifically Communitarian terms”.25
In other words, a rule may be validated by two rules of recognition. This entails 
that there are two separate legal orders, each with their own distinct rule o f 
recognition, and that the rule in question belongs to both orders at the same 
time.
Yet this seems to be incompatible with the nature o f the rule of recognition. 
Hart emphasises that the rule of recognition is both ultimate and supreme. It is 
supreme since rules identified as valid by reference to it “are still recognised as 
rules of the system, even if they conflict with rules identified with reference to 
the other criteria, whereas rules identified by reference to the latter are not so 
recognized if they conflict with the rules identified by reference to the supreme 
criterion”.26 It is ultimate since it provides criteria for the assessment o f the 
validity o f other rules, but is unlike them in that there is no rule providing 
criteria for the assessment of its own legal validity. Since a rule o f recognition 
must be supreme over all other criteria o f  validity, it cannot admit o f rivals.
24 CL, p.97.
25 MacCormick, “Beyond the Sovereign State”, pp.7-8.
26 CL, p.103.
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However» a reply to this objection is to be found within MacCormick’s analysis. 
As we saw, according to MacCormick there would be two rules of recognition, 
each with a different content, that both apply to the overlap between the two 
respective systems. MacCormick writes that “[provided the same rules are in 
fact acknowledged as valid in the area of overlap, this will not lead to 
incompatibility or conflict...**.27 Yet now another objection immediately arises: 
since the rules o f recognition are those of separate legal systems and are 
necessarily different, there will always be conflict and incompatibility in the area 
of overlap. The only solution is for there to exist criteria in both the rules o f 
recognition which provide for the supremacy of one of them in the case of 
conflict. In fact, this is clearly the response adopted in MacCormick’s chosen 
example of Factortame, and in a long list of judgments which assert the primacy 
of Community law over national law.
This solution does not sustain the pluralistic conception of law as system that 
MacCormick wishes to offer. Since the criteria of validity in one system 
ultimately bow to criteria within the other, in terms of the hierarchy of rules 
they are logically one system, which has its apex in only one rule of recognition. 
This model leans more towards Kelsen’s monistic view of the relationship 
between legal systems, rather than a pluralistic view. In fact, it is difficult to see 
upon what basis Hart’s theory can be said to accommodate a pluralist model o f 
legal orders.28 Where Hart does explicitly criticise Kelsen’s monist approach to 
the relation between international and national law, he firstly does so simply on 
the ground that international law is not a legal system at all, but only a set o f 
rules, which contains no rule of recognition.29 Yet although it may still be 
possible to deny that international law is a fully-fledged legal system,
27 MacCormick, ‘‘Beyond the Sovereign State” , p.8.
28 It must be said that MacCormick’s claim on this point is carefully spelt out to be that only 
the basis and potential o f  the argument can be found in Hart’s work. Yet if one finds bias 
towards either the monist or pluralist approach it would seem to be the monist, given the 
hierarchical, supreme and ultimate nature o f  the concept o f  a rule o f  recognition.
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Community law, as we saw above, does form a legal order, and the issue ot 
interaction between orders cannot be side-stepped.
Hart’s second criticism of Kelsen is based upon the argument that Kelsen fails to 
give adequate import to the facts o f making and recognising laws and the 
effectiveness of legal systems.29 30 He understands Kelsen’s doctrine of the unity o f  
law (monism) to mean that a legal system can be identified by individuating all 
the laws belonging to one chain of validity -  which laws thus form a legal 
system. This, however, ignores “the dividing line introduced by the idea that 
recognition by the law-identifying and law-enforcing agencies effective in a 
given territory is o f crucial importance in determining the system to which laws 
belong“.31 And it is clear that, as Raz says, “the attitude o f the population and 
the courts is of the utmost importance in deciding the identity and unity o f a 
legal system in the sense in which this concept is commonly used“.32
If Kelsen’s theory of monism were to be interpreted in the way that Hart 
proposes, his objections would be persuasive. It is true that Kelsen is confusing 
on this point, and Raz supports Hart in criticising Kelsen’s unity doctrine in 
relation to this understanding of legal systems.33 However, the doctrine can also 
be interpreted in another way, a way which I would suggest is closer to Kelsen’s 
text with regard to his analysis of the interaction between legal orders, and 
which does not fall victim to Hart and Raz’s criticisms. In fact, Raz himself 
discusses and approves this second interpretation o f Kelsen’s monism.34 This
29 See CL, ch.10, section 5 (pp.226-231).
30 This criticism is to be found in Hart, “Kelsen’s Doctrine o f  the Unity o f  Law”, particularly 
p.313 and pp.320-321.
31 Hart, ibid., p.336.




interpretation is centred upon the point that Kelsen’s doctrine o f monism does 
not refer to ‘legal system* in the sense in which this concept is commonly used.
3.3 Monism revisited
In using the term ‘legal system* we generally have in mind the institutions and 
organisation that characterise a particular body of law. Legal systems have 
complex institutional structures; as Harris says, “the expression ‘developed legal 
system’ is commonly used to refer to the typical panoply of such institutions to 
be found in a contemporary industrialized society**.35 The dualist or pluralist 
conception of the relationship between the international and national legal 
orders holds them to be separate and independent, and if we are thinking of 
legal systems in this typical way this is obviously true: organisationally, they are 
divided from each other, they are accompanied by their particular political and 
social systems and related institutions.
However, this is not Kelsen’s meaning when he uses the term ‘legal order’ or 
‘system*. Neither does he deny that legal orders are generally separated from one 
another in an organisational sense. He makes it clear that his concept of the 
unity of law is to be understood not as organisational but as cognitive. I quote:
“ [A]s the ultimate goal of the legal development directed toward increasing 
centralization, appears the organizational unity o f a universal legal 
community...At this time, however, there is no such thing. Only in our cognition 
of law may we assert the unity of all law by showing that we can comprehend 
international law together with the national legal orders as one system of 
norms...”.36
35 Harris, Law and Legal Science, p.13.
36 PTL, p.328 (emphasis added).
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The doctrine of the unity of law is only to be understood as part and parcel o f 
the perspective which chooses to interpret law as normative, authoritative, 
through the presupposition of the basic norm.
In fact, monism can only be understood as the cognition of law from one 
particular perspective, a point missed by Hart and by MacCormick. Hart’s last 
objection to Kelsen’s theory is that Kelsen “disregards the important fact 
that...descriptive-ought statements when true are true only relatively to the 
systems that they describe”.37 MacCormick picks up this criticism, arguing that 
monism flies in the face of the attitudes and beliefs of those working within a 
particular legal order. English judges, for example, view their authority as based 
upon the British legal system and in no way contingent upon validation of that 
system by international law; British politicians do not regard British sovereignty 
as conferred by international law.38
The discussion in Chapter One o f the committed and the detached normative 
perspectives will have already shown that Kelsen’s theory is sensitive to the 
possibility of different points o f view relative to law. Hart and MacCormick 
offer no objection to monism. The opposite in fact: applied to the Community, 
Kelsen’s theory can accommodate the diversity of beliefs and viewpoints within 
the Member State and Community systems without allowing it to challenge and 
fragment the unity o f the law which is the object o f those viewpoints. This is 
because from each single point o f view, the law must be a unity: “regarded from
37 Hart, “Kelsen’s Doctrine o f  the Unity o f  Law” , p.331.
38 See MacCormick, “Beyond the Sovereign State”, pp.8-9. MacCormick then retracts in 
“Liberalism, Nationalism, and the Post-Sovereign State”, saying that Kelsen does take the 
internal point o f view into account (p.147). O nce he had made this step it was no longer 
clear why he prefered the Hartian over the Kelsenian model, and in fact in his most recent 
work he has changed to a kind o f  monism (see “Constitutional Pluralism in the European 
Union: Are Collisions Avoidable?” and chapter 7 o f  Questioning Sovereignty). This shift is 
discussed in the text below.
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one point o f view every set of norms necessarily forms one consistent and 
unified normative order”.39
Let us, for example, take a European Union citizen. Her behaviour is regulated 
by many different norms, but legally, by norms of her national legal system, by 
norms of European Community law, and by norms of international law. Her 
sphere of behaviour is one unified whole, which maybe once was legally 
regulated entirely by norms belonging to the national legal order. Now 
however, her behaviour is regulated by a plurality o f legal systems, but that law 
must logically form a unity from her point of view if she interprets those laws as 
normative, and not, for example, as sociological motivations to act.40
As Raz points out, our Union citizen may feel that some of the norms which 
regulate her behaviour conflict, but this is “a psychological, not a normative, 
fact”. In Kelsen’s words:
“If one assumes that two systems of norms are considered as valid 
simultaneously from the same point of view, one must also assume a 
normative relation between them; one must assume the existence of a norm 
or order that regulates their mutual relations. Otherwise insoluble 
contradictions between the norms o f each system are unavoidable”.41
Thus the Union citizen, whose behaviour is governed by norms from various 
systems, and views those norms as valid, must view them as related in such a 
way as to form a cognitive unity.
39 Raz, The Authority of Law, p.138. Ronald Dworkin puts this idea in a slightly different way: 
“When Kelsen says that i f  international and municipal law conflicted, w e could not speak o f  
them both as valid at the same time, he means that someone who had to decide what he 
ought to do - a judge for instance -  could not treat them both as valid in the conclusory 
sense, could not, in Kelsen’s phrase, serve two masters”: Dworkin, “Comments on the 
Unity o f Law Doctrine”, p.201. See also the discussion o f  the nature o f  the committed 
normative perspective infra., Chapter One.
40 Her point o f  departure, in the terminology o f  Chapter O ne, is the committed normative 
perspective.
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This is not to say that diverse points of view cannot be appreciated or even 
adopted by one person. As we saw in Chapter One, an anarchist, for example, 
could approach the law first from his own viewpoint and then from that of legal 
science: “even an anarchist, if he were a professor of law, could describe positive 
law as a system o f valid norms, without having to approve of this law“ .41 2 The 
persona] point o f view and the point o f view of legal science43 are entirely 
different. Raz reminds us of Kelsen’s position: “Norms judged as valid from a 
personal point o f view are those adopted as just. But legal theory is value-free 
and norms judged to be valid from its point o f view are not thereby adopted as 
just”.44
However, cognition can only take one point o f view at any one moment. This 
becomes clearer once we look at models of the cognitive unity o f the 
international, national and Community legal orders, and realise that this 
unifying view of law is at the root of every normative description of the 
relationship between them.
Kelsen’s initial view was that the international legal system must take primacy 
over the state legal system, thus co-ordinating all state legal systems in their 
spheres o f validity.45 However, in the later edition of Reine Rechtslehre he 
changes his mind, and argues that there are instead two possible monistic 
constructions, the first as before in which international law takes primacy, but 
the second in which national law has precedence.46 Dealing with only two legal 
systems, the two constructions are relationships in which first the national and 
then the international takes precedence.
41 Kelsen, What is Justice?, p.284.
42 PTL, p.218, note 82.
43 The committed normative and the detached normative perspectives respectively.





Adding European Community law, there are nine possible permutations o f the 
chain of validity linking the three legal systems.47 Six are models in which the 
validity (and therefore authority)48 o f two systems rests on the other (and 
therefore upon the Grundnorm of that system). Three are models in which two 
systems are co-ordinated, separated in their spheres of validity, by a third, 
higher-order system that governs their creation. They are here presented 
graphically: the international legal order is represented as TNT’, that of the 
Community as ‘E C ’, and the Member State legal order as ‘MS’.
There is only ever one Grundnorm, presupposed specifically in relation to one 
legal system, but finally validating all three legal systems. In the models set out 
below, the Grundnorm is always presupposed in relation to the highest legal 
order in the chain. This Grundnorm will be either that o f international law, 
validating the norm-creating effect of international custom, that of national law, 
validating the national constitution or national custom, or that of Community 
law, validating the Community constitution or Community custom.
47 Compare MacCormick, “Liberalism, Nationalism, and the Post-Sovereign State”, where he 
suggests that the monist theory can offer three models of the relationship between national, 
international and Community law. He assumes that the Grundnorm will be presupposed in 
relation only to the international legal order, and so discusses models equivalent to the first, 
second and seventh proposed here.
48 Kelsen’s use o f ‘validity’ is interchangeable with ‘authority’. The law has authority when the 
Grundnorm is presupposed -  and ‘an authority’ is simply a person or institution competent 
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Model 1
The Grundnorm is presupposed as validating the norm-creating effect of 
international custom. A norm o f general international law is the basic norm of 
the national legal order: the norm o f efficacy.49 The national legal order then 
confers validity on the Community legal order through the norm which initially 
recognised Community law as valid for that nation State.50
Model 2
A norm of international law validates the Community system, through the 
effectiveness of either its customary or constitutional independence, which in 
turn confers validity on the Member State. The basic norm of the Member 
State must be a norm of Community law by which its acts are legal from the 
point of view of the Community order.51 The basic norm o f the Member State 
will therefore be the norm of Community law which admits the State into the 
Community, contained either in its particular Treaty of Accession or in the 
original Community Treaties.
Model 3
Here the international legal order is validated by the national legal order, and 
itself contains the basic norm of effectiveness of the Community order. The fact 
that the national order is co-ordinated by the international (and here also the 
Community) is not an obstacle for Kelsen. The national legal order is to be 
understood in a narrow and a wide sense: only in the narrow sense is it subject
49 PTL, p.337.
50 PTL, p.333.
51 PTL, p.337: “Since international law regulates the behavior o f states, it must determine 
what is a ‘state’ in the sense o f international law -  it must determine...under what conditions 
their acts are to be regarded as acts o f state, that is, legal acts in the meaning o f  international 
law”. The European Community regulates the behaviour o f its members, and so must 
determine, in this model, under what conditions their acts are to be regarded as acts in the 
meaning o f  Community law.
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to the international norm of efficacy; in the wide sense it confers validity upon 
international and (indirectly, here) Community law.52
Model 4
The Member State legal order and the Community order respectively confer 
validity upon the Community and international legal orders.
Model 5
The Member State is validated by the Community norm under which it 
acceded to the Community; international law is brought within both through 
its authorisation by the Member State.
Model 6
The Community legal order confers validity on international law, which in turn 
validates the effective Member State.
Model 7
International law co-ordinates both Member State and Community law. A 
third, co-ordinating, higher order ‘‘determines the creation of the other two, 
delimits their spheres of validity against each other, and thus co-ordinates 
them”.53 As long as the creation and sphere of validity of Member State and 
Community law are effective, they are authorised by international law.
52 The legal order in the narrower sense “comprises the norms o f  the constitution and the 
norms created -  in accordance with the constitution -  by the acts o f legislation, jurisdiction, 
and administration. T he national legal order in the wider sense...includes the recognized 
international law...Figuratively speaking we may say: the state which recognizes international 
law thereby submits to international law”. However, the ultimate reason for the national 
legal order's validity is not international law’s principle o f  efficacy but the Grundnorm 




Starting from the presupposed validity o f the Community legal order, it confers 
validity through membership on the Member State, and validity through 
recognition on the international order.
Model 9
The Member State co-ordinates and confers validity on international and 
Community law.
The models are presented and viewed neutrally from Kelsen’s ‘point of view of 
legal science’ - the point of view termed, in Chapter One, the detached, 
normative perspective. From this perspective they are presented as models 
which compete with each other but between which no choice is made. While 
from the point o f view of a judge or an individual the extent to which a 
particular model reflects actual practice within the Community will be crucial, 
for the detached perspective it is of much less importance that certain of the 
models seem distant from reality.54 For example, it may seem far-fetched to 
describe the Community as validating both the international and national legal 
orders when the debate regarding its own independence from both is still not 
closed. Yet this is the task of the science of law: to step back from the fray and 
set out the logically theoretical (the ‘pure’) possibilities, in order that our choice 
between them is an informed choice. The crux of Kelsen’s theory at this point 
is that while each model is equally authentic, no one of them is argued to be 
‘correct’. In fact, Kelsen argues that it is not possible to decide between them on 
the basis o f the science of law: “This science can do no more than describe 
them”.55
54 Neil MacCormick evaluates each model on its plausibility in relation to actual Community 
practice, but Kelsen’s conceptual approach rejects such empirical testing o f  his theory.
55 PTL, p.346.
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3.5 Sovereignty and the identity crisis
From the detached, normative viewpoint o f legal science, each model is equally 
correct and equally justified. The decision can therefore “be made only on the 
basis of non-scientific, political considerations”.56 Thus of his two models of the 
relationship between national and international law Kelsen says that “he who 
treasures the idea o f  the sovereignty of his state...will prefer the primacy of the 
national legal order. He who values the idea of a legal organization of the 
world, will prefer the primacy of international law”.57
Sovereignty, therefore, can play no part in a neutral conceptual modelling of the 
relationship between the Community, its member States and international law. 
To move from the presumption o f the legal sovereignty of one’s state is to choose 
to presuppose the validity of that legal order: a choice that is not required by the 
models themselves but is made for other motives. Kelsen argues that the concept 
of sovereignty is rooted in the presumption that the state in question is supreme, 
which presumption is underpinned not by logical arguments but by the 
“political design” to preserve the “notion that the state represents, in absolute 
terms, the highest legal community”.58
O f course, in the era of state legal orders which were alone in regulating the 
entire sphere o f behaviour of those subject to them, a model which understood 
law as founded on the validity o f the state was the natural choice. Once the 
material sphere of competence of the State is fragmented between different legal 
orders, however, the question of legal authority is exposed in its garb of political
56 Ibid,
57 Ibid. Looking back to Kelsen’s earlier preference for the primacy o f international law in the 
light o f  this later work, it is possible to identify the ‘non-scientific, political’ considerations 
upon which he bases his choice: he “values the idea o f a legal organization o f the world” 
and so rejects the concept o f  sovereignty and opposes the primacy o f  the nation state model 
on the grounds that it has the consequence o f  'denaturing' international law’s function o f  
co-ordinating all states (I P L T p. 117).
5 8 IPLT, pp.115-116.
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power. Thus the uncertainty with respect to the legal basis and authority of the 
Community legal order simply reflects the indeterminacy of its competences.
Ian Ward argues that the constitutional identity of the Community remains 
undefined because there is a ‘corporate uncertainty’ as to how the Union should 
be determined.59 The key to this indeterminacy in the Union is the concept ot 
subsidiarity, which is particularly important since “the establishment of its 
identity...will determine the nature o f the European legal and constitutional 
order’’.60
However, the manner in which subsidiarity was introduced into the Maastricht 
Treaty evidences the intention of the Member States to preserve uncertainty: 
“every effort was made at Maastricht to avoid providing any determination”.61 
Subsidiarity “was never intended to be clear and concise. Indeed, its purpose 
was quite the opposite”.62 Through the ambiguity in its nature the “vexed 
question o f the ceding of sovereignty”63 could be successfully avoided, thus 
maintaining indeterminacy as “the conscious result o f political expediency”.64
The net effect o f the political compromise which produced the concept o f 
subsidiarity is “a constitutional order...which can mean anything to anybody”65 
and which, therefore, allows the Member States to preserve the fiction of State 
sovereignty. Since “ [djiscuter sur la souveraineté de l’Etat, c’est raisonner sur des
59 Ward, "The European Constitution and the Nation State”, p. 165.
60 Ward, “Identity and Difference: The European Union and Postmodernism”, p.24.
61 Ibid.
62 Ward, “The European Constitution and the Nation State”, p.164.
63 Ward, ibid., referring to Lord Mackenzie Stuart, “Subsidiarity -  A Busted Flush?”, in Curtin 
and O ’Keeffe (eds), Constitutional Adjudication in European Community Law and National Law.
64 Ward, “(Pre)conceptions in European Law”, p.203.
65 Ward, “The European Constitution and the Nation State”, p.165.
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hypothèses de science juridique”,66 the Member States are therefore holding on 
tight to a model o f the relationship between the legal orders which allows them 
to presuppose the authority of their own.
3.6 Cognitive shuffling and normative conflict
A state of legal indeterminacy is only stable, however, as long as no normative 
challenge is made to it which challenges the political basis of the cognitive model 
adopted. Although there is no organisational hierarchy between legal orden, 
once the individual viewpoint is adopted the norms form not solely a cognitive 
unity but also a hierarchy, since there cannot be logical conflict between 
them .67 Since the legal orders interact normatively, each time a norm is created 
or amended in one particular order, the cognitive arrangement of norms must, 
from our one particular viewpoint, be shuffled around in order to accommodate 
the change. Maastricht entailed, for example, a massive cognitive shuffling on 
the part o f the Member States, to accommodate the new and changed norms 
within their pictures o f the hierarchy of norms.
As we saw in Chapter One, an individual in her personal capacity (not, for 
example, in her capacity as a legal scientist) or an official within a legal order 
cannot remain at the level of simple cognition but must also choose between 
the models that cognition makes clear to her. In any committed, normative 
interpretation of Community law, international law and Member State law, 
therefore, one particular model must be adopted. It is possible to tease out from 
the views o f commentators on the Community which model has been chosen, 
even if the reasons for this choice are not explicit. For example, underpinning 
the sovereignty rhetoric o f the British ‘Euro-sceptic’ lies one o f the models in 
which the national legal order is supreme, chosen since his reference system is
66 Kelsen, “Les rapports de système entre le droit interne et le droit international public”, 
p.255.
67 GTLS, pp.408-9; PTL, pp.18-19, 25, 205-8, 328.
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firmly connected with the British legal order. The European Court in Cost^s 
firmly adopts the seventh model, placing the Community on a level of co­
ordination with its Member States. The Constitutional Court of the Federal 
German Republic in the Maastricht-Urteil case can be said to be championing 
the cause of the first model against that o f the second.68 9
Problems arise when the model of authority chosen by one person or body 
contains norms which are incompatible with, and therefore challenge, the 
model of authority chosen by another. This situation would arise, for example, 
in the hypothesis given by the German Federal Constitutional Court in Bnitmer. 
if  the EU institutions were to act outside the power conferred upon them by 
the EU Treaty.70 Such an act on the part of the EU institutions would be 
incompatible with the view o f the Constitutional Court as expressed in Brunner 
that they have no authority to do so. If the Court did accept the EU action, in 
doing so it would be revolutionising its model of sovereignty and authority.
3.7 Revolt? Revolution? Cold war?
The Kelsenian analysis here supports in certain respects the thesis recently 
defended by Diarmuid Rossa Phelan.71 Phelan argues, firstly, that as a result o f 
the demands placed upon national law by European Community law, national 
constitutional law “is at breaking point“.72 There is a crisis in the relationship 
between the legal orders, a crisis which has arisen because EC law and national 
law are, he believes, based on different legitimacies, because there are limits on
68 Case 6/64 Costa v  ENEL  [1964] ECR 585.
69 Bruntier, Judgment o f  Oct. 12, 1993, BverfG, 89 BVerfGE 155 (Brunner v Treaty on European 
Union)', English translation [1994] 1 CMLR 57. This case involved a challenge to the validity 
o f Germany’s accession to the Maastricht Treaty. For a legal-theoretical analysis see 
MacConmick, “The Maastricht-Urteil: Sovereignty Now".
70 Bmttner, English translation [1994] 1 CMLR 57, at para. 49 o f the judgment.
71 Phelan, Revolt or Rei>olutiott: The Constitutional Boundaries of the European Community.
72 Ibid., p.10.
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the extent to which national law can be amended, and because Community law 
views its status in national law and demands on national courts in a way that 
those national courts do not share. He argues that if EC law continues to 
develop along current lines the result within the Member State legal orders will 
be “either a revolution in law where consistent legitimation becomes impossible 
or a revolt o f national constitutional authorities, the focal case being courts, to 
avoid a revolution“.73
As was noted in Chapter One, Phelan takes up a particular point of view in 
order to explain the constitutional relationships between Member State and 
Community law, a method which is intrinsically connected to the development 
of his argument. He adopts what he calls an ‘order approach’, according to 
which:
“The focus is on how the three legal orders o f public international law, 
European Community law, and national law (more particularly, national 
constitutional law), by legal provisions, decisions, and other authoritative 
sources, describe themselves internally, their relations with the other orders 
and, so far as necessary to describe their relations with the other orders, those 
other orders’’.74
Phelan is careful to underline that the descriptions o f law resulting from this 
method are not correct in “any general or external sense’*, by which he means a 
claim to correctness from all points of view, or independently o f any point o f 
view .75 They “may be correct, in the sense of accurate, within the terms of that 
order. But that is all...’’.76
73 Ibid., p.10; see also p.413.
74 Ibid., p.3.
75 Ibid., p.7 and see pp.6-7, note 11.
76 Ibid., p.7.
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The dilemma o f revolt or revolution will arise, he argues, because from the 
point of view internal to one order, the claims another order makes upon it may 
be impossible to accept. Conflicts are unavoidable because both legal orders 
make claims in the same areas.77 For example, there may be an irresolvable 
conflict between what Phelan terms a ‘national constitutional law natural right’ 
and a European Community law right,78 or between a national constitutional 
law policy and a European Community law policy.79
Kelsen’s theory supports Phelan’s method and argument here; in fact, Phelan’s 
thesis is only tenable if a Kelsenian monistic approach is taken to the 
relationship between the international, Member State and Community legal 
orders. His discussion of conflicts between orders shows that he presumes that 
which Kelsen’s theory demonstrates: that from a perspective ‘internal to the 
order’ (which would fall under the present terminological umbrella of the 
‘committed, normative perspective’), a set of norms must necessarily form a 
coherent unity.
“If an insoluble conflict existed between international and national law, and 
if therefore a dualistic construction were indispensable, one could not regard 
international law as ‘law’ or even as a binding normative order, valid 
simultaneously with national law (assuming that the latter is regarded as a 
system of valid norms). The relations concerned could be interpreted only 
either from the viewpoint of the national legal order or from that o f the 
international legal order”.80
Only if a monist model is taken, will it follow that when norms from différent 
legal orders simultaneously claim to be authoritative for the same behaviour o f
77 Ibid., p.14.
78 Ibid., ch. 30.
79 Ibid., ch. 31.
80 PTL, p.329.
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the same people at the same time, there will necessarily be a logical conflict 
which must be resolved - resolved within the European Union, for Phelan, by 
revolt or revolution.
Phelan’s intemal-to-the-order perspective presumes, however, a certain clarity 
and consensus within each particular order regarding that its own authority and 
legitimacy, a presumption which is open to criticism. Phelan claims to describe 
how the orders view themselves, but as the uncertainty noted in Chapter Tw o 
about the form o f a Community Grundnorm shows, any claim about the source 
of legitimacy and authority o f at least the Community and, it is suggested, even 
the Member States, can be and is likely to be contested. Phelan’s order 
perspective does in fact differ from the committed normative point of view 
distinguished here, in that it claims to speak ‘for’ the order as a whole; the 
committed normative point o f view is, more modestly, the personal point o f 
view of the individual, or that of the judge. It is possible to envisage, for 
example, various points of view ‘internal’ to a legal order which do differ with 
respect to that order’s legitimacy. To take a very simple example, one judge of 
the European Court of Justice may view the authority o f Community law as 
derived from that of the Member States; another may view the authority of 
Community law as (independently of the Member States) derived, like that of 
the Member States, directly from its citizens.
Phelan is however correct to locate the arena of conflict between the legal 
orders in the courts o f the Member States and Community. As he says,
“[t]he conflict between orders will result in conflicts between courts because 
of...the extent o f the overlap between the claims of European Community 
law and national law in respect o f the same or different aspects o f  many 
justiciable actions”.81
81 Phelan, Revolt or Revolution: The Constitutional Boundaries of the European Community, p.15.
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The nine models o f authority and validity that result from taking the detached 
perspective on the European Community are only of academic interest within 
the courts, for a judge cannot, unlike a law professor, abstain from the Volition’ 
that distinguishes the committed from the detached point o f view. It is in the 
nature o f the judicial role that an authoritative decision must be given, even 
when that decision involves the very authority and legitimacy of the legal order 
itself. The central role of courts in situations of fundamental uncertainty is to be 
seen, for example, in constitutional cases from the 1950’s and 60’s that arose in 
revolutionary situations. In Pakistan, Uganda and what was then known as 
Rhodesia, courts were asked to judge the foundations o f new legal orders and 
the legitimacy of revolutionary regimes. In these times of turmoil it was the 
lawyers who became ‘demolition experts’;82 and the judges did not hold back 
from declaring the effect of a successful revolution upon the law in their 
respective jurisdictions.83
Fundamental issues regarding the legitimacy o f both Community law and 
national law have already arisen in the courts: Phelan illustrates his thesis o f 
conflicts between the legal orders with the Grogan case,84 which he analyses as 
turning on a direct conflict between the Irish constitutional law right to life o f 
the unborn and the European Community law right to receive services and 
information concerning services.85 Another well-known case is obviously the 
Brunner decision, already noted. Weiler and Haltem have suggested that this 
decision, in which the German Federal Constitutional Court expressly rejected 
any suggestion that the balance of power between Germany and the 
Community would be resolved, through Maastricht, in favour of the
82 S.A. de Smith, “Constitutional Lawyers in Revolutionary Situations“, p.93.
83 See Harris, “W hen and Why does the Grundnorm Change?”, p.103. It is also to be noted 
that the courts o f  each o f  these countries cited Kelsen’s theory o f  change in the Grundnorm 
as authority for their decisions (see Harris p. 103-4).
84 Case C -159/90 Society for the Protection o f the Unborn Child v Grogan [1991] ECR 1-4685.
85 See Phelan, Revolt or Revolution: The Constitutional Boundaries of the European Community, 
pp.374-400.
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Community,86 is analogous to the commencement o f a cold war, “with its 
paradoxical guarantee of co-existence following the infamous MAD (Mutual 
Assured Destruction) logic”.87
For the Community or a Member State to introduce a law that could only be 
accommodated by the other order if  it were to change its understanding o f the 
source of its own validity and authority would be politically to “deal the first 
blow”.88 Weiler and Haltem comment that the “logic o f the Cold War is that 
each side has to assume the worst and to arm as if  the other side would actually 
deal the first blow”, and in the terms o f  this paper, the German Court’s ‘arming’ 
was not only to repeat its presumption of the validity o f its own legal order but 
to go on the offensive and doubt even the autonomy of that o f the 
Community.89
The Court in Bnmner denied that the European Court of Justice could 
legitimately have authority over its own competence, and effectively held that 
the authority to decide the competence of the European organs was vested in 
itself. Phelan would, presumably, applaud this decision, since his ‘proposed 
direction’ in response to the dilemma of revolt or revolution that he poses is 
that of authority placed firmly in the hands of national courts:
“The proposal is that a European Community constitutional rule is adopted 
to the effect that the integration o f  European Community law into national 
law is limited to the extent necessary to avoid a legal revolution in national 
law. The extent to which such limitation is necessary is to be finally 
determined by national constitutional authorities (such as the Supreme
86 Brunner, particularly paras. 54-55 o f  the judgment.
87 Weiler and Haltem, “The Autonomy o f  the Community Legal Order -  Through the 
Looking Glass”, p.455.
88 Ibid., p.445.
Court [of Ireland] or the Conseil Constitutionnel) in accordance with the 
essential commitments o f the national legal order, not by the Court o f 
Justice”.89 0
Schilling takes a similar line, arguing that a Member State always has a residual 
right to ‘autointerpretation*, and that the individual supreme courts of the 
Member States, acting separately, have the final say on the competences of the 
EC.
Neither MacCormick, in discussing Phelan’s suggestion, nor Weiler and 
Haltem, discussing Schilling’s, accept this approach. Weiler and Haltem retort 
that a “pragmatic nightmare” would ensue if it were adopted.91 If one State, for 
example, in the face of an unfavourable judicial decision from a Community 
court, were to unilaterally abrogate a Treaty provision, the international law 
principle of reciprocity would mean that the particular obligation would cease 
to be binding between that State and all the other parties. If combined with 
abrogations by other States in respect of the same or other provisions, the 
permutations would be cripplingly complex.92
MacCormick’s objection to Phelan’s solution brings us conveniently back to 
Kelsen, for it is based upon a theoretical modelling of the situation. 
MacCormick phrases the problem in terms of boundaries: “ [t]he question is one 
about how to settle boundaries between interacting systems on the assumption 
of non-hierarchical ranking between them”.93 He argues that in response to this
89 The Court claims that it would have the last word on the validity o f  Community legislation 
that conflicts with German constitutional provisions: Brunner, paras. 49 and 99 o f  the 
judgment.
90 Phelan, Revolt or Revolution: The Constitutional Boundaries of the European Community, p.417.
91 Weiler and Haltem, “The Autonomy o f  the Community Legal Order -  Through the 
Looking Glass", p.434.
92 Ibid.
93 MacCormick, “Constitutional Pluralism in the European Union: Are Collisions 
Avoidable?”, p.10.
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question, “there seem to be only two reasonably arguable analyses of the 
situation that obtains among the states and the Community and Union”, models 
which he calls respectively ‘radical pluralism* and ‘pluralism under international 
law*.94 He responds to the question of the difference between them as follows:
“The answer depends on the relationship between the Community systems 
and international law...According to pluralism under international law, the 
obligations of international law set conditions upon the validity of state and 
of Community constitutions and interpretations thereof, and hence impose a 
framework on the interactive but not hierarchical relations between systems. 
According to radical pluralism, these obligations simply give a third 
perspective on the relationships in question, a further non-hierarchical 
interacting system”.95
‘Radical pluralism* corresponds to the Haitian position he defended in his 
earlier work. ‘Pluralism under international law’, by contrast, is “a kind of 
monism in Kelsen’s sense”,96 and would correspond to the seventh of the nine 
Kelsenian models presented earlier in this chapter.
MacCormick originally preferred radical pluralism over a Kelsenian model on 
the grounds that on a pluralistic conception of relations among legal systems, 
“from the internal point of view of each legal system, its ultimate grounds of 
validity are in principle distinct from those of every other; but there can in fact 
be intimate interaction between systems”.97 This “factual” intimate interaction 
can, however, only continue up to a certain point, since under radical pluralism 




97 MacCormick, “Liberalism, Nationalism and the Post-sovereign State” , p.149.
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which challenges to the system’s fundamental grounds of authority will be 
repulsed.
It follows from radical pluralism that in this situation courts o f one legal system 
will be committed to denying the authority of a court of another. Although this 
is “not logically embarrassing, because strictly the answers are from the point of 
view of different systems”, it is “practically embarrassing to the extent that the 
same human beings or corporations are said to have and not have a certain 
right”.98 Radical pluralism thus has its limits: “acceptance of a radically 
pluralistic conception of legal systems entails acknowledging that not all legal 
problems can be solved legally”.99 Thus Phelan’s proposal would, under radical 
pluralism, be tempting, since “it would therefore be of value for all participants” 
to make explicit that “neither can or should claim all-purpose supremacy over 
the other”.100
Radical pluralism is open to the criticisms noted earlier in this chapter applicable 
to any model built upon Hart’s concept of law. A Haitian will immediately find 
himself in difficulties once faced with the problem of conflicting norms in 
overlapping systems.101 Further, the Haitian emphasis, at the final reckoning, on 
the division and separation between legal systems is misplaced and misleading in 
the new world o f intimate interaction between them. Whether by cross­
fertilisation, adoption, or explicitly direct effect of norms of one legal order in 
another, no legal system, whether of a Member State of the European Union, 
or the Community itself, is now so isolated. As MacCormick writes, “pluralism
98 MacCormick, “Constitutional Pluralism in the European Union: Are Collisions 
Avoidable?", p.15.
99 MacCormick, ibid., and see also “The Maastricht-Urteil: Sovereignty Now", p.265.
100 MacCormick, “Constitutional Pluralism in the European Union: Are Collisions 
Avoidable?”, p.15.
101 As Schilling notes, the weakness o f the Hartian approach “lies in its appeal to a reasonable 
interpretation" o f  conflicting laws (“The Autonomy o f the Community Legal Order -  An 
Analysis o f Possible Foundations”, p.399).
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under international law suggests that we need not run out of law (and into 
politics) quite as fast as suggested by radical pluralism”.102
In his latest work, MacCormick in fact changes his position from that o f radical 
pluralism to the thesis of pluralism under international law .103 MacCormick 
argues that radical pluralism ignores the decisive role that could and should be 
given to (public) international law:
“The potential conflicts and collisions o f systems that can in principle occur 
as between Community and member-states do not occur in a legal vacuum, 
but in a space to which international law is not only relevant but indeed 
decisively so given the origin of the Community in Treaties..., to say 
nothing of the fact that in respect o f their Community membership and 
otherwise the states owe each other obligations under international law. A 
part of the legal considerations that ought to bear upon the deliberations of 
both state courts and the ECJ is regard for these mutual obligations”.104
Therefore Phelan’s suggestion is therefore unacceptable, since for national 
courts to have “an unreviewable power to determine the range of domestic 
constitutional absolutes” that limit the scope of EC law within the Member 
State legal systems is to “invite a slow fragmentation o f Community law”.105
MacCormick objects further that Phelan’s solution to the revolt or revolution 
dilemma is much too strong, in that it gives an “unsatisfactorily unbounded 
discretion to state courts”.106 He suggests that it should be qualified to the 
extent that any determination by the national constitutional authorities of the
102 MacCormick, “Constitutional Pluralism in the European Union: Are Collisions 
Avoidable?”, p.15.
103 This shift takes place in “Constitutional Pluralism in the European Union: Are Collisions 
Avoidable?” and is confirmed in chapter 7 o f  Questioning Sovereignty.




limits of EC law within the domestic legal order should be “in accordance with 
international obligations to other member states and in accordance with essential 
commitments of the national legal order including the commitment to good 
faith observance o f international obligations”.107 An amendment such as this 
would have two effects. Firstly, it “signals...that state Courts have no right to 
assume an absolute superiority of state constitution over international good 
order, including the European dimension of that good order”.108 Secondly, it 
“would help to diminish the risk of normative collisions, but in the event of an 
apparently irresoluble conflict arising between one or more national courts and 
the ECJ, there would always on this thesis be a possibility of recourse to 
international arbitration or adjudication to resolve the matter”.109 Collisions 
thus are not inevitable, he concludes, although they are quite likely. Under the 
approach of pluralism under international law that he suggests, however, “they 
are not incurable in the event that they do occur”.110
MacCormick is right in saying that collisions are not inevitable, not just because 
of the mediating role of international law but also because the question o f 
fundamental authority within our national legal orders has changed beyond 
recognition - we are, to appropriate yet again a phrase o f MacCormick’s -  
beyond the sovereign State. The debate over the type of theoretical model we 
might use to characterise the relationship between the Member States, the 
Community and the international legal orders is only the first step towards 
entering the forum where the real question awaits: is the authority of the law 
within the Union (both o f the Community and Member States) and the 






The conception o f all-powerful, sovereign state was bom during an age of crisis, 
an age in which writers such as Hobbes and Bodin were concerned about the 
possible fragmentation of the state from the turmoil arising from religious 
discord, civil unrest and external threat.111 The adoption of the concept of 
sovereignty and of forms of highly centralised authority was a response to this 
threat. The position of the nation States of the European Community is now 
entirely different, however: instead o f reacting reflexively to centrifugal forces, 
they are engaged in a project of construction which aims to create a community 
of peace and prosperity and which is geared towards harnessing the benefits of 
global changes. Within it the Member States have introduced centrifugal forces: 
the challenge lies in maintaining fragmented authority in suspension, without 
dissolving the ties of loyalty which still bind the co-ordinating communities 
together. The key to this project is not integration but co-operation.
Given this need, it is in all the parties’ interests to preserve the indeterminacy 
regarding the ‘ultimate’ authority within the Community and the Member 
States, in order to enable each to latch on to the model of legal authority that is 
politically most comfortable and easily sustainable. That is why collisions are not 
inevitable: even if, as MacCormick wonders, the diffusion of power we have 
come to know in the Community is “just the phenomenon of a passing 
moment”,112 for the moment a showdown would be potentially destructive for 
all involved. Sovereignty used to be “a source of certainty, and hence a source 
of peace”.113 As long as we can peacefully accommodate uncertainty, we can 
remain beyond sovereignty.
111 See Craig, “Public Law, Sovereignty and Citizenship”, pp.317-319, where he discusses the 
challenge to the traditional doctrine o f  sovereignty made in Britain at the beginning o f the 
century by the ‘pluralists’ -  writers such as H.J. Laski, E.Barker and A.D. Lindsay. See also 
Koopmans, who argues that we are “approaching an age o f new legal pluralism...” 
(Koopmans, “Sources o f  Law: The N ew  Pluralism”, p.191).




How does ‘pluralism under international law’ and the general Kelsenian 
approach discussed earlier fit into the central debate about the justification ot 
authority within the Community? Although it is true that what matters in the 
end is who has power, and how they exercise it, in the Community our 
conceptual picture o f that power takes on an inflated role, since the preservation 
o f the ‘identity crisis’ magnifies the importance of competing personal views o f 
the seat of power and authority within it. The link between the Kelsenian 
models and the justification of authority lies in a recognition of the fact that 
whichever theory, model, concept we come to hold, “[w]e clloose this 
interpretation, hoping to have recognized the beginning of a development of 
the future and with the intention of strengthening as far as possible all the 
elements...which tend to justify this interpretation and to promote the evolution 
we desire”.114
The application o f Kelsen’s theory of validity to the Community aimed to show 
that there are various theoretical models we can use as tools to understand the 
authority and autonomy of the Community. It is the choice of tool that must be 
justified. Kelsen warns that “in social and especially in legal science, there is still 
no influence to counteract the overwhelming interest that those residing in 
power, as well as those craving for power, have in a theory pleasing to their 
wishes”.115 The nine different theories of authority we identified show that, for 
example, the view of the world which places the sovereignty of one’s own State 
is not inevitable.
114 Hans Kelsen, Law and Peace in international Relations: The Oliver Wendell Holmes Lectures, 
(1942), p,54-55, quoted in David Kennedy, “A Case Study of Legal Architecture: The Hans 
Kelsen o f  the Oliver Wendell Holmes Lectures: Public International Law Pragmatist”, p.49.
115 GTLS, Preface, p.xvii.
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We may do well to note Craig’s reminder that the core o f  the British theory of 
sovereignty proposed by A.V. Dicey - widely cited as a source of the ‘orthodox’ 
view - is a normative argument constructed to justify the parliamentary 
sovereignty he empirically describes.116 Craig claims that the Diceyan argument 
“is based on the realization that there must be some principled justification for 
the existence of parliamentary sovereignty”,117 the essence of the justification he 
eventually proposed being that “a Parliament...represented the most 
authoritative expression of the will o f the nation”.118 Sovereign power is only 
legitimate if reasons for it can be found in arguments which are defensible in 
terms of normative principle -  which, Craig argues, “opens the way for a 
modification of traditional ideas on sovereignty if  no convincing normative 
justification can be found in the present day”.119
From this perspective, Kelsen takes us to the threshold of the debate on 
authority, but does not enter it. For Kelsen, elaborating his pure theory of law, 
sovereignty is reduced to the hypotheses and presuppositions of legal science. 
Yet this ignores the ties of identity and loyalty that are inherent to the concept 
of sovereignty (particularly understood as justified authority), even though he 
himself tells us that the adoption of one model amongst those presented by the 
pure theory is a matter of choice and justification, not just cognition. Kelsen 
abdicates from analysis of this further step, detaching himself from the questions 
that arise in and from the making of this choice. Kelsen’s aim is to unveil reality, 
not to engage with it -  a project valid in itself but which offers little guidance to 
people who must grapple with the law.
Those people include judges, who are o f central importance in reflections upon 
authority because they do not only work with the authoritative standards o f





which the law consists, but also claim to offer authoritative decisions regarding 
the law. Kelsen’s theory, notwithstanding its invocation as grounds tor their 
decisions by the courts embroiled in the revolutions in Pakistan, Uganda and 
Rhodesia forty yean ago, can have no application to the role of the judge. 
These courts argued that Kelsen’s theory licensed them to accept the legality o f 
the successful revolutions occurring in their respective countries, and that in 
doing so they were not entering the political arena.120 Yet Kelsen’s theory was 
misappropriated here: being purely descriptive it licenses no such decision.
In reflecting on the authority o f Community law we must leave Kelsen behind 
and turn to theorists who offer us insights into the nature o f the committed, 
normative point o f view. Weiler and Haltem suggest that the effects of the 
German Federal Constitutional Court’s decision in Brunner are not necessarily 
‘unhealthy’: “The German move is an insistence on a more polycentred view of 
constitutional adjudication and will eventually force a more even conversation 
between the European Court and its national constitutional counterparts”.121 It 
could be that collisions between the legal orders become, in the courts of the 
Member States and the Community, a catalyst for greater attention to the 
legitimacy of the network of power within the Union, and greater awareness o f 
and sensitivity to the political interests upon which the different understandings 
o f legal authority rest. The next chapter will consider the relationship between 
political and legal authority in more detail.
120 See Hams, “When and Why does the Grundnorm Change?”, p.104.














In order to consider the authority of European Union law it is necessary to step 
both forward and back: forward, to adopt the committed normative perspective, 
and back, to widen our vision to encompass the European Union. After 
exploring the relationship between authority and legitimacy, I introduce the 
committed point o f view o f Ronald Dworkin and ask how our political 
practices within the Union underpin the authority and legitimacy of the law 
that those practices produce. However, this question leads us back once more to 
the issue of perspectives, and to the relationship between the object being 
studied and the subject studying it. This time I look at the perspective of the 
critic -  and how we can look at perspectives critically.
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4.1 Authority and legitimacy in the European 
Union
4.1.1 W hat is legitim acy?
The basis of political legitimacy with which we are most familiar in the West is 
democracy - the justification o f political authority according to the principle 
that coercive power must be the ‘power of the people’, the people being the 
‘authors’ of the laws which govern them. Democracy is seen as an answer to the 
question why the state may legitimately exercise coercive power over its 
subjects. Yet the concept of democracy is understood in a myriad of different 
ways, the variety and extent o f which becomes immediately clear on any 
reading of the literature discussing legitimacy in the European Union.
Harlow notes that after Maastricht, the political mood in Europe changed 
sharply:
“Where once issues of sovereignty and separation of powers had dominated 
the agenda, legitimacy had now become the staple fare o f public law debate 
and arguments for transparency and accountability were increasingly 
heard”.1
Following this change, legitimacy was a central concern of the debates that took 
place as part of the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference (IGC). According to 
De Burea’s analysis, the IGC debates report that the legitimacy of the Union 
rests on four particular ‘themes’: European citizenship, as a means o f 
identification with the Union as a legitimate polity; democracy, in that 
enhancement of the democratic nature of the institutional structures and 
processes o f the Union is necessary if members of the public are to feel that they 
can participate in processes affecting them; subsidiarity, by which is meant that
1 Harlow, in Craig and Harlow (eds.), Lawmaking in the EU, p.xviii.
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decision-making should only take place at the European level if that is the most 
appropriate and effective means; and lastly, the transparency and openness of 
procedures, which should be improved in order that the public are informed 
about and can scrutinise the Union’s political and decision-making processes.
Yet the concept o f legitimacy is a complex one, and we cannot safely assume 
the Union will be ‘a legitimate polity’ so long as it enhances citizenship, 
democracy, subsidiarity and transparency. For some, the legitimacy of the 
Union is inconceivable without the protection of human rights and individual 
liberties2 or the “constitutional traditions” of the Member States;3 for others the 
core of legitimation is the provision of fora for political deliberation and 
argumentation.4 The gap between concepts of legitimacy leads to a debate 
conducted at cross-purposes: this can be seen in the fact, for example, that while 
some parties are calling for a European Constitution and a written EC Bill o f 
Rights,5 others doubt even that the EU enjoys or can enjoy any democratic 
legitimacy while no common European language or media exist.6
There will always be disagreement about the conditions under which political 
power and the laws it creates will be legitimate. In Chapter Six I consider more 
fully the question of legitimacy in the Union. In this section, however, I want 
to make an initial clarification of the question itself. ‘Legitimacy’ goes to the 
heart of the relationship between law and politics. The product of political 
power wielded in a way which claims legitimacy is law.7 Yet what is at stake
2 See, e.g., Hauser and Müller, "Legitimacy: The Missing Link for Explaining EU Institution 
Building", p.25.
3 Petersmann, “Constitutionalism, Constitutional Law and European Integration”, p.256.
4 See, e.g., Gerstenberg, “Law’s Polyarchy: A Comment on Cohen and Sabel", pp.350-351.
5 Petersmann, “Constitutionalism, Constitutional Law and European Integration”, pp.260- 
261.
6 Mestmäcker, “On the Legitimacy o f European Law", pp.628-629.
7 Behind this short phrase He many scholarly works, a great number o f  which would disagree 
with the connection suggested here. I am drawing on Raz, who argues persuasively, to my 
mind, that a political authority does not only exercise coercion but claims to be legitimate in
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here is not the justification of politics, or law, as such, but the justification of 
their claim to authority,* 8 What must be justified is the claim that the Union law­
makers and the law they make should be obeyed.
In order to understand legitimacy, then, we must understand authority, for 
legitimacy is simply justified authority. Both ‘authority’ and ‘justified’ can bear 
various meanings. There are, for example, various forms o f  authority. Weber, 
famously, distinguishes what he terms charismatic authority from traditional 
authority and the authority o f natural law.9 Raz demonstrates further that 
authority is understood in various ways.10 Having authority may mean having 
permission to do something which is normally forbidden - to have authority to 
read mail addressed to my boss, for example. Someone may, on the other hand, 
have authority to the extent that he is an expert with specialised knowledge and 
experience. Both of these types of authority are different from the political 
authority we see in the European Community (and every Member State), 
which might be initially described as a having the right to rule.
Authority can and has been approached from many different angles and with 
different objectives in mind. Weber’s approach is, obviously, primarily 
sociological, exploring the conditions and causes of the emergence and 
development o f authority. The perspective from which authority is here 
approached, however, is predominantly normative: it asks whether the authority 
of the EU lawmakers can be justified. This question is fundamental because, as 
our assumption in the West that democracy must play a part in the authority o f
doing so: an essential feature o f law is thus that it claims legitimate authority (Raz, The 
Authority of Law, pp.29-30; Raz, “Authority, Law and Morality”, p.296). Raz’s arguments 
are discussed in Chapters Five and Six, infra.
8 Anscombe gives probably the pithiest definition o f  political authority: to have authority is to 
have “a regular right to be obeyed in a domain o f  decision” (“O n the Source o f the 
Authority o f  the State”, p,144).
9 Weber, Economy and Society; An Outline of Interepretiue Sociology. See also the discussion o f  
Weber’s concept o f  authority in Finnis, “O n Positivism and Legal Rational Authority”.
10 See Raz, Authority, pp.2-3.
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our political and legal practices shows, we do not accept that naked power 
necessarily has authority. While we accept the idea that a controlling group of 
gangsters may wield political power in a certain territory, we instinctively reject 
the notion that they have authority to do so. An authority must make some 
claim to legitimacy: it has the right to rule.11
Discussing authority in the context of the European Union, an extra 
qualification must be added to our starting point. The way in which authority is 
exercised has a bearing upon, but must not be confused with, the way in which 
authority may be justified. Debate over competing theories o f governance in the 
EU, such as those of Moravscik (intergovemmentalism)12 and Weiler 
(supranationalism)13 relates to theories which are descriptive and analytical, not 
normative. The way in which power is exercised in the EU clearly does make a 
difference to the factors which might justify it, but the descriptive and 
normative questions must be separated.
4.1 .2  L egitim acy as justified authority: three distinctions
Legitimacy - justified authority - can be understood in different ways. In the 
European debate, Weiler breaks down the concept of legitimacy into formal 
and social legitimacy. He defines formal legitimacy as follows: although, he 
argues, any notion of legitimacy must rest on some democratic foundation
11 Raz, in his introduction to Authority f terms this understanding o f  authority as the starting 
point for its normative justification: “All the writers represented in this volume agree that 
neither brute force by itself nor any amount o f  influence or power are sufficient to constitute 
any person or body as an authority" (p.3). Anscombe, in her analysis o f  the authority o f the 
State, makes a further distinction on this particular point: she argues that in order to 
understand authority we need to distinguish government exercising it from “two contrasting 
things: on the one side, from large-scale voluntary cooperative associations, and on the other 
from a place’s being quite under the control o f  a smooth sophisticated Mafia" (“On the 
Source o f  the Authority o f the State", p.143).
12 See, e.g., Moravscik, “Preferences and Power in the EC: A Liberal Intergovemmentalist 
Approach".
13 See, e.g., Weiler, "The Transformation o f Europe" and “The Dual Character o f  
Supranationalism”.
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(which he refers to as the people’s consent to the polity’s power structures and 
processes), we can still speak o f formal legitimacy “if we can show that the 
power structure was created following democratic processes and with the 
people’s consent”.14 Formal legitimacy is, he argues, to be distinguished from 
social legitimacy, which “connotes a broad societal acceptance (empirically 
determined) of the system”.15 It does, however, contain “an additional 
substantive component: Legitimacy is achieved when the government process 
displays a commitment to, and actively guarantees values that are part of, the 
general political culture -  such as justice and freedom”.16
I have set out Weiler’s arguments here because he has taken probably the most 
thoughtful approach to the concept o f legitimacy in the EU. I find his 
breakdown of the different branches o f legitimacy confusing, however. I would 
prefer to set out three different types o f legitimacy, which I will term 
respectively the social, legal and normative justification of authority. Firstly, a 
political system may be argued to be legitimate if it enjoys some level of social 
acceptance, just as Weiler says. This type o f legitimacy mirrors what Kelsen calls 
the efficacy (as opposed to the normativity) of law. Secondly, legitimation 
through a legal justification of authority corresponds loosely to Weiler’s ‘formal’ 
legitimacy, but in the terms of this thesis shall be more specifically defined as the 
Kelsenian view o f authority: law is legitimate if it can be subsumed under 
another legal norm or, alternatively, under the Gnmdnomu
The third type o f  legitimacy, authority which is justified normatively, relates to 
the ‘component’ that Weiler adds to social legitimacy. It should stand 
independently from social and legal legitimacy, however, because it is a 
contested question whether political authority must have real power in order to 
qualify as an authority; in other words, whether an authority may be




normatively justified while lacking the social and possibly legal acceptance that 
confers social and legal authority. Weiler himself shows why it is important 
neutrally to identify the normative justification of authority: his suggestion that 
authority will be justified when the process of government guarantees values 
that are part of the general political culture is only one criterion among many 
highly controversial criteria.
I have separated out these three branches of legitimacy because the fulfilment of 
all three types is not required in order for it to be possible to argue that a 
political and legal system has justified authority. One obvious example is that of 
revolution, where a new political authority no longer has legal justification but 
is sustained by a level of social support sufficient to claim legitimacy 
nevertheless. What both legal and social justification for authority have in 
common, however, is that when either are in doubt, they shall and must turn to 
the normative question of legitimacy.
It is clear that great attention is given to the legal justification of the authority 
both of Community and Member State decision-makers within the Union. 
Sophisticated procedures of judicial review safeguard legal legitimacy within 
both Member States and Union. Justification of Union authority through a 
certain level of social acceptance is, however, more problematic. De Burca, for 
example, points to the substantial level of public opposition to the EU 
manifested in the public debate surrounding the Maastricht Treaty: she is 
correct to say that if the power of the Community institutions is seriously 
challenged and their purpose questioned, the legitimacy (at least, the social 
legitimacy) of the Community system is seriously undermined.17
Gibson and Caldeira, in a similar vein, suggest that the legitimacy of one 
particular Community institution, the European Court o f Justice, is low. They 
claim that they “have good reason to doubt the extent and depth of the
17 See De Burca, “The Quest for Legitimacy in the European Union”, p.351.
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legitimacy of the [ECJ]...[It] confronts important problems of support, 
legitimacy, and ultimately of compliance’*.18 They base this conclusion upon a 
survey conducted through Eurobarometer (the semi-annual survey o f public 
opinion within Europe, under the aegis o f the European Commission) in each 
of the Member States, which showed, they argue, that “a large proportion of 
ordinary Europeans is unwilling to continue supporting the institution if it 
makes unpopular decisions”.19
However, the usefulness of Gibson and Caldeira’s conclusion, that the 
legitimacy of the ECJ is challenged by these findings, is severely curtailed by the 
fact that they take such an emaciated concept o f legitimacy. Gibson and 
Caldeira ignore the different types and elements o f legitimacy identified above. 
Their criterion, that the legitimacy o f the European Court o f  Justice rests solely 
upon “how the mass public views, evaluates and supports the [Court]”20 is 
misleadingly simplistic. The Court o f Justice is, in fact, a prime example of the 
complex interplay between social, legal and normative authority which fuses to 
constitute a court’s (or a ruler’s, or a government’s) legitimacy. Crude 
measurements o f public ‘support’ ignore, for one, the duty of any court to 
uphold the law rather than popular opinion, particularly where, in the 
constitutional democracies that largely make up the European Union, the law 
will not infrequently protect the minority against the majority.
Furthermore, plain majorities are not decisive in according or withholding 
legitimacy: the present day abounds with examples of political authorities which 
are socially legitimised not through a ‘broad societal acceptance’ but by the 
strength and power o f key figures and groups within society. The audience is 
crucial. This is particularly true in the case of courts, which address their 
judgments primarily to an audience of lawyers, an audience which has infinitely
18 Gibson and Caldeira, “The European Court o f  Justice: A Question o f  Legitimacy”, p.205.
19 Ibid., p.221.
20 Ib il, p.205.
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more power than the ‘mass public* to ‘evaluate and support* a court and thus to 
confer or withdraw social legitimacy upon or from it. Since authority is 
effective only if enough powerful people regard the ruling body as having 
justified, normative authority, an analysis of social legitimacy will also involve an 
analysis of normative legitimacy.21
By distinguishing the particular audience that an authority will primarily court 
for legitimacy, we see also the role that normative justification o f authority plays 
in both legal and social legitimacy. Both legal and social legitimacy depend, at 
root, not only upon the formal authority bestowed by compliance with legal 
norms and the demands of brute power, but also upon inescapable normative 
criteria; criteria regarding the nature o f the democracy we believe to be correct, 
regarding the balance between competing interests of the public and the 
individual, regarding the type of society within which we wish to live. It is the 
issue of normative legitimacy that will therefore be explored in the following 
chapters.
In the European Union, social legitimacy will, to state the obvious, depend on 
offering both a normative picture of legitimate authority that elites and ‘mass 
publics’ will find acceptable, and then showing that the political and legal 
practices within the Union match or at least aspire to that ideal. Weiler, for 
example, explicitly considers ways in which to contribute to the social 
legitimacy of the Union. He suggests that popular support would be increased 
by taking the following steps: firstly, to “demonstrate visibly and tangibly that 
the total welfare of the citizenry is enhanced by integration’*; secondly, “to 
ensure that the new, integrated polity will have democratic structures”; and 
thirdly, “to give, for a time at least, an enhanced voice to the separate 
polities”.22
21 See Raz, The Authority of haw, pp.29-30.
22 Weiler, “After Maastricht: Community Legitimacy in Post-1992 Europe”, p.22.
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A normative picture o f political authority in the EU as being legitimate if it 
contains the elements of welfare enhancement, democratic structures and 
consultation of Member State authorities is clearly a good sketch from which to 
start. Yet a sketch only goes so far: what form are those “democratic structures’* 
going to take, for example? And how far should an interpretation of the political 
and legal practices that constitute a normative picture o f legitimate authority be 
affected by the likelihood of its social acceptance? De Burca points out that in 
her reading of some of the reports made in the context of the 1996 IGC she 
finds it unclear whether the official participants in the reform process “genuinely 
believe that the Union lacks essential legitimacy and requires fundamental 
reform, or whether their principal aim is to placate the public”. “Is their 
concern”, she goes on to ask, “mainly with popular legitimacy and not with the 
normative values underlying this loss of support?”23
The question that will be considered in this and the following chapters is that of 
the form that a normative justification for the political and legal authority of the 
European Union might take. In order to do this, however, yet more steps 
backward must be taken in order to widen our perspective and give the fullest 
picture possible of all the elements of normative authority. Looking carefully at 
legitimacy also entails examining the way in which we look. The next move 
will therefore be to introduce Ronald Dworkin’s theory of political legitimacy, 
which incorporates not only a normative analysis o f justifiable political and legal 
practice but also an analysis of “how we look” - a theory o f interpretation of 
social practices.
23 De Burca, “The Quest for Legitimacy in the European U nion”, p.372.
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4.2 Dworkinian legitimacy: political integrity and 
constructive interpretation
The reference to ‘Dworkinian legitimacy’ may seem initially obscure, since if 
any slogans are used in relation to Dworkin’s work, those o f “law as integrity” 
and “law as interpretation” are the most common. However, Law's Empire, the 
book that contains Dworkin’s most elaborated version of legal interpretation, is 
concerned also with legitimacy. After all, the questions that he claims to tackle 
within it - what is the law, how do and how should judges identify it -  are all 
questions that go to the correctness, and thus the legitimacy, o f the authority of 
the law and the authority of the judges that apply the law.
Dworkin’s work will provide the framework for the following chapters of this 
thesis. In this section, however, I introduce Dworkin’s views on constructive 
interpretation and his concept of integrity. This is necessary in order to go on to 
consider the claim which is central to Dworkin’s theories both of legitimate 
interpretation of law and legitimate interpretation of politics: that only a 
community which accepts the political principle of integrity can claim genuine 
authority and legitimacy.24 I then take a look at the first stage in Dworkin’s 
two-stage test of interpretation: that of fit. I ask whether integrity fits the 
practices of the European Union; I conclude that it does not.
4.2 .1  Integrity and interpretation
Although Dworkin’s theory is usually termed “law as integrity”, it does in fact 
contain both legal and political elements. It is true that Dworkin’s work on 
integrity is built up in response to the task of developing a “program of 
adjudication” that can be recommended to judges and used to criticise what 
they do. However, Dworkin’s legal principle of integrity cannot be separated 
from the political principle of integrity. Law as integrity presupposes a
24 LE, p.214.
commitment to integrity in the political community to which the law belongs. 
The political community must accept integrity as a distinct political virtue in 
order that its judges may legitimately use Dworkin’s programme of law as 
integrity in adjudication.
Dworkin argues that the way a judge interprets the law (and his beliefs as to 
what interpreting the law mean) are rooted in, but also create, a particular 
political conception of his community. The political principle o f integrity, in its 
most innocuous and innocent form, asks lawmakers to try to make the total set 
of laws morally coherent.25 Yet this modest demand conceals a model of 
political legitimacy, obligation, community and membership which has 
repercussions even on the conception o f democracy we wish our community to 
embrace.
Dworkin’s theory depends on his thesis that social practices, such as courtesy, or 
law, or politics, are interpretive concepts. This thesis is based on a detailed 
argument which I will not reproduce here;26 I simply want to set out Dworkin’s 
basic contentions in order to describe how in attempting to understand the 
politics o f any community, including the European Union, we are engaged in 
interpretation. This interpretation, further, is of a particular type: what Dworkin 
terms constructive interpretation.
When we interpret a social practice such as a community’s law or politics we 
aim, according to Dworkin, to interpret something created by people as an 
entity distinct from them, rather that what people say (conversational 
interpretation) or events not created by people (scientific interpretation).27 
Constructive interpretation is, roughly, “a matter of imposing purpose on an 
object or practice in order to make o f it the best possible example of the form
25 LE, p.176.





or genre of which it is taken to belong”.28 Dworkin takes care to underline that 
a person who seeks to interpret a social practice does not ask what people think 
about it: to do so would simply be to reproduce the interpretations o f the 
practice that those people have already made. Instead he must “join the practice 
he proposes to understand”; his conclusions are then “claims...competitive with 
theirs” 29
Interpretive claims are to be measured along two dimensions, which Dworkin 
calls the dimension o f ‘fit* and the dimension of ‘justification’. A constructive 
interpretation of a social practice should fit that practice, and it should provide a 
sound justification for it.30 The dimension of fit is a rough threshold 
requirement that an interpretation must meet if it is to be at all credible.31 Any 
interpretation of the law of the European Union that denied the possibility of 
private ownership, for example, would fail the test of fit and would be 
disqualified outright. The political test o f fit is derived from the bulk of political 
practice and the political history of the community.32 Different interpreters 
might set this threshold differently, but if a person’s test of fit is subject to and 
adjustable to her personal convictions then she is not in good faith interpreting 
the practice at all.
I f  an interpretation passes the initial test of fit, the test of justification comes into 
play. The interpreter must choose between eligible interpretations “by asking 
which shows the community’s structure of institutions and decisions - its public 
standards as a whole - in a better light from the standpoint of political 
morality”.33 It is at this stage that personal beliefs come into play: the
28 LE, p.52.
29 LE, p.64.
30 See LE, p.139.




interpreter’s “own moral and political convictions are now directly engaged’*.34 
The test of justification is an examination of an interpretation’s substantive 
appeal, although the formal and structural constraints that dominate on the first 
dimension figure on the second as well, for one interpretation may show the 
practice in a better light because it fits more o f its history, for example.35
4.2.2 C om m u n ity  personified
If we wish to argue that the European Union should be interpreted as accepting 
the principle o f integrity, however, we must simultaneously defend the 
argument that the Union itself is a distinct moral agent. Otherwise it becomes 
impossible to refute the objection that the Union cannot be “committed to” 
integrity as a principle, or compromise “its” principles in accepting 
checkerboard provisions, since the Union is not an entity that can have 
principles to compromise. It is inconsistency in principle among the acts of the 
Union personified that integrity condemns, and this supposes that the Union as a 
whole can be committed to principles of fairness or justice “in some way 
analogous to the way particular people can be committed to convictions or 
ideals or projects”.36
How can a community be committed to particular principles in the way that a 
person can? Dworkin’s theory demands a particularly deep personification of the 
political community, in that it assumes that a political community can be some 
“special kind of entity distinct from the actual people who are its citizens”.37 He 
argues that the opposing view, that a state and its government are merely 
collections o f people, fails to account for our practice of sometimes according 






which we require special standards of behaviour from officials who act in the 
name of a group to which we all belong.38
The acceptance of the legislative principle o f integrity by a community and the 
personification of that community are interdependent, in that personification is 
an aspect of political integrity, and vice versa.39 Thus Dworkin’s argument is not 
that integrity is a special virtue o f politics because the state or community is a 
distinct entity, but that “the community should be seen as a distinct moral agent 
because the social and intellectual practices that treat community in this way 
should be protected“.40 We must ask whether we do well to interpret the 
Union as a distinct moral agent which recognises integrity as a legislative 
principle.
4 .2 ,3  P olitical integrity in  the European U nion: the d im ension  o f  
fit
W hat this section aims to do is to examine, in relation to the European Union, 
Dworkin’s preferred interpretation of political practices. He argues that we 
should interpret our political life as accepting the principle of integrity. Integrity 
becomes a political ideal “when we insist that the state act on a single, coherent 
set of principles even when its citizens are divided about what the right 
principles of justice and fairness really are“.41 It is thus to be distinguished from 
fairness in politics, which “is a matter o f finding political procedures - methods 
o f  electing officials and making their decisions responsive to the electorate - that 
distribute political power in the right way“,42 and justice, which “is concerned







with the decisions that the standing political institutions, whether or not they 
have been chosen fairly, ought to make”.43
Dworkin develops his concept of integrity through an analysis o f the obligations 
people hold in relation to each other and themselves within particular political 
communities. The stages of his argument will arise in more detail in the next 
chapter; suffice it to say, he concludes that best defence of political legitimacy 
(“the right of a political community to treat its members as having obligations in 
virtue of collective community decisions”)44 *is to be found in the concept of 
integrity: only a community which accepts integrity (which then falls within his 
category of a ‘community of principle’) can claim genuine authority and 
legitimacy.43 Does, then, the European Union accept integrity? Following 
Dworkin’s test, this must be answered by looking at fit and at justification.46
Does integrity fit the political practices o f the European Union? Evidence that 
the Union does accept integrity as a distinct political virtue would be the 
general rejection o f what Dworkin calls “checkerboard” laws. By this he means 
laws that are internally compromised, in the sense that principles must be 
appealed to in order to justify one part o f the law that are incompatible with 
another. For example, if the people of Alabama disagree about the morality of 
racial discrimination, their legislature could forbid discrimination on buses but 
allow it in restaurants. Checkerboard laws treat a community’s public order as a 




43 LE, p.214. Dworkin’s argument here, and the three types o f  community he identifies, are 
considered more fully in Chapter Six, infra.
46 Justification for integrity in the EU is examined in Chapter Six.
47 LE, p.179.
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At first sight it would seem that the Union rejects such checkerboard laws: it 
prefers to compromise about which scheme of justice to adopt, rather than 
adopting a compromised scheme o f justice. If the decision-makers had disagreed 
about the extent to which women should be paid the same as men for equal 
work, they would not have adopted a scheme which allocated protection 
according to the strength of the different viewpoints, such as deciding to protect 
them against discrimination if they worked for a bank but not if they worked 
for a retailer. The Union is also committed to the principle o f equality, which 
comes hand-in-hand with integrity: a general principle of equality of treatment 
supplants the various provisions to be found in the Treaties. O n the bulk o f the 
Union’s political practice, it seems to accept integrity as a political principle.48
4 .2 .3 .1  F lexib ility
However, in the last few years a concept has been introduced into Union 
politics which, in its stronger forms, appears to be incompatible with integrity. 
This concept is ‘differentiation’, or ‘flexibility’; more euphemistically it has also 
been re-named ‘closer co-operation*. It has existed and been discussed in the 
Community and Union context for several years. In the early debates the 
meaning of differentiation and the terminology used to describe the varying 
meanings differed widely. Stubb distinguishes three main subcategories: (i) 
‘multi-speed’; (ii) ‘variable geometry*; and (iii) ‘a la carte’ .49 Originally 
differentiation was taken to mean ‘multi-speed’: an approach which allowed 
certain Member States to advance faster than others toward some particular 
integrative goal. Multi-speed integration in its classic sense has particular 
characteristics: the integration process is based on policy objectives agreed by all
48 It is no obstacle to the commitment o f the EU to integrity that there may be differences 
among the Member States, even over matters o f  principle. Integrity holds within political 
communities, not among them, so the scope o f the requirement o f  integrity is restricted only 
to the decision-makers o f  the Union in their Union roles, no further (see Dworkin, LE, 
pp.185-186).
49 Stubb, “A Categorization o f  Differentiated Integration”.
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the Member States; it is accepted that all the Member States will eventually 
reach these objectives; it is only the speed at which the process takes place 
which is differentiated, and so the differentiation is therefore temporary. Curtin 
also adds that multi-speed differentiation must be capable of “objective 
justification*’, by which she means justification by social and economic factors as 
opposed to political reasons.50
It is clear that recourse within the Union to a legislative principle of multi-speed 
differentiation by no means flouts the principle o f integrity in the way that, for 
example, rules providing that only those Union workers bom in even years 
should be subject to a maximum number o f hours in their working week clearly 
would. Yet Dworkin’s examples o f checkerboard statutes are the most dramatic 
violations o f the ideal o f integrity, which leaves open the possibility o f cases 
which are violations nevertheless, albeit in a small way. Differentiation will be 
contrary to integrity if it takes a form which entails that the Union must endorse 
principles to justify part of what it has done that it must reject to justify the 
rest.51 In creating multi-speed legislation, however, the Union does not do this; 
or, at least, any inconsistency is minimised by the overarching principle o f 
eventual convergence, which ensures that the temporary derogation from 
integrity is just that - temporary.
The Maastricht Treaty, however, saw an extension of differentiation which 
moved to the realm of ‘variable geometry’. The crystallisation of the concept 
within the THU took place as a response to the crippling difficulties 
experienced in reaching consensus among the Member States in key areas of 
policy. As Curtin puts it, it is “indisputable that a Union o f 15 Member States 
whereby each individual Member States [sic] has the power to effectively veto 
the others from undertaking new or expanded activities is doomed to helpless




stagnation”.52 In addition, Gaja points out that certain Member States are 
viewed as incapable o f taking part in further integration because of their 
political, economic or social conditions — he gives the example o f Greece with 
regard to the adoption o f the single currency.53
Flexibility can therefore satisfy the desire of some Member States to strengthen 
their ties in particular areas of policy, and release Member States from the need 
to proceed at the pace of the slowest (an issue which has become more pressing 
with the prospect of the accession of Eastern European countries to the Union). 
Very simply, flexibility offers an approach which solves both these problems by 
enabling Member States to “enjoy different classes o f obligations in terms of 
membership commitment”.54
Yet flexibility in the form of ‘variable geometry’ is not temporary and is far 
more difficult to reconcile with an acceptance within the Union of the 
legislative principle o f integrity. Various examples o f such a form of flexibility 
were to be found in the Maastricht Treaty, such as the Protocol and Agreement 
on Social Policy and the provisions on Economic and Monetary Union. These 
have particular characteristics which distinguish them from the multi-speed 
form of differentiation. For example, the Protocol and Agreement were the fruit 
o f a fundamental disagreement between the UK and the other Member States 
which was left unresolved: in the absence of consensus the UK, opposing the 
objectives and aims of the other Member States in the field o f social policy, 
‘opted-out’ from the controls that the others wished to create. This opt-out 
was, further, unlimited: as opposed to the temporary nature o f the multi-speed 
approach, the UK obtained the possibility of a permanent derogation from the 
new provisions. These characteristics are shared by similar opt-outs obtained by
52 Deirdre Curtin, "The Shaping o f  a European Constitution and the 1996 IGC: ‘Flexibility* 
as a Key Paradigm?’*, p.241.
53 Gaja, "How Flexible is Flexibility under the Amsterdam Treaty?”, p.858.
54 Ibil
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both the UK and Denmark in the sphere o f  Economic and Monetary Union, 
which allow them to refuse to join the transition to a common currency at the 
third stage of the procedure towards monetary union.
Such opt-outs suggest that the legislature is no longer speaking “with one 
voice”, as integrity requires - in fact, the EMU opt-out provides that the 
derogating Member States shall no longer join in that voice, since their voting 
rights are thus suspended. Integrity demands that there be compromise about 
which scheme of justice to adopt: the variable geometry form of flexibility is 
incompatible with integrity since, in the absence of such compromise, it 
compromises the scheme which is adopted.55 According to Ehlermann, acts 
adopted under the Social Policy Agreement were acts of the Community, as 
opposed to intergovernmental agreements between the participating Member 
States.56 On this analysis, integrity would seem to have fallen by the wayside, 
since to exclude British Union citizens from that area of law would be 
incoherent in principle with the rest of the Community’s constitutional scheme, 
which makes other rights Community-wide in scope and enforcement.57
However, the question whether integrity ‘fits’ the legislative practice of the 
Union must be distinguished from the question whether integrity fits the 
legislative practice o f the Community. The Union is clearly not committed to a 
legislative principle o f integrity -  and, o f course, it has no legislature as such. It is 
the European Council which provides the Union “with the necessary impetus 
for its development and shall define the general political guidelines thereof’,58 
which guidelines do not have the status of Community legislation and are
55 See Dworkin, LE, p.179.
56 Ehlermann, Increased Differentiation or Stronger Uniformity, p.14. This view  is not shared by all 
commentators, however: Curtin shows how  unclear the status o f  such acts would be and 
argues that they should be interpreted rather as intergovernmental norms (“The 
Constitutional Structure o f  the Union: A Europe o f  Bits and Pieces”, p.57).
57 See Dworkin, LE, p.186.
58 TEU, Art. D.
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almost entirely exempt from the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice.39 The 
Union, although including the Community, is individually characterised by its 
“forms of co-operation”; far from “speaking with one voice”, the Council 
operates as an intergovernmental body and, as the expansion of the concept o f 
differentiation since the creation of the Union demonstrates, will accept division 
along national lines.
At the time, Ehlermann’s view that acts adopted under the Social Policy 
Agreement were acts of the Community was not shared by all commentators. 
Some commentators argued that variable geometry under Maastricht was 
contained to the Union only and was external to the Community. Harmsen, for 
example, noted that their precise status is unclear,59 60 while Curtin argued that 
the Protocol does not confer upon them the status of Community law.61 On 
this interpretation, the coherence of the Community’s legal order was 
unbreached and the commitment to integrity maintained.
However, the Treaty of Amsterdam has extended flexibility once more through 
the provisions it contains on ‘closer co-operation’. The general mechanism is 
outlined in the new Title VII of the TEU (Articles 43 to 45). This is 
supplemented by specific provisions relating to the first pillar (in Article 11 o f 
the EC Treaty) and to the third pillar (in Article 40 of the TEU). Philippart and 
Edwards comment that the TA contains three types of flexibility: “a general 
system of rules for any close co-operation that meets certain preconditions; 
predetermined flexibility, i.e., closer co-operation in particular fields with
59 TEU, Art. L.
60 Robert Harmsen, "A European Union o f  Variable Geometry: Problems and Perspectives”,
p. 121.
61 Curtin, “The Constitutional Structure o f  the Union: A Europe o f  Bits and Pieces”, p.57.
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special arrangements (largely via ‘protocol-ization’); and case-by-case flexibility 
through constructive abstention and opt-outs”.62
In particular, there are two significant changes. First, the TA has taken a variable 
geometry form of flexibility to the heart o f the European Community legal 
order. Article 11 o f the EC Treaty provides a mechanism by which Member 
States which wish to co-operate more closely between themselves may be 
authorised to make use of the EC Treaty’s procedures and institutions in order 
to do so. Secondly, the TA opens the way to flexibility in areas which are 
undefined: as Dashwood says, the “novelty o f the mechanism... is that it may be 
used in cases which have not been pre-determined at the level of primary 
Union law”.63
Yet the new provisions do not flout the Dworkinian principle of integrity so 
much as might be first supposed. Firstly, a line is drawn between flexibility 
within and flexibility without the Community legal order. There are significant 
differences between the flexibility provisions relating to the first pillar -  the 
Community - and those relating to the Union. The conditions to be fulfilled 
before closer co-operation can take place are more stringent under Article 11 o f 
the EC Treaty than under Article 40 of the TEU. The procedures are also 
different: under Article 11 the Commission has the right o f initiative, whereas 
the Council is the decisive actor under Article 40. The instruments and 
procedures after the establishment of closer co-operation are those of the 
respective treaty frameworks.64 Lastly, under Article 11 both the Commission or 
any of the Member States through the Council is in a position to block closer 
co-operation. It is clear that the extent to which closer co-operation is viable
62 Philippart and Edwards, “The Provisions on Closer Co-operation in the Treaty o f  
Amsterdam: the Politics o f  Flexibility in the European U nion”, p.89.
63 Dashwood, “States in the European U nion”, p.210.
64 See Monar’s discussion o f  flexibility, particularly in relation to the third pillar, in “Justice 
and Home Affairs in the Treaty o f  Amsterdam: Reform at the Price o f  Fragmentation”, 
pp.332-335.
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within the Community is far more restricted than within the wider Union 
sphere.
In fact Jo Shaw goes so far as to argue that the TA “provides a framework for 
future co-operation which is likely to be too restrictive to be workable, except 
in very limited circumstances”.65 The attempts to restrict the impact of 
flexibility on the Community order show that value is still ascribed to its 
coherence. However, the restrictions cannot take away the fact that even within 
the first pillar flexibility contradicts the principle of integrity and creates a risk of 
fragmentation of Community law. As Gaja says, “ [t]he interpretation of one 
provision o f Community law in its normative context may well yield different 
results according to whether a Member State participates in closer co-operation 
or not”.66 Philippart and Edwards wam against viewing the system as a ‘white 
elephant’, useless and unmanageable: “even in pillar I, this assumption is 
debateable, given the possible pressures within, say, the single currency area or 
simply because of institutional logic...[T]he system now exists and a possible 
activation cannot be excluded”.67
This would, according to Dworkin, be a fundamental stumbling-block for any 
claim of European Community law to be authoritative for the subjects of the 
legal system. A community which, in its political practices, does not accept and 
implement the principle of integrity, does not have justified authority. Yet I 
would suggest that Dworkin’s claim here does not match our experience here 
with relation to the EC. It is true that the concept of flexibility is for the most 
part alien to our experiences within our unified, generally homogenous 
Member States. Yet it is not seen as a death blow to the legitimacy of the law o f 
the European Union. Quite the opposite in some circles: it is viewed as a
65 Shaw, “The Treaty o f  Amsterdam: Challenges o f Flexibility and Legitimacy”, p.63.
66 Gaja, “H ow Flexible is Flexibility under the Amsterdam Treaty?”, p.867.
67 Philippart and Edwards, “The Provisions on Closer Co-operation in the Treaty o f  
Amsterdam: the Politics o f  Flexibility in the European Union", p.103.
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compromise between the claim to authority o f national governments and 
national legal systems, and the competing claim of the HU. Philippart and 
Edwards capture this precisely: “ [t]he system is designed around the defence of 
the cohesion and coherence of the European construction (even if Amsterdam 
has no provision for any solidarity mechanism) and the recognition of the 
continued significance, if not primacy of national interests”.68
This observation leads to the criticism that Dworkin is mistaken to argue that 
integrity is and should be our bench mark of legitimacy. He is wrong in his 
assessment o f justified authority: instead, we would often prefer to accept the 
nearest approximation to a morally and practically sound legal solution, with its 
corresponding decrease in integrity and coherence in the law as a whole. 
Contrary to Dworkin’s portrayal o f decision-making, whether in politics or in 
law, we are willing to accept compromises that may run against the principle o f 
integrity. As Raz says, Dworkin’s assumption that it is unintelligible for people 
to accept a less coherent body of principles over a more coherent alternative is 
false: “ jnjobody who cannot have a whole loaf refuses, on principle, half o f 
one”.69
The closer co-operation provisions in the TA demonstrate this point once 
more: the restrictive nature of the mechanism may have the consequence that 
Member States will not use it but instead adopt forms of co-operation outside 
the TA procedures. As Shaw says, “there is nothing in the Treaty to prevent 
forms of informal flexibility which effectively bypass all democratic structures as 
well as the formal legitimacy controls o f the courts and the rule of law”.70 
Faced with the choice between integrity and greater legitimacy, we choose the 
latter. Dashwood for one would certainly do so: “a highly differentiated Union 
-  what Deirdre Curtin once called “a Europe of bits and pieces” -  is preferable
68 Ibid., p.102.
69 Raz, Ethics iti the Pttblic Domain, p.313, and see also p.298.
70 Shaw, “The Treaty o f  Amsterdam: Challenges o f  Flexibility and Legitimacy”, p.85.
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to a coherent Community with bits and pieces of closer co-operation going on 
around it”.71
We do not value integrity to the extent that Dworkin suggests, particularly if it 
is achieved by silencing many different voices in order to achieve the one voice 
with which the ‘community personified’ speaks. It has been suggested that a 
complex community can never speak in a single voice, and that Dworkin’s 
insistence upon integrity does away with inevitable inconsistencies while 
offering only “a very strained coherence” in their place. In relation to the 
European Union we are faced with a pluralist society simply too heterogeneous 
in its ideology to accept the sort of ‘tidying up’ and imposition of coherence 
that integrity demands.72 In relation to the brute realities of the process of 
achieving (or not achieving) political consensus in the Union, Dworkin’s vision 
advertises an “extraordinarily idealized, romanticized account of law - 
impossibly clean and orderly”.73
For Raz, this forcing of the law into one integral unity is not only a denial of 
the plurality of ‘voices’ behind the law, but denies the variety of the aims, goals 
and principles of the various bodies which enjoy legal authority.74 And in 
considering the ramifications o f the argument that Dworkin’s model of political 
integrity does not fit the politics of the European Union, it may be that this is 
the most telling for Dworkin’s theory: the lack of integrity within the Union is, 
when seen in practice, far less damaging to its authority and legitimacy than
71 Dashwood, “Sates in the European Union”, p.214.
72 See Waldron, “The Circumstances o f Integrity”, p.8. Dworkin does comment on this 
‘dystopic’ criticism o f  his work under the title o f ‘internal skepticism’ in LE (pp.266ff, and 
more specifically, the section on the Critical Legal Studies movement from p.271), and 
dismisses it. Yet Dworkin’s main argument against Critical Legal Studies, that it ignores the 
distinction between contradictory and competing principles, runs into the same difficulties, 
in that it continues to set up integrity as a principle competing with justice. See the 
discussion in Waldron at pp.9-12.
73 Schlag, “Normativity and the Politics o f  Form”, p.862.
74 Raz, Ethics in the Public Domain, p.307.
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Dworkin’s work assumes. What might this mean for Dworkin's theory of 
political and legal integrity? It suggests that integrity does not do what it claims 
to do: it does not give an account o f law which explains the premise that the 
existence of law cannot be separated from its claim to normative authority.
4.3 The authority o f law: Raz’s critique of
integrity
Raz gives a detailed critique of Dworkin’s theory of integrity based upon the 
objection that Dworkin fails to account for the authoritative nature of law.75 
Raz begins by arguing that the law always and necessarily claims that it has 
legitimate authority, and goes on to show that since the law claims to have 
authority it is capable of having it.76 Once this point is established, Raz 
identifies two features which must be possessed by anything capable o f being 
authoritatively binding. These two features are as follows:
“First, a directive can be authoritatively binding only if it is, or is at least 
presented as, someone’s view of how its subjects ought to behave. Second, it 
must be possible to identify the directive as being issued by the alleged 
authority without relying on reasons or considerations on which the 
directive purports to adjudicate”.77
These features are necessary characteristics o f law and necessary characteristics of 
authority.
Raz’s argument is, in summary, that Dworkin’s conception o f law contradicts 
these two features. As we saw, Dworkin argues that ‘the law’ includes the best 
justification of the legal materials. This best justification may be one that has
75 Raz criticises Dworkin in various articles and monographs. Here I concentrate particularly 
upon his arguments as set out in “Authority, Law and Morality’', and in chapter 13 o f Ethics 
in the Public Domain (“The Relevance o f  Coherence").
76 Raz, “Authority, Law and Morality", pp.300-302.
77 Ibid, p.303.
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never been thought of before, one that has never before been explicitly 
mentioned either in judicial opinion or legislative statement.78 Dworkin’s 
theory here clearly contradicts the first feature of authority (and thus o f law, 
which claims authority for itself). According to Dworkin, there can be laws 
which do not express anyone’s judgment on what their subjects ought to do, 
nor are they presented as expressing such a judgment.79
Neither does Dworkin’s theory fulfil the second necessary characteristic of 
authority. Quite contrary to that condition, Dworkin argues that the 
identification of much of the law depends on considerations which are the very 
same considerations which the law is there to settle. On Dworkin’s conception 
of integrity, establishing what the law is involves judgment on what it ought to 
be .80
Raz concludes that Dworkin’s theory is therefore inconsistent with the 
authoritative nature of law. The rationale for authority and the authoritative 
instructions of which law consists is to enable people to act on ‘nonultimate 
reasons’, to “save them the need to refer to the very foundations of morality and 
practical reasoning generally in every case“.81 Law must mediate “between the 
precepts of morality and their application by people in their behaviour”,82 but 
Dworkin’s conception denies to the law this fundamental role.
In his detailed notes to the text of Law's Empire Dworkin considers, and rejects, 
Raz’s criticism o f his work on this score. Referring to the Raz’s article in The 
Monist (“Authority, Law and Morality”), Dworkin replies that Raz “falls back
78 LE, p.247.
79 Raz, “Authority, Law and Morality”, p.309.
80 Raz is careful to underline here that his disagreement with Dworkin is not about how  
judges should decide cases: his argument here is aimed at Dworkin’s claim to offer not only a 
theory o f adjudication but a theory o f law (“Authority, Law and Morality”, p.310).
81 Raz, “Authority and Justification", p.136.
82 Raz, “Authority, Law and Morality”, p.310.
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upon linguistic rules, to say that this is just what ‘law* or ‘authoritative’ means 
under criteria for its application educated lawyers and laymen accept”.83 Yet 
Dworkin’s dismissal o f Raz’s argument does not square with a detailed reading 
o f it. As Finnis points out,84 Raz explicitly denies that he assumes such 
unanimity or conceptual clarity and instead founds his argument on claims 
about what practices are “ serviceable”85 and beneficial and (evaluatively) 
“important”86 -  exactly the type of reasons Dworkin demands when he says that 
any plausible argument must be “an argument of political morality or wisdom”. 
Finnis agrees with Raz: Dworkin fails to recognise the worth of having clear 
rules “for securing that litigants are treated uniformly at a given time”.87 A 
sound legal theory, according to Finnis, should have no hesitation in tracing the 
authority o f law back to convention, not consensus of independent conviction.
Raz’s arguments are convincing, but once more we seem to be swinging 
backwards and forwards between the legal positivist emphasis upon rules, and 
Dworkin’s emphasis upon the reasons behind them. Raz’s argument is 
essentially one that emphasises the need for authoritative rules in order to secure 
co-ordination within a community, and which resonates with the ideals 
commonly associated with the concept o f the Rule o f Law, such as 
predictability and stability. Yet there is a constant dialectic between a political 
community’s need o f such stability, and its need o f flexibility in certain 
situations. Schauer, discussing the differences between what he terms the 
jurisprudence of rules (of which Raz’s work would be an example) and the 
jurisprudence o f reasons (Dworkin), argues:
83 LE, p.431.
84 Finnis, “O n Reason and Authority in Law‘s Empire”, p.369.
83 Raz, “Authority, Law and Morality”, p.304.
86 Ibid., p.320.
87 Finnis, “O n Reason and Authority in Law*s Empire”, p.378.
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“when the moral and political stakes are high, as in constitutional 
adjudication, or when we are uncertain of the values we wish stabilized, as 
with common law adjudication, we have implicitly embraced something 
much closer to the jurisprudence of reasons then to the model of rules'’.88
For the purposes o f this chapter the most important aspect o f this quotation is 
that the emphasis moves away from the characteristics (authoritative, legitimate) 
o f the object (law) and instead introduces a subject - the \ve’ who are 
‘uncertain’. For in reflecting upon legitimacy and authority we are, once more, 
back at the issue of perspectives.
An immediate connection should be made here with the problem o f 
perspectives picked up in Chapter One of this thesis while discussing what 
Dworkin terms the ‘preinterpretive stage’ - the point at which the rules and 
standards taken to provide the content of the practice are identified. Dworkin 
criticised Hart’s work on his terms, assuming it to be an interpretation of the 
law; MacCormick and others noted that Hart gave a far more plausible 
explanation of the stage of identifying the law - which may then go on to be 
interpreted. We saw that the seemingly insurmountable difference between Hart 
(and other legal positivists) and Dworkin could be easily explained by 
distinguishing two different approaches from which law can be studied (what 
were termed the ‘committed normative’ and ‘detached normative’ points o f 
view),
Any reflections on the nature of authority and legitimacy in the European 
Union must encompass further consideration of the question of perspective. 
The focus o f this chapter is “the critic’’, by which cryptic title I have in mind 
the person who approaches law obliquely by stepping even further back and 
examining more carefully the nature o f the various possible points of view. In 
Chapter One, I distinguished three types of perspective: the external perspective,
88 Schauer, “The Jurisprudence o f  Reasons”, p.869.
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the detached, normative perspective, and the committed, normative perspective. Within 
the last, ‘committed normative’ perspective, I briefly looked at the individual, 
the judge, and the ‘practically reasonable person’ (Finnis’ ‘central case’). In the 
next section I will present the arguments o f J.M. Balkin, my chosen critic, who 
goes much further in his analysis o f the relationship between the object being 
studied and the subject who studies it.
4.4 Perspectives again - this time critically
4.4 .1  Partial perspectives
Although it is possible to separate out different perspectives on law by 
identifying those generally associated with particular subjects, such as the judge 
(as has crudely been done in the organisation o f this thesis), it must be 
emphasised that the blueprint of a perspective is rather to be found in the 
purposes of the subject.89 We saw in Chapter One that the purposes of an 
individual in her role as a legal scientist distinguish this perspective from that 
which she holds as an individual citizen. Balkin extends this argument by 
insisting that there are as many different forms of legal understanding (and 
perspective) as there are purposes in undemanding the law. Coherence, or 
integrity, for example, is more than a property of law; it is the result of a 
particular way of thinking about the law. He argues that we must “shift the 
focus...from the study of the properties the legal system is thought to have...to 
the nature o f the legal subject who apprehends the legal system and judges it to 
have these properties’’.90
89 A person w ho seeks to understand something is a ‘subject’; that something is the ‘object’ o f  
her understanding. See Balkin, “Understanding Legal Understanding: The Legal Subject and 
the Problem o f  Legal Coherence”, p.106, note 1. See further, e.g., Pierre Schlag, “The 
Problem o f  the Subject”.
90 Balkin, “Understanding Legal Understanding”, p.106.
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The goal of this approach, says Balkin, is “not to replace all inquiries about the 
legal object with those about the legal subject; it is rather to see the subject and 
object oflegal interpretation as equal partners in the constitution o f the legal 
system’’.91 It is a critical perspective, in the sense that it does not deny the 
importance of the internal perspective (on the contrary, it “takes seriously the 
contributions o f subjectivity to the nature of law”)92 but at the same time, 
“instead of taking for granted the primacy o f the internal viewpoint o f 
participants in the legal system, [it] asks how this internal experience comes 
about”.93
Balkin turns his critical perspective upon Dworkin, and argues that judgments ot 
integrity and coherence as ‘recommended’ by Dworkin only arise when we 
understand the law in a particular way. It is one o f many approaches to law that 
can be adopted by a subject for a particular purpose, and that will have a 
particular result. He calls this special type of legal understanding ‘rational 
reconstruction’, which is, briefly, “the attempt to see reason in legal materials - 
to view legal materials as a plausible and sensible scheme of human 
regulation”.94 The experience oflegal coherence is “the result of our attempt to 
understand law through the process o f rational reconstruction”.95
Yet there is no compulsion to take up the viewpoint o f rational reconstruction - 
it is only one interpretative attitude that we can adopt. We could, for example, 
understand a legal system according to a perspective o f rational deconstruction, 
where we “critically examine legal doctrine to discover its shortcomings”.96 








the legal object, and “to envision how it could be a reasonable accommodation 
of principles and policies that are themselves reasonable”,97 the goal of rational 
deconstruction is to examine legal doctrine in order to discover its 
shortcomings; it “is not to see the law’s substantive rationality, but its failures in 
that regard”.98
It is an easy to task to point to examples of both types o f legal understanding in 
the practice of and comment on EC law. Deirdre Curtin’s article on the 
changes introduced by the Treaty o f Maastricht,99 for example, falls squarely 
within Balkin’s viewpoint o f rational deconstruction: the “bricoleur’s
amateurism” she metaphorically finds in the haphazard construction of the 
elements o f the (then) new European Union is repeatedly held up (and found 
wanting) against the “master bricklayer’s strive for perfection and attention to 
detail”.100 Rational reconstruction, on the other hand, can be found in 
practically any o f the judgments o f the European Court of Justice, and is 
manifested even more clearly in the principled and rationalising opinions o f the 
Advocates General.
For Dworkin, his program of interpretation and of adjudication is the only 
acceptable way o f viewing law. Yet ironically enough, Dworkin himself 
demonstrates that there are many more ways of understanding an object than his 
picture of interpretation and his rationally reconstructive program of law as 
integrity would suggest. Balkin criticises the way in which Dworkin obscures 
“not only the many different forms o f legal understanding, but also the many 
different forms o f  nonlegal understanding”.101 His discussion of the Critical 
Legal Studies movement is, as Balkin points out, a clear example of a case in
97 Ibid.
98 Ibid.
99 Curtin, “The Constitutional Structure o f the Union: A Europe o f  Bits and Pieces”.
100 Ibid., p.24.
101 Balkin, “Understanding Legal Understanding”, p.134.
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which Dworkin’s purpose is manifestly not to portray an object in its best light: 
when Dworkin is describing and criticising CLS, “constructive interpretation 
and interpretive charity are thrown out the window”.102 Dworkin’s mistake is 
to fail to take the implications of his own argument to their logical conclusion: 
“if law is truly an interpretive enterprise, we must necessarily be concerned with 
the ideological, sociological, and psychological features o f interpretation and 
their effects on our internal experience of understanding”.103
Balkin takes up the criticism levelled at Dworkin by Finnis and others, and 
noted in Chapter One of this thesis: that Dworkin is mistaken to pick out one 
particular form and purpose of understanding (in his case, that of the Herculean 
judge) and bestow upon it the title of the internal perspective. However, 
Dworkin is in good company: to forget the purposive and contextual 
component to all understanding is the “occupational hazard of traditional 
jurisprudence”,104 according to Balkin. The person who understands law for the 
purpose of rational reconstruction (the ECJ judge, for example) and the person 
who understands law for the purpose of prediction (Rasmussen’s ‘realist’ 
approach to the European Court of Justice springs to mind) might each believe 
that they are engaged in the same enterprise and that the other party is mistaken. 
“In fact, each is merely projecting [his] situated, purpose-driven subjectivity 
onto the object o f their study and giving it the name o f ‘the theory of law’”.105
It is perfectly possible to agree with Dworkin that judges do and should take up 
the perspective o f rational reconstruction when deciding cases. However, while
102 Ibid. Balkin notes that Dworkin dismissses CLS in “five pages and two lengthy footnotes” , 
a tendency to set aside his own practices o f  argument which is repeated in relation to other 
theoretical positions contrary to his own. Charles Silver has argued, for example, in relation 
to Dworkin’s understanding o f  legal positivism, that “Dworkin rarely asks whether an 
argument he calls positivistic is the best argument a Legal Positivist could make” - Silver, 
“Elmer’s Case: A Legal Positivist Replies to Dworkin”, p.381-2.




there is nothing wrong with offering a normative or descriptive theory ot 
judicial understanding, it must be labelled accurately. The problem is that 
Dworkin believes that explicating this form of undemanding also explicates the 
nature o f law.106 The consequence o f Dworkin’s view is, suggests Balkin, that 
“the subject, her purposes, and her preconceptions disappear from view. 
Interpretation has become purposeless and subjectless”.107
We saw in Chapter One that one o f the strengths of Kelsen’s approach is that 
he, unlike Dworkin, understood the partial nature of his own perspective and 
took certain points of view to be complementary (sociological and normative 
jurisprudence, for example). It is Cotterrell who highlights this aspect of 
Kelsen’s work, and Cotterrell who writes most clearly about the obfuscatory 
nature of a failure to understand the partiality of one’s own perspective:
“normative legal theory has too often been presented as if it represented 
truth about the nature o f law, when what it actually represents is a certain 
partial perspective or cluster of closely related perspectives on 
law...Normative legal theory...becomes mystificatory only when it is 
assumed that what is being discussed is not primarily the particular mode of 
thought of lawyers about law in a certain context but, in some general and 
timeless sense, the nature of law. Then, normative legal theory, assuming 
itself to be not a specific, partial perspective or limited range of perspectives 
on law but a somehow complete perspective, turns into professional 
ideology...It is ideological precisely because it does not even notice that its 
own perspective is inevitably limited and incomplete”.108
Ideology is, of course, hardest to resist when considering the fundamental issues 
of the legitimacy and authority of law. I shall set out further BaJkin’s explication
106 Ibid, p,133. This criticism o f Dworkin is widespread -  see, for example, Schauer, “The 
Jurisprudence o f Reasons”, p.851, and Ruth Gavison, “Comment on Dworkin”.
107 Balkin, “Understanding Legal Understanding”, p.133.
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of the critical perspective in order more effectively to return to Dworkin, the 
European Community, and its political and legal legitimacy.
4.4 .2  T h e critical perspective
As we saw, Balkin suggests that we ground jurisprudence in a critical 
perspective, one which sees the subject and object of legal interpretation as 
equal partners in the constitution o f the legal system.109 Balkin goes on to 
elaborate further on the nature of this critical perspective. It has, he proposes, 
three aspects. Firstly, legal understanding is a purposive activity of subjects, not 
simply the apprehension o f preexisting properties of a subject. Secondly, 
understanding depends not just on the purposes of the subject, but also upon 
features o f the self: judgments of legal coherence and incoherence, for example, 
are “shaped by the features and sources of our understanding - our preexisting 
commitments, values, and beliefs, and our knowledge and ignorance of the legal 
system”.110 Thirdly, legal undemanding is itself a source of power over the 
subject. The process of understanding can never leave us untouched: “we must 
recognize not only the effects that our undemanding has on the objects we 
construct, but the effects that the act of undemanding has on us”.111
As far as the first aspect of the critical perspective is concerned, it is clear that 
Dworkin views the political legitimacy (or lack of legitimacy, as the case may 
be) of a legal system as a property of that system. For him, the European 
Community is legitimate if its political practices accept the principle of integrity 
- if it makes laws which are coherent and which express a commitment to a 
coherent scheme of principle. Dworkin’s rational reconstruction of the law uses 
what Balkin calls a test of hypothetical justification: “The law (or some part o f
10  ̂Cotterrell, The Politics of Jurisprudence, p.229.
109 See Balkin, “Understanding Legal Understanding”, pp. 106-7.
110 Ibid., p. 112.
111 ibid.,p.ny ;
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the law) is coherent112 if  we can explain it by a set of consistent principles and 
policies which, i f  they were justified, would justify the content of legal 
doctrine”.113 Yet he also employs the technique of rational deconstruction 
where necessary, which adopts a test not of hypothetical justification but o f 
actual justification: “The law (or some part of the law) is coherent if we can 
explain it by a set o f consistent and justified principles and policies which, taken 
together, justify the content o f legal doctrine”.114
Balkin, through detailed argument and over several pages, shows that the use o f 
these two tests, and the consequence o f taking up the points of view of rational 
reconstruction and deconstruction, is to spike us on the horns of a dilemma.
“A theory of actual justification too readily collapses questions of coherence 
into those of moral justification and thus guarantees that almost any existing 
legal system will lack coherence. On the other hand, a principle of 
hypothetical justification, by divorcing questions of coherence from those of 
moral justification, seems to do no important justificatory work at all; it 
threatens to make the issue of coherence tautological”.115
The result, then, is “an endless dialectic”116 between the two tests, in which one 
side constantly defends the consistency o f legal doctrine while the other attacks 
it. The dilemma cannot be resolved so long as the subject refuses or is unable to 
step outside the circle and look more closely at her purposes in engaging in 
these types of understanding.
112 I will not dispute Balkin’s characterisation o f  Dworkin’s theory as a coherence theory o f  
law, although this point is disputed, Raz, for example, discussing coherence theories, does 
not include Dworkin’s among them, although he argues that Dworkin’s is open to many o f  
the same objections. See Raz, Ethics in the Public Domain, pp.319-321.
113 Ib id .,pM 7.
114 Balkin, “Understanding Legal Undemanding”, p. 117.
115 Ibid., p.117. On the dialectic between the tests o f  actual and hypothetical justification, see 
pp. 117-121. On rational reconstruction and deconstruction, and their employment o f the 
justification dialectic, see pp. 124-127.
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If it is accepted that any understanding of authority and legitimacy will be 
tempered according to the purpose o f the subject, not simply by identification 
o f certain properties of the object, then not only Dworkin’s theory but also that 
o f Raz is necessarily partial. Balkin suggests that Raz’s discussion of coherence, 
although made with greater consciousness of the influence of the chosen point 
o f view, is still incomplete in that Raz fails to identify the further categories 
within his chosen perspective o f ‘participant*, and the further distinctions 
between them arising as a result of their various purposes. While Dworkin, we 
saw, makes the mistake of picking out the perspective o f the judge, Raz makes 
the mistake of picking out one form of understanding practised by “particular 
legal elites” and then “ [bestowing] upon it the title of 'the internal 
perspective’”.16 17
I will return to the purposes of the subject in the next section, where I attempt 
to use the critical perspective to shed further light on the authority of the 
decisions of the European Court of Justice. For the moment, however, I will 
move on to the second element of the critical perspective: the influence upon 
understanding of the features of the self. Continuing with the example o f 
rational reconstruction, Balkin discusses three features o f subjectivity that will 
shape such judgments. I will summarise them very briefly. First is the state o f 
our moral and political beliefs: “political ideology...actively assists in the 
construction of the legal object of interpretation”.118 The second is the state o f 
our knowledge about the legal system: Balkin suggests that our knowledge o f 
*what the law is’ is remarkably limited, even for individuals who regularly 





of the legal system or parts thereof may be as much matters of faith and 
ideological presupposition as the consequence of reasoned analysis’".119
The third is the state of our efforts at rational reconstruction through 
considering possible conflicts o f value between legal doctrines. What Balkin 
seems to mean by this is that although we may purport to escape from our own 
subjectivity by viewing legal doctrines as in some way competing amongst 
themselves, we are misguided to do so: there is no understanding and there is 
no judgment of coherence or legitimacy that is not made by a particular subject. 
The implications o f this are two-fold. Firstly, our experience of legitimacy will 
be necessarily grounded in our social situation and in the manner in which we 
encounter law, and secondly, our understanding of legitimacy will be dynamic - 
our continuing experience as individuals will shape and change our judgments.
Although I will later come back to the third point, I have raced through these 
features of subjectivity because I want to give greater attention to Balkin’s 
treatment of the theory that any subject engaged in understanding is greatly 
influenced by a psychological need to reduce irrationalities and incoherences in 
the world around him. This is the theory o f cognitive dissonance, which claims 
that “when faced with inconsistent beliefs and attitudes, we engage in cognitive 
work to reduce the resulting dissonance”.120 Since individuals need to believe 
that their own beliefs are ordered, coherent and rational, when dissonance occurs 
in the object studied, it will lead to a change in the behaviour, beliefs or 
attitudes o f the subject.
When considering how judgments o f legal coherence will be affected by this 
need, Balkin suggests, the key question is whether an individual has an 
‘ontological stake’ in the coherence o f the legal system. It will, in fact, be very
119 Ibid., p.139.
120 Ibid., p.144, citing the work o f  J. Richard Eiser, Social Psychology: Attitudes, Cognition and 
Social Behaviour (1990) and Susan T. Fiske and Shelley E. Taylor, Social Cognition 467-68 
(1991).
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likely that an individual will have a considerable stake in believing that the 
norms and arrangements in the society in which she lives are morally coherent. 
For example, they will probably have used those norms to justify their own 
actions. Their own code of conduct may well be partly if not entirely 
constituted by that of the society’s. Any challenge to the belief of the justice and 
coherence of the society’s norms would require enormous effort on the part of 
the individual to arrive at alternative conceptions o f the vast number of 
standards that they unselfconsciously accept and apply.121
At first glance, practising lawyers “would seem likely candidates for strategies o f 
dissonance reduction to avoid uncomfortable conclusions about legal coherence 
and incoherence”, says Balkin.122 Yet clearly different types of lawyers will have 
different stakes in the system. A judge of the European Court of Justice will 
have a strong stake in believing in the rationality o f the system he has helped to 
create. Similarly, a judge of a Member State will have a similar stake in the 
coherence of the relationships between his national system and the Community. 
A legal academic will most probably have a very weak stake, however, since 
academics’ role is often to discover normative disorder in the law - although this 
may be restricted to local pockets of law, not the entire canvas.
The theory of cognitive dissonance leads us to the third element of the critical 
perspective: the affect that legal understanding itself has on the subject. Rational 
reconstruction, for example, “is not merely something that we do to the law; it 
is also something that the law does to us”.123 The act of understanding affects 
both the subject as well as the object of interpretation. Whenever we seek to 
understand a text we must be open to the possibility that it is true and that it has 
something to teach us: understanding is “the willingness to be confronted by




what the text says and recognize it as possibly having more authority than our 
own judgments”.124 i
This is why “we are not wholly safe” when we interpret:
“To understand is not, as some might think, to study the object o f 
interpretation at a distance, free from its claims upon us. It is above all to be 
challenged, to be vulnerable to the alteration o f  our own beliefs through the 
fusion of horizons. To risk understanding is to risk change”.125
There are two dangers, Balkin argues, in any act o f understanding. Firstly, we 
run the risk that interpretation will become simply an affirmation of our existing 
beliefs and traditions: understanding may mean “the reinforcement of existing 
prejudices already located in ourselves and in the constructed object of our 
contemplation”.126 127The second danger stems from the way that the object of 
understanding confronts us with its claims to truth. We saw that understanding 
involves willingness to change: it is however possible that we may be seduced 
into agreeing with the wrong things. These two dangers are thus two 
symmetrical difficulties inherent in interpretation: that we will too easily 
conform the interpreted object to match our preexisting beliefs (Balkin calls this 
the problem of conformation) and that we will too easily tailor our beliefs to 
match the interpreted object (co-optation).4127
We saw in the previous chapter that Dworkin’s objections to accounts of 
judicial decision-making which attempt to constrain the feared evil of a rogue 
judge struck a chord of truth when he pointed out that the image of the deviant 
judge is the stuff of fantasy in the huge majority o f cases. A conversation with
124 Ibid., p.153, citing Hans-Georg Gadamer, 
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any judge in the European Court of Justice will confirm the suspicion that 
accusations of seditious political manoeuvering and politically motivated 
activism on the part of the Court are simply not credible - just as in national 
legal systems, judges tend in good faith to apply what they sincerely believe to 
have identified, to the best o f their ability, as the law.128
Balkin’s critique does in fact support Dworkin’s insistence upon the fact that 
disagreement about the law does not match the ‘rogue judge’ accounts of legal 
decision-making. Yet it also strikes another chord, this time in dissonance with 
Dworkin, in that it suggests that the problem may be quite different: the danger 
o f conformation, for example, is that when a liberal judge looks at the law, she 
already sees liberal principles emanating from it and understands deviations from 
these principles as simply mistakes. In other words, the problem may be not the 
consciously subversive judge but the entirely sincere judge, who is “destined to 
see the law according to her own ideological perceptions and beliefs’’.129
The danger of co-optation is just as strong. The history o f the first decades o f 
the European Community gives a good example o f a situation in which those 
involved in understanding and interpreting this unprecedented type of legal 
organisation were subject to great pressure in making of it a success. Given that 
understanding is a type of vulnerability and receptivity, it is not surprising if any 
newcomer, whether to the Commission, Court of Justice, or any other 
Community institution, or a newcomer to the study of Community law, asks 
less whether Community legal doctrine makes sense than he or she attempts to 
grasp why it makes sense.
Any judge might feel somewhat daunted, faced with the warnings that Balkin’s 
critical analysis o f understanding gives. Assuming that she rejects a consciously
128 o f  course this does not mean that judges never apply political morality: but political 
morality is applied not because it is their own but because they believe it to be sound in the 
legal system within which they work. There is a great difference between the two.
129BaIkin, “Understanding Legal Understanding”, pp.162-3, note 122.
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sceptical position, such as anarchism, and that she wants in good faith to try’ and 
interpret and apply the law as well as she can, she is faced with an obstacle 
course. She is told by Dworkin’s ‘program of adjudication* to emulate his ideal 
judge, to attempt to give Herculean judgments by interpreting the law in the 
best light possible. Yet Balkin’s critique tells her that she cannot escape herself, 
that Hercules may easily fall foul o f the dangers of conformation and co­
optation; that, oblivious to his psychological inclinations to reduce cognitive 
dissonance, Hercules may too easily match his own moral and political 
convictions to the law as he sees it; that in encouraging Hercules to focus 
exclusively on the object of interpretation, Dworkin may actually prevent 
Hercules (and his human imitators) from a necessary awareness of the effect o f 
the features of his own self upon the law and the effect of the law upon himself.
Furthermore, the Dworkinian judge will be engaged in rational reconstruction, 
which, Balkin argues, may well create the cognitive stake in the coherence of 
the legal system that leads to an individual’s attempts to reduce any dissonance 
found. This, he says, is the “unanticipated corollary” of Dworkin’s claim that all 
knowledge of law is interpretive:
“If disagreements about law are interpretive, we may have a personal stake 
in our interpretations because our reconstruction of the law has produced an 
agreement between ourselves and the constructed object of interpretation. 
Our interpretations -  which include our work at rational reconstruction - 
have become part of our beliefs, and our own sense of self-worth may 
depend upon their acceptance and success”.130
How, then, is a judge to tackle the job o f making decisions while fighting the 
urge to reduce cognitive dissonance, resisting the temptation of conformation 
and co-optation, and maintaining a constant alert with regard to her particular 
purposes, her effects upon the law and its effects upon herself? How can one
130 Ibid., p.164.
ever say that the decisions o f  a judge and the judgments of a court are 
legitimate? It is with these questions in mind that we move on to the next 
chapter, which focuses upon the legitimacy of the European Court of Justice.
4.5 Conclusion
Before beginning that new chapter, however, a brief recap of all the threads 
exposed in this chapter is in order. I began by discussing authority and 
legitimacy as concepts which could be applied to social organs such as rulers and 
courts, and distinguished three kinds of authority which might make up a 
judgment of ‘legitimacy’: social, legal and justified authority. It was the third 
type of authority and its relation to legitimacy which was taken to offer the 
most fruitful exploration of the authority and legitimacy of the EC. I then 
moved on to the work of Ronald Dworkin, who offers a particular model o f 
political legitimacy based on his theory of interpretation and o f integrity in law 
and politics. Taking only the first stage of his two-stage test of interpretation, 
that of fit, I found that it was disputable that integrity fits the legal and political 
practices of the EC. This would seem to be a death blow, on Dworkin’s terms, 
to any claim that the governance and law of the EC are legitimate.
However, this result had to be viewed in a different light once Raz’s arguments 
that Dworkin’s theory is inconsistent with the authoritative nature of law were 
considered. The dialectic between the ‘model o f rules’ and the ‘model o f 
reasons’ led back, once more, to perspectives, for an application of Balkin’s 
work to the question of authority and legitimacy showed that we should not 
look at legitimacy as the property of an object alone, but open our eyes to the 
effect of the properties of the subject. It became clear that our exploration of 
legitimacy, just as in relation to system and authority as discussed in Chapters 
Two and Three, must look to both subject and object: our understanding will 
be tempered by both the purposes o f the subject and the relation between 
subject and object. Chapter Five, which follows, takes a look at both subject 
and object in the situation in which the subject takes on probably the greatest
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In Chapter One, I described the two types of situation where the committed, 
normative perspective is taken up in relation to law. The first is that of the 
individual who looks to norms of law as reasons for action. The second is that 
of the judge who interprets and applies the law. This chapter is concerned with 
the second situation, and more particularly, with the perspective of the judges 
who interpret and apply the law of the European Union.
We have already seen that in developing his theory of law, Ronald Dworkin 
adopts the internal, participant’s point of view. I argued in Chapter One that 
Dworkin’s project fails because he fails to distinguish between ‘law’ and ‘the 
law’, offering as a theory of law what might best be described as a theory o f 
adjudication. This criticism came out more clearly in Chapter Four, where 
concentration on the question of the subject we engage in understanding law 
demonstrates how stunted a view of law which takes solely the eyes of the
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appellate judge will necessarily be. As Balkin says, *‘[t]here is nothing wrong in 
offering a normative or descriptive theory of judicial understanding if it is 
understood and labeled as such. The problem is that Dworkin believes that 
explicating this form of legal understanding also explicates the nature o f law” .1
However, rejecting Dworkin’s claim to offer a theory o f law does not entail 
rejecting his claim to offer a ‘program of adjudication*. In Law’s Empire 
Dworkin offers a sophisticated and subtle account o f the unique perspective o f 
the judge in the judge’s unique role o f not only understanding and interpreting 
but also applying law. Bengoetxea analyses the ECJ:
“as an institution which engages in social action mainly by furthering the 
Community project and continually reshaping EC law as a coherent order 
inspired by some notion of integrity or system. It is in this respect that the 
ECJ is a Dworkinian court” .2
This chapter considers this claim, the task that faces the judges who apply 
European Union law, and how Dworkin’s program of adjudication might work 
within the Union system. These judges who apply EU law are, of course, the 
judges of every Member State, but I focus particularly upon the cases and judges 
of the European Court of Justice.
Chapter Four ended with the question: how can one ever say that the decisions 
of a judge and the judgements o f a court are legitimate? This, for Dworkin, is 
‘the problem’. First of all, this chapter will consider ‘the problem’ in relation to 
the EU, using a particular and well-known case (Fratxcovicfi) as an example. 
Secondly, I shall take a quick look at the debate on judicial legitimacy of the 
European Court o f Justice. Thirdly, I will briefly set out the main points of 
Dworkin’s ‘program of adjudication’, and how it relates to some of the popular
1 Balkin, "Understanding Legal Understanding”, p.133.
2 Bengoetxea, T/ie Legal Reasoning of the European Court ofJustice, p.9.
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theories o f adjudication in the HU. Fourthly, I will clarify the extent to which I 
believe Dworkin’s program is open to criticism as a theory of adjudication: I 
return once more to the question of the subject, and the nature of Hercules, and 
conclude that integrity must eventually give way to justice at the point at which 
the judge must choose. With these qualihcations I then go on to apply 
Dworkin’s theory to another well-known case, Brasserie dti Pccheur and 
Factortame.
5.1 The problem
The problem is the way that people decide what ‘the law’ is. A particular bone 
o f contention in the context o f the European Union is the way that the judges 
of the European Court of Justice decide cases. As Dworkin puts it,
“Since it matters...how judges decide cases, it also matters what they think 
the law is, and when they disagree about this, it matters what kind o f 
disagreement they are having”.3
Since the Court o f Justice gives collegiate judgments and its deliberations are 
secret we do not have written records of the disagreements its judges have over 
what the law is in any given case. However, disagreements there most certainly 
are, just as there are disagreements about what the law is amongst the parties o f 
the case, the Advocate General who gives his opinion, the Member States and 
Community institutions that intervene with their views, and all the lawyers and 
interested individuals that are concerned to ask themselves that question.
Dworkin sets out his answer to the problem by attempting to unravel the 
argumentative nature of our legal practice: he joins that practice and “ [struggles] 
with the issues o f soundness and truth participants face”.4 He begins and 
illustrates his theory by describing some actual cases decided by judges in the
3 LE, p.3.
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United States and Britain for, as he says, all his arguments are “hostage to each 
reader’s sense o f what does and can happen in court”.4 5 Here I will begin by 
describing an actual case decided by the European Court o f Justice: Francovich v 
Italy.6
5.1.1 A n  exam p le: the Francovich  case
Sig. Francovich, Sig.ra Bonifaci and thirty-three others were employees of 
companies that had gone bankrupt, owing them millions of lire in unpaid 
wages. Just this situation had been envisaged yean earlier at the Community 
level and in October 1980 the Council had issued a directive which had the 
specific aim of protecting employees in the event of the insolvency of their 
employer.7 The method chosen to do this was for the Member States, in 
implementing the directive, to set up guarantee institutions financed by 
employers. The Member States were required to comply with the directive by 
23 October 1983 at the latest. However, Italy did not do so and in February 
1989 the Court o f Justice declared that it had failed to fulfil its obligation.8
By 1990 Sig. Francovich and the others had still received nothing and so they 
brought proceedings against the Italian Republic. They firstly argued that the 
directive had direct effect, and so claimed from the State the guarantee payment 
that the guarantee institution would, if  Italy had implemented the directive, 
have given them. Their alternative claim was for damages for the loss they had 
suffered as a result o f Italy’s failure to implement the directive. The Italian 
tribunals decided that further interpretation of Community law was needed, and 
referred three preliminary questions to the Court of Justice. The first, which
4 LE, p.14.
5 LE, p. 15.
6 Joined Cases C -6 /90  and C-9/90, [1991] E C R  1-5357.
7 Directive o f  the Council o f  20 October 1980 (80/987/EEC ).
8 Commission v Italy, Case 22/87, [1989] ECR 143.
done will be considered here, concerns the possible direct effect of the directive 
and, in the alternative, the issue of the non-contractual liability o f Italy.9
The European Community Treaties provide a particular procedure, to be found 
in Article 234 of the EC Treaty, under which national courts can refer questions 
of Community law to the Court of Justice. The Court gives a ‘preliminary 
ruling’ if requested to do so by a national court or tribunal. In Sig. Francovich 
and the others’ case, the Pretore di Vicenza and the Pretore di Bassano del 
Grappa requested an interpretation of Community law on the two questions set 
out above. Following the Article 234 procedure (or Article 177, as it was at the 
time), the European Court did not decide Sig. Francovich’s case: it gave a 
ruling on an abstract point of law which was then used by the Italian courts to 
give a judgment.
The Court of Justice firstly considered the question of the direct effect of the 
directive. The concept of directly effective rights has a very specific meaning 
within Community law. Normally the status of an international treaty in its 
signatory member states depends on the member state’s rules regarding 
international law. If the national legal system is ‘dualist’, such as that o f the UK, 
treaty law has to be enacted explicitly into national law in order to have effect 
there. In the European Community, however, Community provisions can 
create rights which individuals may rely upon before their domestic courts: this 
is the concept o f ‘direct effect’. This concept was elaborated by the Court o f 
Justice in a celebrated passage in a celebrated case, Van Gend en Loos:
“Independently of the legislation of Member States, Community law 
therefore not only imposes obligations on individuals but is also intended to 
confer upon them rights which become part o f their legal heritage. These 
rights arise not only where they are expressly granted by the Treaty, but also 
by reason of obligations which the Treaty imposes in a clearly defined way
9 The Fraticovich case (cit.).
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upon individuals as well as upon the Member States and upon the 
institutions o f the Community”.10
If the Court found that the directive did confer directly effective rights, Sig. 
Francovich and the others would have been entitled to a remedy in national 
law.
However, not all obligations o f Community law have direct effect. There are 
certain conditions: a measure must be clear and unambiguous, it must be 
unconditional, and it must not depend on further implementation by the 
Community institutions or the Member States.11 The Court found that the 
insolvency directive did not fulfil these conditions, and so the directive did not 
have direct effect.
The Italian courts had asked whether, in any event, Sig. Francovich and the 
others could claim reparation for the loss and damage they had suffered as a 
result of Italy’s failure to implement the directive. Yet the Treaties contained no 
provision expressly and specifically governing the consequences of breaches of 
Community law by the Member States (as the Court o f Justice explicitly 
recognised in a later case),12 in contrast to the provision made by the Treaty for 
the non-contractual liability of the Community institutions.13 According to one 
view, the Court should have therefore stopped there: in the absence of an 
explicit written Treaty norm, there was “no Community law on the matter” 14 
and so it should have fallen to the national law of the Member State concerned 
to determine whether the State were liable.
10 Van Gend en Loos v Nederlands Admiustatie de Belastingen, Case 26/62 [1963] ECR 1, p.12.
11 Francovich, para. 12 o f  the judgment, and see Hartley, The Foundations of European 
Community Law, p.200.
12 Brasserie du Pêcheur SA  v Federal Republic of Germany and R  v Secretary of State for Transport, ex 
parte Factortame Ltd and Others, Joined Cases C -46 /93  and C -48/93, [1996] ECR 1-1029.
13 Article 288 o f the EC Treaty.
14 Fraticotnch, Observations o f the Netherlands Government, p.5368.
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Yet according to the plaintifis in the case, there was Community law ‘on the 
matter’. They argued that the absence of a Treaty provision did not mean that 
Community law denied them a remedy. According to the plaintifis, the case- 
law of the Court o f Justice showed that EC law allowed them to claim damages 
for their loss. The lawyers o f Sig. Francovich and the others pointed to several 
earlier decisions of the Court of Justice where the Court had decided that States 
should compensate people for damage caused to them through the State’s 
infringement of Community law. In a 1975 case, for example, the Court ruled 
that a man who had lost money when a state body acted in contravention of 
Community law should be compensated for the damage he had suffered.15 In 
1990 a group of women who had been required to retire earlier than male 
colleagues by their employer, a state body,16 an act which was an infringement 
of Community law, were able to rely on the provisions of a directive in order 
to claim for damages.17
The lawyers of Sig. Francovich and the others relied on these cases as 
precedents, decisions which had made it part of the law that people in their 
position are entitled to compensation. In systems o f common law, such as those 
of the United States and of England and Wales, ‘precedent’ is a binding source 
of law. These systems both have doctrines of precedent, which means the 
doctrine that “decisions of earlier cases sufficiently like a new case should be 
repeated in the new case”.18 The European Community is different, however. 
There is clearly no strict doctrine of precedent, which obliges judges to follow
15 Russo v AIMA, Case 60/75 [1976] ECR 45.
16 In this case the Court also faced the question whether the women’s employer, British Gas, 
could be classified as part o f  the State before its privatisation. A claim for damages could only 
be pursued if, on the test the Court laid down, British Gas was part o f  the State; the House 
o f Lords later did decide that British Gas, when a nationalised industry, was an emanation o f  
the State for the purpose in question.
17 Foster v  British Gas, Case C -188/89 [1990] EC R  1-3313.
18 LE, p.24.
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the earlier decisions o f certain other courts, even if they believe those decisions 
to have been wrong.
Writers about Community law disagree about the bindingness o f precedent, 
although both the Advocates General and scholars use the term in discussing the 
European Court’s past decisions. A.G. Toth has shown that opinion ranges from 
the belief that the Court of Justice’s case-law is not binding and not a formal 
source of law, to the view that the Court’s decisions are binding on all 
European courts except the ECJ itself.19 The middle ground view is that the 
case-law “is at least de facto binding” because “the Court is so consistent in 
following its past decisions”.20 Barcelo notes that although the Court never 
refers to past decisions as ‘precedents’, it does use the cases as justification for 
stated rules or principles.
Differences of opinion between lawyers about the obligation to follow some 
past decision on the question o f law they now face may explain why some cases 
are controversial. This was not, however, the point of controversy in Francovich. 
The disagreement was about what law the cases contained. The doctrine of 
precedent only comes into play if the past decisions cited are sufficiently like the 
present case as to be ‘in point’. “Sometimes one side argues that certain past 
decisions are very much in point, but the other side replies that these decisions 
are ‘distinguishable’, meaning they are different from the present case in some 
way that exempts them from the doctrine”.21 Thus the UK and German 
governments argued that the cases the plaintiffs’ lawyers had cited were 
distinguishable because those cases involved directly effective rights contained in 
a regulation, not a directive, and certainly not a directive without direct effect. 
Another difference was that although the Court said that the plaintiffs should be
19 See Toth, “The Authority o f Judgments o f  the European Court o f  Justice: Binding Force 
and Legal Effects”.
20 Barcelo, “Precedent in European Community Law”, p.415.
21 LE, p.26.
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compensated, it also said that it was for the State involved and its courts to 
provide a remedy: in Russo, for example, the Court said that the State was liable 
“in the context o f the provisions of national law on the liability of the State”.22
In the view of Germany, the UK and the Netherlands, the cases cited were not 
only distinguishable but supported their view: Advocate General Mischo notes 
that “the plaintiffs...and the Commission on the one hand and the UK and the 
Netherlands Government on the other all cited those same judgments in 
support of divergent if not contrary propositions”.23 How can people who have 
the text o f a decision in front o f them disagree so radically about what it actually 
means, and about what law it has made? How can people disagree so radically 
about what the law is?
Such radical disagreements can arise because people have different ideas about 
what, properly, makes up the law, and about ways of identifying the law are 
acceptable. These ideas can be said to be theories about the way in which the 
law should be interpreted. Typically, however, these theories and the 
(normative) ideas about the proper grounds of law are not explicit. We have 
already seen that on one view the lack of an explicit Treaty provision on the 
non-contractual liability ‘exhausted’ the law on the subject; the plaintiffs, on the 
other hand, had a theory of law which extended beyond the Treaties.
In Francovich the Court of Justice employed a method of interpretation which is 
particularly associated with it: a method which is usually termed the 
‘teleological’ approach to legal interpretation. The Court argued that “[t]he 
issue must be considered in the light o f the general system o f the Treaty and its 
fundamental principles”.24 It pointed to particular principles contained 
elsewhere in Community law and interpreted the law on non-contractual
22 At para. 9 of the judgment.
23 Franeovich, Opinion o f  Advocate General Mischo, p.I-5384.
24 Francovich, para. 30 o f  the judgment.
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liability o f a Member State as conforming as closely as possible to these 
principles. The first principle it relied on was the principle that the rights 
conferred upon individuals by Community law must be protected. This 
principle was linked to the fundamental tenet that Community law must be 
fully effective, and to the duty o f the Member States, contained in Article 10 of 
the EC Treaty, to “take all appropriate measures...to ensure fulfilment of their 
obligations under Community law”.
The Court reasoned that “the full effectiveness...of Community rules would be 
impaired and the protection of the rights which they grant would be weakened 
if individuals were unable to obtain redress when their rights are infringed by a 
breach of Community law for which a Member State can be held 
responsible”.25 The availability of compensation was also “particularly 
indispensable” where, in the absence of action by the State, “individuals cannot 
enforce before the national courts the rights conferred upon them by 
Community law”.26 The Court therefore concluded that “ the principle 
whereby a State must be liable for loss and damage caused to individuals as a 
result of the breaches of Community law for which the State can be held 
responsible is inherent in the system of the Treaty”.27
The Court employed its own particular theory of law and interpretation in 
deciding Francovich: others compared the decision against their personal theories 
o f law in criticising it. Trevor Hartley, for example, commented that the judges 
of the ECJ had used the Francovich case as part of their “campaign to make 
directives fully effective”, implying that the Court’s reasoning was in fact a 
sham, a cover for a purely political decision.28 In Hartley’s view the Court in 
some cases does not really try to identify the law. All the judges really want to
25 Fraticovich, para.33 o f  the judgment.
26 Francovich, para.34 o f  the judgment.
27 Francovich, para.35 o f  the judgment.
28 Hartley, The Foundations of European Community Law, p.225.
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do is promote their own values and objectives. He accuses the Court ot 
“judicial legislation’*,29 and o f ignoring “the distinction between what the law 
ought to be and what it is“.30 In his view the ECJ has “given judgment contrary 
to the Treaty”, and these “departures from the objective meaning of the Treaty 
were not the result of inadvertence, or a misunderstanding of the text, but were 
deliberate”.31 Are Hartley’s criticisms justified? How are Community judges 
supposed to decide the cases in front o f them, and how do we assess whether 
their decisions are correct?
5.2 The critics o f the court: a turmoil o f red 
herrings?
Both judges and critics do - and necessarily must - use some normative theory 
of law in making or criticising decisions. We saw in Chapter One that Phelan’s 
claims to be outside legal theory boiled down to no more than a refusal to 
engage with theoretical positions other than his own. Similarly, critics of the 
Court of Justice who condemn or approve of its decisions are without fail 
assessing judgments against their own bench-mark theory of legitimate decision­
making. Hjalte Rasmussen is quite simply wrong when he says that “a 
normative theory o f interpretation o f Community law is not a precondition for 
discussing meaningfully judicial excess of power”32 and that, further, the 
fontiulatioti of a normative theory o f interpretation of Community law is not 
even feasible.33
29 Hartley, “The European Court, Judicial Objectivity and the Constitution o f the European 
Union”, p.95.
30 Hartley, The Foundations of European Community Law, p.87.
31 Hartley, Constitutional Problems of the European Union, p.41.




On the contrary, any statement that a judge or court has acted wrongly 
presupposes some normative yardstick which demonstrates what the correct act 
would have been. Rasmussen, for example, comments that the Court did not 
have “the slightest justification for ruling the way it did“34 in the seminal case 
Van Gend en Loos.35 The Court offered justifications for its decision: Rasmussen 
offers no explanation for his opinion that those justifications were not 
acceptable. Joseph Weiler was entirely correct to criticise Rasmussen on the 
ground that “[i]f the Court has acted improperly one is presumed to have a 
criterion, the application of which would indicate what the proper result should 
have been“ .36
Rasmussen in fact contradicts himself: he claims that he rejects the possibility o f 
a normative theory of interpretation, while at the same time giving us the seeds 
of his own. His criticism of Van Gend, for example, is based on a theory about 
the importance o f fidelity to the plain meaning of a legal text: he says that the 
Court of Justice “went way beyond the textual stipulations o f [Article 
189(3)]”.37 Similarly, he approves of the decision in another case because the 
interpretation “remains within the textual limitations established by the 
language of [the] Article“ .38 He also refers to the extent of the European 
Court’s loyalty to the intention o f the ‘Founders of the Community’ as another 
element in the acceptability or otherwise o f the Court’s judgments.39
Trevor Hartley, another vigorous critic o f the ECJ, also has strong views about 
the role of the text in legal interpretation. His condemnation of several of the 
Court’s judgments is based on a theory which gives pride of place to the
34 Rasmussen, On Law and Policy in the European Court of Justice, p.12.
35 Case 26/62, [1963] ECR 1.
36 Weiler, "The Court o f Justice on Trial”, pp.565-6.




“natural meaning o f  the words used”40 and which condemns decisions which he 
characterises as “contrary to the text”.41 And it is clear that any theory of 
interpretation of written sources of law such as provisions o f the European 
Treaties must give place to the words which form them; as a one-time judge at 
the Court of Justice has said: “You have to start with the wording of a 
provision, with its ordinary or special meaning”.42 This approach towards 
identifying the law has been classified in relation to the ECJ as the ‘textual 
method’, normally the “point o f departure of all interpretation” by the Court.43
Yet the textual method forms only part of the Court of Justice’s theory about 
the way it should decide its cases. It is another method of interpretation which 
is most famously (or infamously, depending on one’s point of view) associated 
with the ECJ: the so-called teleological method. It was to this method that the 
Court was turning in Francovich when it said that the issue of the non­
contractual liability o f the Member State had to be considered “in the light o f 
the general system of the Treaty and its fundamental principles”.44 Teleology is 
the study o f final causes and ultimate objectives, and the purpose of the legal 
teleological method is “to interpret a rule taking particular account of the 
purpose, the aim and the objective which it pursues”.45
The Court of Justice favours teleological reasoning46 and its corresponding 
emphasis on the “fundamental principles of the Community legal system”,47
40 Hartley, “The European Court, Judicial Objectivity and the Constitution o f the European 
Union”, p.95.
41 See pp.96, 100 and 101.
42 H. Kutscher, “Methods o f interpretation as seen by a judge at the Court o f Justice”, p.I-5.
43 See Bredimas, Methods of Interpretation and Community Law% p.34.
44 At para. 30 o f the judgment.
45 F. Dumon, “The case-law o f the Court o f  Justice -  A critical examination o f the methods o f  
interpretation”, p.III-87.
46 Tridimas, “The Court o f  Justice and Judicial Activism”, p.204.
47 Brasserie du Pêcheur, para. 26 o f  the judgment.
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which it believes to be “generally accepted methods o f interpretation” .48 
However, it is clear that this approach to law is not accepted by Hartley, nor 
Rasmussen, nor by certain other critics o f the Court.49 Yet this rejection o f the 
reasons the Court gives for its decisions is supported by no discussion or 
argument explaining why the Court’s interpretation is wrong. Hartley, for 
example, does not even mention the importance the ECJ gives to teleological 
reasoning. From demonstrating that the Court in some cases does not always 
limit itself to the literal and “natural” meaning of the text (perfectly true), he 
leaps to the radical conclusion that the Court therefore makes decisions outside 
the law, simply pursuing its own political agenda of promoting European 
federalism.50
The charges are grave: not only that the Court has usurped its role but that it 
has done so “in pursuance of a settled and consistent policy” .51 This is typical o f 
the nature of criticism of the ECJ: as Edward says, “it seems...to be suggested 
that each o f the [members of the Court] has successively been enveigled (but by 
whom?) into the web of an ongoing conspiracy”.52 But as Tridimas points out, 
“ [n]o persuasive argument has so far been made why, in exercising its 
interpretative function, it would not be legitimate for the Court to seek 
guidance from the spirit and the scheme of the Treaties and to seek to further 
integration” .53
48 Ibid.
49 See, for a recent example, Sir Patrick Neill Q .C ., “The European Court o f Justice: A Case 
Study in Judicial Activism”. Neill argues that the Court o f  Justice has breached the 
boundaries o f  its judicial role and that many o f  its judgments are “logically flawed or skewed 
by doctrinal or idiosyncratic policy considerations” (p.245).
50 See Hartley, The Foundations of European Community Lato, pp.86-90, and “The European 
Court, Judicial Objectivity and the Constitution o f  the European U nion”, p.95.
51 Hartley, The Foutidatiotis of European Community Law, p.95.
52 David Edward, "Judicial Activism -  Myth or Reality?”, p.31.
53 Tridimas, “The Court ofjustice and Judicial Activism”, p.205.
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The question of the correct approach to interpretation of Community law has 
been further muddied by the use o f the terms ‘activism’ and ‘passivism’ in 
criticising certain o f the ECJ’s judgments. Judicial ‘activism’, as Pierre Pescatore 
says, is “une expression éminemment subjective...Ce qui est décrié comme 
activisme par l’un est perçu par l’autre comme une protection juste et 
nécessaire’’.54 Rasmussen, for example, condemns judgments as unacceptably 
activist and therefore illegitimate, while negating any criteria of legitimacy apart 
from the “known reactions to the European Court’s jurisprudence given by 
society’s countervailing powers”,55 by which he means the other Community 
institutions plus the courts, parliaments, administrations, legal commentators, 
press and so on of the Member States.56 Apart from the fact that this test ignores 
the role of courts in protecting minorities against majority power,57 it can in no 
way reflect upon the legitimacy or legality of the Court o f Justice’s judgments. 
To say that a judgment is ‘activist’ on Rasmussen’s terms merely reflects the 
extent and the nature of the public response to it, no more.
This is not enough. The question o f what the law is and how it can be 
identified is fundamental. Faced with a case which could provoke or has 
provoked censure from the ‘countervailing powers’, the central issue is the 
question of law: what do the Treaties,58 properly interpreted, actually require? If 
the right answer to that question in the Francovich case is that the Member States 
must compensate individuals to whom they have caused loss and damage as a 
result of breaching Community law, then deferring to a contrary opinion of the
54 Pescatore, “Jusqu’où le juge peut-il aller trop loin?'*, pp.301-302.
55 Rasmussen, “Between Self-Restraint and Activism: A Judicial Policy for the European 
Court”, p.36.
56 Ibid., p.36, and Oh Law and Policy in the European Court of Justice, pp.7-8.
57 See Cappelletti, “Is the European Court o f  Justice ‘Running Wild’?”, where he points out 
that “it is one of the most important virtues o f  the judicial function...not to be strictly bound 
to the environment’s powers and pressures” (p.6). See also Weiler, “The Court ofjustice on 
Trial”, p.570.
58 Or, more widely, “the law o f the European Union”.
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“countervailing powers’“ would be to amend Community law in just the 
‘activist* way critics such as Rasmussen think so appalling. As Ronald Dworkin 
says, the question o f law is inescapable.59 If critics of the Court ignore it, “all 
their indignation about judicial usurpation...is irrelevant to legal practice, a 
turmoil of red herrings“ .60
5.3 Ronald Dworkin and the question o f law: a 
program o f adjudication to recommend to judges 
and use to criticise what they do
Ronald Dworkin’s work in his book Law's Empire is all about the question o f 
law. He elaborates a solution to the problems that we face when confronted 
with disagreement about the law such as that we saw in the Francovich case. He 
focuses on one particular question: “how can the law command when the law 
books are silent or unclear or ambiguous’*?61 The answer to this question, the 
core of his program of adjudication, is that “legal reasoning is an exercise in 
constructive interpretation, that our law consists in the best justification of our 
legal practices as a whole, that it consists in the narrative story that makes of 
these practices the best they can be“ .62
5.3.1 C onstructive interpretation and law as in tegrity
Interpretation takes place in many different contexts. The most common 
context, which is probably also the most familiar to us, is conversation, when 
we interpret the “sounds or marks another person makes in order to decide 
what he has said’’.63 Interpretation of conversation is “purposive”: “it assigns 






speaker to have"’,64 reporting this meaning as the ‘intention’ of the speaker. 
Artistic interpretation is also familiar to us: critics interpret books and films and 
paintings in defending some view of their “meaning or theme or point“.65
It is central to Dworkin’s theory of law that he believes the interpretation of 
law, and in fact o f all social practices, to be analogous to the interpretation of 
art. He explains as follows:
*‘[T]he interpretation of a social practice...is like artistic interpretation in this 
way: both aim to interpret something created by people as an entity distinct 
from them, rather than what people say, as in conversational interpretation, 
or events not created by people, as in scientific interpretation”.66
The nature of legal and artistic interpretation is particularly to be distinguished 
from the interpretation of what people say. Legal and artistic interpretation are 
instances of creative interpretation; the latter of conversational interpretation.67 
Although all three are concerned with purpose, and in interpreting works of art 
or social practices we may aim to decipher the authors’ intentions in writing a 
particular novel or a community’s purpose in creating a practice of courtesy, 
creative interpretation is not conversational but constructive. The purposes in play 
in creative interpretation axe not the purposes and intention of the author or 
community but o f the interpreter herself. Interpretation of art, or courtesy, or 
law, “is a matter o f imposing purpose on an object or practice in order to make 





67 See LE, pp.50-53.
68 LE, p.52.
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However, the interpreter is not free to capriciously make any interpretation she 
may wish. The interpretation takes place within certain boundaries, since “the 
history or shape o f  a practice or object constrains the available interpretations o f 
it” .69 Dworkin also takes pains to clarify that the ‘author’ still has a role to play 
in the interpretation of art and o f social practices:
**[E]ven if we reject the thesis that creative interpretation aims to discover 
some actual historical intention, the concept of intention nevertheless 
provides the formal structure for all interpretive claims. I mean that an 
interpretation is by nature the report of a purpose; it proposes a way o f 
seeing what is interpreted -  a social practice or tradition as much as a text or 
painting - as if this were the product of a decision to pursue one set o f 
themes or visions or purposes, one ‘point’ rather than another”.70
Therefore, "creative-interpretation, “on the constructive view, is a matter o f 
interaction between purpose and object...A participant interpreting a social 
practice...proposes value for the practice by describing some scheme of interests 
or goals or principles the practice can be taken to serve or express or 
exemplify”.71
The constraints on the interpreter, however, do not exclude the possibility that 
there may be competing interpretations. The “raw data” may not -  in fact, 
typically will not -  lead to only one possible interpretation: “those data will be 
consistent with different and competing ascriptions” .72 In these cases, the initial 
test, based on these data, gives way to another: each interpreter must then make 






value for the practice -  which one shows it in the best light, all things 
considered”.73
The Mata’ o f law lead to many, possible interpretations, and Dworkin develops 
his own by considering two other alternatives.. One he terms ‘conventionalism’, 
the idea that judges discover and enforce special. legal conventions.74 The 
, second is ‘pragmatism’, which finds the best interpretation of law in the idea 
that judges do and should make whatever decisions seem to them to be the best 
for the community’s future, not counting any form of consistency with the past 
as valuable for its own sake.75 It is however the third conception of law which 
concerns us here. This is ‘law as integrity’, the interpretation of law that 
Dworkin constructs and champions.
“Law as integrity denies that statements of law are either the backward­
looking factual reports of conventionalism or the forward-looking 
instrumental programs of legal pragmatism. It insists that legal claims are 
interpretive judgments and therefore combine backward- and forward- 
looking elements; they interpret contemporary legal practice seen as an 
unfolding political narrative” .76
Law as integrity also differs from conventionalism and pragmatism in that it does 
not offer itself as an interpretation of our legal practice.
“Law as integrity...is both the product o f and the inspiration for 
comprehensive interpretation of legal practice. The program it holds out to 
judges...is essentially, not just contingently, interpretive; law as integrity asks
73 LE, p.53.
74 See LE, p.410 and Ch.4.
75 See LE, p.95 and Ch.5.
76 LE, p.225.
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them to continue interpreting the same material that it claims to have 
successfully interpreted itself’.77
Law as integrity, unlike conventionalism and pragmatism, therefore offers itself 
as a program of interpretation.
Dworkin shows his concept of law as integrity in action by comparing law with 
literature, drawing an analogy between a judge deciding what the law is on 
some issue and a literary critic “teasing out the various dimensions of value in a 
complex play or poem”.78 He introduces an “artificial genre of literature”79 that 
he calls the ‘chain novel’.
“In this enterprise a group o f novelists writes a novel seriatim; each novelist 
in the chain interprets the chapters he has been given in order to write a 
new chapter, which is then added to what the next novelist receives, and so 
on...[T]he novelists are expected to take their responsibilities o f 
continuity...seriously; they aim jointly to create, so far as they can, a single 
unified novel that is the best it can be” .80
Each novelist must try and make the novel “the best novel it can be constructed 
as the work of a single author rather than, as is the fact, the product o f many 







“He must take up some view about the novel in progress, some working 
theory about its characters, plot, genre, theme and point, in order to decide 
what counts as continuing it and not as beginning anew”.82
Although he will not be able to find a single, exhaustive theme (“because the 
value of a decent novel cannot be captured from a single perspective”),83 
structure can be given to any interpretation he considers, by distinguishing two 
dimensions on which it can be tested.
As we saw briefly in Chapter Four, the first of these dimensions is the 
dimension of fit: a rough threshold requirement that an interpretation must 
meet if it is to be at all credible.84 The novelist cannot adopt an interpretation if 
he “believes that no single author who set out to write a novel with the various 
readings of character, plot, theme and point that interpretation describes could 
have written substantially the text he has been given”.85 It is not necessary that 
the interpretation should fit every bit o f the text, but it must nevertheless have 
“general explanatory power”;86 “it is flawed if it leaves unexplained some major 
structural aspect of the text”.87
If the novelist finds that more than one interpretation fits the bulk of the text, 
he must move on to the second test: the dimension of justification, or substance. 
This test “requires him to judge which of these eligible readings makes the 
work in progress best, all things considered”.88 The interpretation tested must 
provide a sound or even decent justification of the text in order to be
82 LE, p.230.
83 Ibid.






acceptable.89 At this point his more substantive aesthetic judgments come into 
play, judgments about the artistic importance of the ideas the novel could be 
taken to express. However, the two dimensions are not entirely separable:
“[T]he formal and structural considerations that dominate on the first 
dimension figure on the second dimension as well, for even when neither of 
two interpretations is disqualified out of hand as explaining too little, one 
may show the text in a better light because it fits more of the text or 
provides a more interesting integration of style and content”.90
The distinction between the dimensions of fit and of justification is therefore 
not so clear as may first seem: it is however “a useful analytical device that helps 
us to give structure to any interpreter’s working theory or style”.91
The dimensions o f fit and justification do not give structure only to a literary 
interpretation but also to an interpretation of law. The interpreter must first ask 
whether the interpretation he is testing fits the legal practices o f his community, 
and then, in examining which of competing interpretations is best, which one 
offers the best justification of those legal practices. Dworkin’s theory of law as 
integrity then asks that judgment be made: the two dimensions of the 
interpretive judgment must come together and so the interpreter “must also 
meld these dimensions into an overall opinion: about which interpretation, all 
things considered, makes the community’s legal record the best it can be from 
the point o f view o f political morality” .92
Law as integrity asks a judge deciding a case to think of himself as an author in 
the chain o f law,93 working from the standpoint of political morality just as the
89 See LE, p. 139.
90 LE, p.231.
91 Ibtd.
92 See LE, p.411.
93 See LE, pp.238-9 and p.313.
novelist must interpret the chain novel as a story that he must continue 
according to his judgment of how to make that story as good as it can be from 
the standpoint of aesthetics. In order to “exhibit the complex structure of legal 
interpretation”,94 Dworkin introduces an imaginary judge of “superhuman 
intellectual power and patience”95 who accepts law as integrity: a judge called 
Hercules. Hercules is immediately put to work ‘deciding* an English common 
law case, since the similarity of legal interpretation to literary interpretation and 
the concept of the chain novel are most evident in the absence of a statute or 
other legislative source.96
While European Community law does not encompass a ‘common law’ in the 
Anglo-American sense of the term,97 I will appropriate Hercules for a quick 
look at two joined cases in which the argument did, nevertheless, “ turn on 
which rules or principles of law ‘underlie’ the related decisions of other judges 
in the past”:98 9Brasserie du Pêcheur and FactortameFirst, however, I will take a 




96 See Dworkin, A Matter of Principle, p.159.
97 I believe the arguments Dworkin offers regarding the interpretation o f  ‘common law* cases 
are still applicable to the European Community. He defines common law cases as cases in 
which “no statute figures centrally in the legal issue, and the argument turns on which rules 
or principles o f law ‘underlie’ the related decisions o f other judges in the past” (A Matter of 
Priticiple, p.159) -  in other words, cases in which “the plaintiff appeals not to a statute but to 
earlier decisions by courts” (LE, pp.23-4). There are dearly cases in EC law which fulfil this 
wide definition: for example, as Advocate General Mischo noted, the entire argument in 
Francovich was based on the case-law o f  the Court o f Justice (para. 36 o f  his Opinion). 
Brasserie du Pêcheur and Factortame were the following episode in the Francovich saga and the 
argument o f the parties similarly relies on EC ‘common law’.
98 Dworkin, A Matter of Principle, p.159.
99 Joined Cases C-46 and 48/93, Brasserie du Pêcheur S.A. v Germany, R  v Secretary of State for 
Transport, ex p. Factortame Ltd [1996] ECR 1-1029.
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5.4 ‘Law as integrity’ in the European Union
I will return to the critics o f the Court of Justice and ask how Dworkin’s 
‘program o f adjudication’ might relate to some of the theoretical arguments that 
have been raised as support for accusations of judicial activism and criticisms o f 
its decisions. Tho first -section considers the role o f the preambles of the 
Community Treaties, while the .second compares the Court’s favoured 
‘teleological method’ o f interpretation with law as integrity and tries to show 
how they differ. /The third looks at the views of those who have criticised the 
way the Court interprets legal texts, and the fourth considers more generally the 
view that the Court should interpret Community law according to the 
intention of those who created it.
5.4 .1  T he role o f  the pream ble and other ‘p o litica l’ guidelines
Should the preambles and other provisions of the Community Treaties which 
state the principles and purposes of the Community be taken into account by 
people interpreting the law? Rasmussen for one argues not: he says that such 
guidelines are essentially political in nature and not judicially applicable. To seek 
inspiration in such guidelines is, he believes, “the root of judicial activism which 
may be an usurpation of power”.100 Cappelletti, however, disagrees, saying that 
it is perfectly legitimate for the Court of Justice to rely on them; in fact, the 
Court has a duty to promote the policies stated within them.101
Dworkin would support Cappelletti: since the core of law as integrity is a 
standpoint which views the law o f a community as the expression of that 
community’s commitment to a background scheme of principle, the statements 
o f principle and purpose within the Community Treaties can be used by the 
judge in constructing the best interpretation he can o f the law he is concerned
100 Rasmussen, On Law and Policy in the European Court of Justice, p.62. See also p.508.
101 Cappelletti, “Is the European Court o f  Justice ‘Running W ild’?”, p.9.
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with in a particular case. The judge who accepts law as integrity may also look 
to other formal declarations of general institutional purpose, which provide a 
contemporary interpretation of the law that was created at that time:
“He acknowledges that legislation is seen in a better light, all else being 
equal, when the state has not misled the public; for that reason he will prefer 
an interpretation that matches the formal statements of legislative 
purpose...”.102
This will particularly be the case if it is likely that citizens have made crucial 
decisions relying on those statements.
5.4 .2  Law as in tegrity  and teleological interpretation
The Court o f Justice generally begins with the language of the provision to be 
interpreted: “You have to start with the wording of a provision, with its 
ordinary or special meaning”.103 However, although it does use several methods 
of interpretation,104 it favours the ‘teleological method’ of reasoning, in 
particular in relation to the Community Treaties. Dumon defines it as follows:
“Teleology is the study o f final causes and o f ultimate objectives...The 
purpose o f the legal teleological method is to interpret a rule taking particular 
account of the purpose, the aim and the objective which it pursues”.105
Thus the Court will consider issues before it “in the light o f the general system 
o f the Treaty”106 and by reference to the "fundamental principles o f the 
Community legal system”.107
102 LE, p.346.
103 Kutscher, ‘‘Methods o f  interpretation as seen by a judge at the Court o f  Justice”, p.I-5.
104 More generally on the Court’s methods, see Anna Bredimas, Methods of Interpretation and 
Community Law, and Bengoetxea, The Reasoning of the European Court of Justice.
105 Dumon, ‘‘The case-law o f  the Court o f  Justice - A critical examination o f the methods o f  
interpretation”, p.III-87.
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The wide contextual approach o f the teleological method is clearly similar to 
the program of adjudication Dworkin holds out in the form o f his theory of law 
as integrity. The teleological method also seems to have been developed by the 
Court in a way which resonates with the constructive understanding o f 
interpretation championed by Dworkin. Dworkin argues that interpretation ot 
law is constructive in that lawyers must interpret it as something created by 
people as an entity distinct from them. Bredimas describes how the Court 
approaches its_task in a way which seems constructive, in Dworkin’s sense: it 
“starts from the fact that the Communities eidst and by deduction draws the 
consequences of the established order”..106 708
However, law as integrity is not to be equated with the teleological method o f 
interpretation. Law as integrity is not a method of interpretation: it is essentially 
interpretive, in that it argues that law in itself is an interpretive concept and that 
the content o f law depends on more refined and concrete interpretations o f the 
same legal practice that it has begun to interpret.109 As such it encompasses the 
different methods the Court of Justice might employ: they are all available to 
play a part in integrity’s requirement that the interpreter constructs the best 
interpretation possible of the Community’s legal practice.
The different methods of interpretation, such as literal interpretation or 
teleological reasoning, play a part in a constructive interpretation of Community 
law only in so far as they contribute to and constitute the interpretation that best 
fits and justifies that law. For example, on some types o f issues the best 
interpretation of the law will be that which, ostensibly, gives precedence to a 
literal method; it most conceivable situations it will matter more, for example, 
that the term of each Member State’s presidency of the Council is settled and
106 Fratuovichj para. 30 o f  the judgment.
107 Brasserie du Pechettr, para. 27 o f the judgment.
108 Bredimas, Methods of Interpretation and Community Law, p.79.
109 LE, p.410.
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not open to fresh consideration by the Court of Justice» than exactly what that 
term is. This use of the literal method would be, however, the result of the 
approach of law as integrity, judging that the principle of legal certainty and a 
literal understanding o f the language provide, in that case, the best interpretation 
of the law.
It accordingly follows that teleological interpretation may. often (legitimately) 
figure in the interpretation of Community law if its emphasis on purpose and 
fundamental principles consistently offers.the best constructive interpretation of 
that law. Pescatore, for example, approves the Court o f Justice’s use of 
teleological reasoning on the grounds that it is particularly suited to the nature 
of EC law:
“Les traités instituant les Communautés sont entièrement pétris de 
téléologie..,Les traités sont entièrement fondés sur la notion d’objectifs à 
atteindre.,.[L]a méthode téléologique n’est pas ici une méthode 
d’interprétation parmi d’autres; bien loin de là, il s’agit d’une méthode 
particulièrement approprié aux caractéristiques propres des traités instituant 
les Communautés’’.110 \  : j m' < > ^
Kutscher agrees that only a teleological and dynamic approach matches “the 
special features and requirements of the Community and its legal system’’.111 
Kutscher writes that the Court necessarily had to flesh out the bones of the 
Communities that the Treaties had provided: the Treaties had given a 
framework, defining with great clarity the plan, principles and objectives of the 
European Community project, but little detail. In that situation the Court was
110 Pescatore, “Les objectifs de U communauté européenne comme principes d’interprétation 
dans la jurisprudence de la Cour de Justice” , pp.327-328.
111 Kutscher, “Methods o f  interpretation as seen by a judge at the Court o f  Justice”, p.I-46.
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compelled to have recourse to the scheme, guidelines, principles and purposes 
underlying them .112
However, it is again worth underlining the point that the teleological method of 
interpretation, like any other method, may only figure in a decision about what 
the law is only in so far as it contributes to an understanding of the principles o f 
justice, fairness and procedural due process that provide the best constructive 
interpretation of the community's legal practice.113 Law as integrity ^and 
teleology have a common approach in that they both advocate the 
interpretation of a rule within its wider context. However, they differ in that 
law as integrity does not end there: it does not simply propose an interpretation 
of a rule according to its purpose and context but requires that the 
interpretation be part of a far more wide-reaching conception of the 
community's law as expressing both the political and legal principle of integrity.
5.4.3 T he ‘natural m ean in g’? T extual interpretation
Criticism of the Court of Justice has in particular focused upon the way it has 
interpreted the Community Treaties and other ‘legislative’ sources of law. 
Recently Hartley, for example, has based a critique of the Court on a view of 
legal interpretation which rejects the various methods the Court has developed. 
Hartley’s views have been in their turn criticised, particularly by Anthony 
Amull in an article dedicated to replying to - and refuting - his accusations.114 
Amull’s critique systematically analyses Hartley’s claims; I offer no such detailed 
consideration of Hartley’s arguments. Instead, I will use Hartley’s work to draw 
out the implications o f Dworkin's ‘law as integrity’ for the Court of Justice 
when it is faced with a text to interpret.
112 Ibid., pp.1-33 and 1-36.
113 SeeLE, p.225.
114 Amull, “The European Court and Judicial Objectivity: A Reply to Professor Hartley”.
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Hartley accuses the Court of Justice o f “judicial legislation”115 on the grounds 
that it sometimes “interprets provisions of the Treaties contrary to the natural 
meaning of the words used”. He writes that the Court will “occasionally ignore 
the clear words o f the Treaty in order to attain a policy objective”,116 and gives 
as an example a case based on what was Article 173 (now Article 230) of the EC 
Treaty in which, Hartley argues, the Court tjave a judgment which was clearly 
“contrary to the text”.117 Commenting on this judgment (Les^Verts), he argues 
that the Court’s approach to the interpretation of the Article was based on a 
logic which “ignores the distinction between what the law ought to be and 
what it is”,118 and, further, that the Court in this and other cases has 
demonstrated that it “does not consider itself bound by the Treaties if they 
conflict with what it regards as desirable in the interests o f the constitutional 
development of the Community”.119
If the Court of Justice really does ignore what Community law is and instead 
substitutes its views on what it ought to be, Dworkin’s program of adjudication 
would support Hartley in his criticisms of it. Considering the responsibilities o f 
judges deciding constitutional cases, Dworkin says:
“Law as integrity condemns activism, and any practice o f constitutional
adjudication close to it. It insists that justices enforce the Constitution
115 Hartley, “The European Court, Judicial Objectivity and the Constitution o f the European 
Union", p.95. See also Hartley, Constitutional Problems of the European Union.
116 Hartley, The Foitndatiom of European Community Law, p.86.
117 Hartley, “The European Court, Judicial Objectivity and the Constitution o f  the European 
Union”, p.101, commenting on Case 294/83, Parti Ecologiste ‘Les Verts* v European 
Parliament, [1986] E C R  1339. See also Hartley, The Fourtdatiom of European Community Law,
p.86.
118 Hartley, The Foundations of European Community Law, p.87.
119 Hartley, “The European Court, Judicial Objectivity and the Constitution o f the European 
Union", p. 101.
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through interpretation, not fiat, meaning that their decisions must fit 
constitutional practice, not ignore it”.120
But in order to understand whether Hartley’s criticisms are justified, the first 
issue that must be faced is the question of what is the law: what does 
Community law, properly interpreted, actually require? What does Dworkin’s 
‘program o f adjudication’ recommend when the primary source of Community 
law is a provision o f the Treaty, or a regulation? The skeleton of the answer to 
this question is the same as that for common law cases. Hercules, as our super­
human law-as-integrity judge, must read legislation in whatever way follows 
from the best interpretation of the legislative process as a whole.
“Integrity requires him to construct, for each statute he is asked to enforce, 
some justification that fits and flows through that statute and is, if possible, 
consistent with other legislation in force’’.121
This justification must take into account both policy and principle and offer the 
best case possible for what the plain words o f the statute plainly require.122 This 
holds for constitutional provisions too: since a constitution is foundational o f 
other law, so Hercules’ interpretation of the document must be foundational as 
well: it “must fit and justify the most basic arrangements o f political power in 
the community, which means it must be a justification drawn from the most 
philosophical reaches o f political theory”.123
What did Community law, properly interpreted, require in Hartley’s example 
Les Verts? In this case the French Ecology Party brought an action under Article 
173 (now 230) o f the EC Treaty for review of a decision of the European 






information campaign about the work of the Parliament. However, this 
campaign was prior to the 1984 Parliamentary elections, and the funding 
effectively went towards the parties’ election campaign costs. The distribution of 
the money was also biased in favour of parties already represented within the 
EP, and discriminated against parties seeking representation for the first time, of 
which the French Ecology Party was one.
At the time of the challenge of Les Verts, Article 173 of the Treaty of Rome 
provided that:
“The Court o f Justice shall review the legality of acts o f the Commission
and the Council...”
The Parliament was not included as an institution whose acts were open to 
challenge. For Hartley, the provision was “perfectly clear”, and the judgment 
that the Court gave, which did allow the decision of the Parliament to be 
reviewed, was thus “contrary to the text” and an instance of judicial 
legislation.124 But Hartley’s view that the Court’s judgment was contrary to the 
text can only be sustained by a theory of literal interpretation which equates the 
law with the series of words in the legal text. Dworkin’s theory offers a different 
view: Article 173 conceived as a series of words is to be distinguished from 
Article 173 conceived as the expression of the law.125 There was no 
disagreement about what the provision said, but there was obviously 
disagreement about what the provision meant.
Hercules’ duty, in interpreting Article 173, is to decide what it means in 
accordance with the best justificatory combination o f principles and policies that 
he can construct for it. He must treat it as flowing from a background scheme o f
124 See Hartley, “The European Court, Judicial Objectivity and the Constitution o f  the 
European Union”, pp. 100-101, and The Foundations of European Community Law, pp.86-7.
See above, where Dworkin’s distinction between a poem conceived as a series o f  words 
and a poem conceived as the expression o f  a particular metaphysical theory or point o f  view  
was noted.
211
political morality to which the European Community is committed and which 
underlies the legal system as a whole. It will be clear to Hercules, examining the 
case, that the intention of the Member States at the time of drafting Article 173 
was to exclude the acts of the European Parliament from judicial review. 
Although the wording is clear, however, he will immediately recognise the case 
as difficult, not because of the language but because once he begins to construct 
the best justification he can for the Article, he finds that the body of principles 
and policies underlying it suggests that its exclusion o f the European Parliament 
is incoherent with the law that the Member States have since created.126
Hercules’ problem in Les Verts is comparable to an example Dworkin gives to 
demonstrate the way in which although a legal text can be perfectly clear there 
may still be fundamental disagreement about what law it actually expresses. 
Elmer had murdered his grandfather: he was convicted and sentenced to jail. 
His grandfather’s will provided that Elmer was to inherit the bulk of the estate, 
but in “Elmer’s case”,127 the grandfather’s daughters now sued the administrator 
o f the will, arguing that since Elmer had murdered their father, the law entitled 
him to nothing. The relevant statute o f wills, however, said nothing about 
whether someone named in a will could or could not inherit if they had 
murdered the testator. Elmer’s lawyer argued that since Elmer was named in a 
valid will, in accordance with all the requirements of the statute, he must 
inherit; to hold for the daughters would be to change the statute and substitute 
what it believed the law should be for what the law actually was.
Most likely the issue of an heir murdering a testator had not even occurred to 
the creators o f the statute of wills, and on the ‘plain and natural meaning’ of the
126 The distinction between hard and easy cases according to the clarity or opaqueness o f the 
language o f  a legal text is, for Dworkin, a ‘non-distinction’ -  “[i]t need not be drawn at all” 
(LE, p.351). The description o f  a case as ‘hard’ or ‘unclear* is “the result rather than the 
occasion o f  Hercules’ method o f interpreting statutory texts. W e will not call a statute 
unclear unless we think there are decent arguments for each o f  two competing 
interpretations o f it” (LE, p.352).
127 Riggs v  Palmer, 115 N .Y . 506, 22 N.E. 188 (1889), discussed by Dworkin in LE, pp.15-20.
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text Elmer’s lawyer was correct: no exception was made for murderers and so 
the will was valid. The parallels with Les Verts are dear: at the time that Article 
173 was drafted, the European Parliament did not even have the capacity to 
make decisions that affected the rights o f third parties - the possibility of adding 
the Parliament to the list of institutions whose acts would have been subject to 
judicial review would not have arisen. However, law as integrity requires a 
judge to interpret the legal text in its context, which includes changes in the 
purposes and principles underlying it over time.
Law as integrity rejects the view of time that is necessarily incorporated into the 
‘plain and natural meaning’ emphasis of the speaker’s meaning theory. Since on 
that theory legislation is an act of communication to be understood according to 
the conversational model of interpretation, the question o f intention must 
necessarily converge upon the particular moment in history “at which the 
statute’s meaning is fixed once and for all”128 - the moment at which the 
intention of the legislators “gave birth” to that law. Instead, the constructive 
interpretation of law as integrity allows Hercules, to “ [interpret] history in 
motion”,129 because h e . interprets “not just the statute’s text but its life, the 
process that begins before it becomes law and extends far beyond that 
moment”.130 His overall task is to make.the legislation’s story, the.best.it can be, 
but this means the continuing story, and his interpretation therefore changes as 
the story develops.131 So in completing his task he will identify not only the 
legislators at the time of the creation of the legislation but also a variety of 
people, groups and institutions whose statements, convictions and intentions 





132 See LE, pp.348-9.
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So Hercules, deciding Les Verts, would start by examining Article 173 within 
the context o f the system of legal remedies and procedures for review that the 
Treaty provides and o f which it forms a part. He must consider the rationale 
behind the provision for review o f the acts o f the Council and Commission and 
ask upon what grounds the Parliament was excluded from this list, and whether 
subsequent developments still support that distinction. He will note the 
principle of judicial review of the acts o f the institutions of the Community and 
must expand his search to ask how diffuse this principle is in the Community 
legal order, and what weight to give it in comparison with other relevant 
principles which, for example, limit the categories o f people who are to be 
allowed to challenge such acts. Hercules wall, in short, seek to understand what 
Article 173 legally requires according to the best interpretation of fairness and 
justice he can construct for it within the legal system of the Community.
The majority of the judges in Elmer’s case looked at the principles of justice 
elsewhere in the law, which gave great weight to the principle that no one 
should profit from his own wrong, and decided that the statute of wills should 
be read to deny inheritance to someone who has murdered to obtain it.133 
Similarly, the Court o f Justice in Les Verts looked to the fact that the European 
Parliament had, since the framing of Article 173, acquired powers well beyond 
its original consultative role, and to the principle underlying the Article and to 
be found elsewhere in the Community legal system that no institution or 
Member State of the Community should be immune to review of the 
compatibility of its acts with Community law, deciding accordingly that the 
Article was to be read as subjecting the Parliament to judicial control.
The program of adjudication that Dworkin’s theory o f law as integrity holds out 
to lawyers and judges does not approve or disapprove of the decisions in these 
cases, but it does approve the way in which the two courts seem to have gone
133 See LE. p.20.
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about interpreting the texts they had before them. The Court of Justice could 
have decided that the best justification of Article 173 it could construct 
demanded that it be read literally, that the meaning o f the Article did 
correspond to the ‘letter’ of the Article in that particular case.134 There is plenty 
o f room for discussion and criticism of the relative importance that the Court 
finally ascribed to the various principles and policies it would have identified in 
constructing an interpretation o f what the Article legally required according to 
an account which fitted and justified its meaning and its place within the wider 
body of Community law. But at least the Court would have reached that 
decision after making an interpretive judgment as to what the law required, not 
according to an over-simplistic theory of Community law which denies that 
anything other than the ‘plain meaning’ of the text is to be understood as law.
So according to the program of law as integrity, it is perfectly possible that 
Community law, and Article 173, properly interpreted, required that the acts of 
the Parliament were subject to judicial scrutiny. The correctness of the decision 
would have to be tested against a detailed and complex reconstruction of the 
judgments o f fit and of justification that the Court apparently made in deciding 
the case. But law as integrity in no way supports Hartley’s and others’ view that 
the Court decided the case in a way which was “contrary to the text’’ or by 
judicial fiat.
5.4 .4  The role o f  legislative intention
Shortly after the Brasserie du Pêcheur ruling, the UK government, in a paper 
setting out its position in respect to the EU Intergovernmental Conference, 
commented that “there is concern that the ECJ’s interpretation o f laws 
sometimes seems to go beyond what the participating Governments intended in
134 See LH, pp.18-19.
215
framing these laws”.135 However, following Dworkin’s ‘program of 
adjudication’, the intention of the Member States (or, for that matter, the 
Council, Commission and Parliament acting as the Community legislature) 
should not assume the role that the UK government would wish to see it play. 
This is both due to the particular nature o f the Community legal system but also 
to the nature of legal interpretation in general and to the demands integrity 
makes upon the interpretation of Community law.
The question of the intention o f the authors of law does, however, bring us 
back to the nature o f authority as discussed in Chapter Four. There we saw that 
Dworkin’s concept o f constructive interpretation could be criticised on the 
ground that it can subvert the nature o f  and need for authority through law 
within a community. Although I shall agree with Dworkin that judges should 
not attempt to establish with what intention the law was created when 
interpreting texts, J_ argue that Dworkin is wrong to disregard intention so 
entirely. Authority, in the end, must dissolve integrity into justice.
The intention of the authors of a Community legal text does not, institutionally, 
have the same importance given to it in other legal systems: the preparatory 
documents (travaux préparatoires) for the Treaties have never been published, for 
example, and the discussions o f the Council and Commission in preparing 
legislation are secret. Amull argues that it is important to recognise that the 
Treaties, in particular, are not the product of a legislative process but the 
outcome o f diplomatic negotiations: they “contain language on which the 
national delegations were able to reach agreement, but that is all”.136 Hartley 
believes, however, that the most important reason why the Court “[disregards]
135 White Paper (A Partnership of Nations), Cm 3181, 1996; see also Spink, “Contravening EC 
Law: The Liability o f  the Member State”, pp. 124-5.
136 Amull, “The European Court and Judicial Objectivity: A Reply to Professor Hartley”, 
p.412.
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the subjective intention of the authors o f the text”137 is that the Court prefers to 
interpret texts on the basis of what it thinks they should be trying to achieve, 
which “goes beyond interpretation properly so-called: it;is decision-making on 
the basis ofjudicial policy”.138
Dworkin terms the theory that statutes and other legislation must be read in 
accordance with the intentions o f their authors, in such a way as to give effect 
to those subjective intentions, the “speaker’s meaning” theory. This theory 
“ treats the various statements that make up the legislative history...not as events 
important in themselves, but as evidence of the mental states o f the particular 
legislators who made them”.139 Dworkin devotes a detailed discussion to the 
speaker’s meaning theory, which, in America, is a popular argument in the 
debate over how judges should decide cases. Dworkin's view is that it is 
fundamentally flawed.140 Its limitations become immediately apparent once it is 
asked exactly how it would work in practice; how judges should identify the law 
in this way. Numerous difficulties arise. An intention is part of an author’s 
mental state, but whose mental states count in fixing the intention behind an 
article of a Community treaty? Every person at the negotiating table, including 
those who voted against? Are the intentions of some - for example, those who 
were strongly in favour of the final wording - more important than others? 
Even if it were possible to decide whose intentions should ‘count’ as making up 
the more general legislative intention, there follow insuperable obstacles in 
identifying which of a person’s beliefs, attitudes or other mental states 
constitutes her intention - that is, if that intention is even clear to the person 
herself, and always assuming that it does not compete or conflict with her other 
intentions.




However, Dworkin_also offers more fundamental arguments against this theory, 
which can be traced back to his contention that the interpretation of law and 
other social practices is not an instance o f  conversational interpretation but of 
creative interpretation. The speaker's meaning theory is part of a strand ot 
thought which views the interpretation o f a social practice as the discovery ot 
the purposes and intentions of the other participants in the practice. But 
Dworkin rejects this: he points out that the claims and arguments participants in 
a the practice make are about what it means, not about what they mean.* 141 
Dworkin’s consideration of the speaker's meaning theory leads him to the 
conclusion that in the end the judge's only chance to interpret the law 
according to the intention of the legislature is to “train his interpretive 
imagination, not on the legislative record o f different legislators one by one, but 
on the record of the legislature itself, asking what coherent system of political 
convictions would best justify what it has done”.142 But at this point the judge 
has left behind the expectations of the law-makers as to what their language 
would do and come full circle to consider the question what the law-makers 
intended to say.
For the criticisms o f the ECJ based on its disregard for the intention of the law­
makers (whether Member States, Council, Commission or Parliament) are 
mistaken because they fail to make the crucial distinction between what the 
law-makers intended their language to say and what they expected their 
language to do.143 W hen the UK government and others say that the Court o f 
Justice goes beyond what the participating governments intended in framing the 
Treaties, they must mean that the Court should have identified the law 
according to what the law-makers expected their laws to do. Dworkin,
14(1 Dworkin discusses legislative intention in detail in relation to statutory interpretation (LE, 
pp.312-337) and also in relation to the constitution (LE, pp.359-363).
141 See LE, pp.62-65.
142 LE, p.335.
143 See Dworkin, FL, p.13 and p.10.
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however, argues that this is wrong: law as integrity demands that a judge look to 
what the law-makers intended to say, and then interpret what they created, not 
interpret their intentions.
Let us return to Hercules. Faced with provisions o f the Treaties, regulations, 
and so on - legislation, for our purposes - Hercules has two strategies to 
compare:
“He can build a legislative ‘intention* in two steps, by interpreting the 
record of individual legislators to discover the convictions that would justify 
what each has done, and then by combining these individual convictions 
into an overall institutional conviction. Or in one step, by interpreting the 
record of the legislature itself to discover the convictions that would justify 
what it has done*’.144
If he were to choose the first strategy, Hercules would need some formula for 
combining the individual convictions into a group intention: he would have to 
“combine individual convictions in whatever manner will provide the most 
plausible set of convictions to attribute to the legislature as a whole”.145 But the 
first strategy then collapses into the second: “the first (implausible and 
unmanageable) strategy would fail unless it somehow reached the same result 
the second reaches directly”.146 So Hercules will choose the second strategy, 
and interpret the record of the institution and not the records of its members.
Dworkin, then, claims that law as integrity offers a different understanding of 
interpretation - an undemanding according to which the Court may act 
perfectly legitimately in “going beyond” what the framers intended in 
interpreting the law they created, while not discarding legislative intention: 
intention forms the formal structure for the purpose which is at the root of all
144 LE, p.336.
145 Ibid.
146 See LE, p.336 and p.361.
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interpretive claims.147 Hercules must consider the intention o f the legislators but 
as part of the political history of the legislation that his eventual interpretation 
must fit and explain, just as it must fit and explain the actual text of the statute 
or treaty provision itself.148
However, although Dworkin’s approach to intention seems to assume a way of 
establishing the content of law before subjecting it to questions of integrity, it 
brings us back once more to the criticisms of Dworkin considered in Chapter 
Four. There we saw that the tests o f fit and justification are criticised by Raz as 
contradicting the authoritative nature o f law, and that both Raz, in his turn, and 
Dworkin, are criticised by Balkin for not taking into account the perspective 
from which they approach the law. Before applying Dworkin’s program of 
adjudication, then, these criticisms need to be considered more carefully.
5.4 .5  S om e qualifications to  the ‘program  o f  adjudication’
Balkin’s criticism o f Dworkin and Raz was based on the theory that 
understanding law entails looking not just to the object - law - but also to the 
subject - the person dealing with the law. That person can have any number o f 
characteristics and also purposes - for example, applying, interpreting, or 
obeying the law. W e saw in Chapter One that an outsider may have no interest 
in obeying or understanding the law himself, but is concerned only to establish 
when the subjects o f law will behave in a particular way. A judge, on the other 
hand, will have a commitment to the legal system which involves taking up the 
approach to law that Balkin terms ‘rational reconstruction’, viewing legal 
materials as having a rational sense and coherence.
Bearing in mind that Raz’s criticisms o f Dworkin concentrate on Dworkin’s 
claim to be offering a theory o f law, not just a theory of adjudication, it is clear
147 See LE, pp.58-9.
148 LE, p.314.
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that Dworkin’s program of adjudication offers a sophisticated theory of judicial 
decision-making. It develops the approach of rational reconstruction which a 
judge, who has a commitment to the legal system within which she or he is 
working, will necessarily have. A judge cannot regard norms as justified unless 
they reach some level of coherence and internal rationality. It is also of 
particular application in the European Union, since it has similarities with the 
teleological approach which the Court of Justice has already adopted.
However, we saw in Chapter Four how integrity does not fit or justify the 
political practices o f the European Union or ̂ Community, and that coherence 
must eventually give way to political choice, which may put community-wide 
co-ordination ahead of internal coherence. While an ideal authority may work 
according to integrity, an authority is justified largely by its ability to achieve 
social co-ordination (as will be discussed in Chapter Six), whose importance is 
such that it overrides lack of coherence. As Raz says, we should reject the 
“premiss that it is unintelligible for people to accept a less coherent body of 
principles over a more coherent alternative“.149
Where does this leave the judge?, Firstly, it is a grave thing for a judge to be 
presented with legal materials that contain blatantly inconsistent elements. As we 
have seen, the judge’s perspective will necessarily be one from which the: law is 
to be viewed as far as possible as constituting a rational and coherent whole. 
This is also part o f the judge’s duty to apply the law rather than create it. The 
judge will always be a force for order and integrity in interpreting the law since 
it is only by the extension of past principles that new and unexpected situations 
can be dealt with. Faced with a pattern of law-making which manifests too 
many conflicting principles and past inconsistencies, the judge can no longer 
extend the materials o f the past. An extension o f the concept of ‘flexibility’
149 Raz, Ethics in the Public Domain, p.298.
221
within the Community and Union can only be a challenging scenario tor the 
European Union judge.
Secondly, for Dworkin, integrity is enough: by following integrity, the judge 
can arrive at the ‘right answer’, the solution that best fits and justifies the 
materials before her. However, it is difficult to see how the tests o f fit and 
justification do not dissolve, ultimately, into a choice between competing 
justifications. This is not to say that judges make law in the manner in which 
legislatures create law: this is clearly not the case. However, integrity can only 
take the judge so far. In particularly opaque cases, the judge is ultimately faced 
with a moral choice: whether to adopt what would have been morally the best 
outcome had settled law not been imperfect, or follow the program o f law as 
integrity, which may lead to an otherwise less than ideal solution in view of the 
imperfections and incoherencies o f settled law.150
At the further reaches o f the test o f justification in judication, Dworkin falls foul 
once more of the issue of authority:
“[Integrity] advocates acting on principles which may never have been 
considered or approved, either explicitly or implicitly, by any legal 
authority, and which are inferior to some alternatives in justice and 
fairness...[This derives] from a desire to see the law, and judicial activities, as 
based to a larger degree than they are in fact, or should be in morality, on an 
inner legal logic which is separate from ordinary moral and political 
considerations of the kind that govern normal government, in all its 
branches’’.151
Just as it was not appropriate to accept a theory that viewed the political 




appropriate for the judges of the the ECJ to exclude considerations of justice at 
those points at which a choice between coherence and justice presents itself
It may be that in an ideal political community, there would be such harmony 
that adjudication can and should be conducted on the assumption that the law 
speaks with one voice. However, we have seen that in the European Union, 
there is such dissonance that on certain issues, the respect for difference must 
outweigh the desire for unity. Raz again: “In the politics of this imperfect world 
we know that imposing one voice on the law can be achieved - if at all - only 
through the imposition of a regime with an inherent tendency to sacrifice 
justice and fairness, restrict civil rights, and curtail individual freedom“.152
H ow  then does the conclusion from Chapter Four, that it may be right to 
prefer the solution which, for example, furthers co-ordination within the group, 
rather than the solution which is politically most coherent, affect the judge? The 
most “general point of law”, says Dworkin, is to establish why past politics are 
decisive of present rights.153 Yet whose purposes or point is this? As we have 
seen, the decision is not guided entirely by the discovery of a ‘right’ answer, but 
must rather lie in the sentiments, disposition and purposes of the chooser.154 It is 
right that a judge follow the path of Dworkin’s program of adjudication as far as 
she can, but at the deepest levels of the test of justification the program offers a 
falsely neutral picture of what is worthwhile. Integrity “lacks any articulated 
concept of the common good...which ought to be promoted as well as 
respected by those in authority, and for the sake of which others acknowledge 
that authority“.155
152 Ibid., p.312.
153 See LE, p.117.
154 See Finnis, “On Reason and Authority in Law's Empire”, pp.361-2.
155 Ibid., p.378.
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In the end the test o f justification itself may not, while relying solely on 
integrity, give a clear and unequivocal answer. It must dissolve into a question 
of justice. As Cornell says, integrity^ fails without justice: it becomes “either 
vacuous, because it cannot tell us exactly what the principles are by which we 
can legitimately reconstruct our historical practice and justify a break with 
precedent, or is itself dishonest, because it smuggles in a conception of justice 
but disavows it as essential to its interpretive schemata”.156 Dworkin’s account 
of the relations between fit and justification does not answer the question of 
what must be done where two or more answers are identifiable which both 
justify the legal and political materials in an equally accurate way.
From the point of view of the judge, there will not be one clear answer but a 
variety of incompatible right answers. As Finnis puts it, “in the absence of any 
metric which could commensurate the different criteria (the dimensions of fit 
and inherent moral merit), the instruction to ‘balance’ can legitimately mean no 
more than bear in mind, conscientiously, all the relevant factors, and 
c/i0ose...[T]he truth is that the choice was not guided by ‘the right answer’ but 
rather established it in the sentiments, the dispositions, o f the chooser”.157
Yet the judge is not free to give rein to her own sentiments and dispositions. 
The judge, Raz suggests, “should simply adopt the most morally sound 
outcome”.158 This means, in the terminology o f Chapter One, giving the 
judgment that comes as close as she as able to the judgment which a morally 
sound, practically reasonable person would give in the circumstances. Dworkin’s 
program o f adjudication can play a significant role in aiding the judge to go 
through a process o f  rational decision-making which greatly raises the chances 
that the judge will be able to make a judgment which does come close to that
156 Cornell, “Institutionalization o f Meaning, Recollective Imagination and the Potential for 
Transformative Legal Interpretation”, p.1173.
157 Finnis, “O n Reason and Authority in Law’s Empire *, p.374 (emphasis in original).
158 R aZj Ethics in the Public Domain, p.313.
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‘most morally sound outcome*. Although the caveats to ‘law as integrity’ should 
be borne in mind, Dworkin’s work still has much to offer to the European 
Union judge. It is on the strength of this conclusion that we may now move on 
to a more practical application of the way in which Dworkin’s theory can be 
used by those judges.
5.5 Chain novels and soap-operas: B rasserie  du  
P êch eu r and F a cto r ta m e
It is not so much the chain novel that is our model for Hercules’ European 
labours as a soap opera, and Brasserie du Pêcheur and Factortame are perfect 
examples: they are, after all, “two of the longest-running judicial soap operas in 
the Community’s history”.159 The chain-novel is an ideal case in that it 
unrealistically assumes that the text with which the novelist is furnished has the 
unity of something written by a single author. In practice, however, the text 
“would show the marks of its history”,160 and the interpreter would have to 
tailor the style of his interpretation accordingly:
“You must lower your sights (as conscientious writers who join the team of 
an interminable soap opera might do) by trying to construct an 
interpretation that fits the bulk of what you take to be artistically most 
fundamental in the text”.161
Hercules, ‘deciding’ Brasserie du Pêcheur and Factortame, is confronted with an 
episode in a series o f recent cases162 elaborating and building upon the basic




162 Which cases include, for example, Case C-5/94, R v Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and 
Food, ex parte Hedley Lomas (Ireland) Ltd, [1996] ECR 1-2533, and Case C-392/93, R v HM  
Treasury, ex parte British Telecommunications pic, [1996] ECR 1-1631.
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principle o f the non-contractual liability of the Member States laid down in 
Francovich.
In 1981 the French brewery Brasserie du Pêcheur SA was forced to stop 
exporting its beer to the Federal Republic of Germany, as the beer did not 
comply with the purity requirement in Germany’s Law on Beer Duty 
(Biersteuergesetz, abbreviated to BStG). In the meantime, however, the 
Commission was investigating this law, believing it to be contrary to what was 
then Article 30 (now Article 28) o f the EC Treaty, which prohibits “quantative 
restrictions on imports and all measures having equivalent effect” between 
Member States. The Commission eventually brought an action against the 
Federal Republic and in 1987 the Court of Justice held that the BStG was 
incompatible with the then Article 30. Brasserie du Pêcheur was then able to 
start exporting its beer to Germany once more, but also claimed damages from 
the German State for the losses it had suffered during the period of exclusion.
Factortame similarly involved a claim for damages, this time against the United 
Kingdom. The applicants, several companies and individuals, had already come 
to the Court of Justice twice before163 in relation to the requirements contained 
in a new registration system for fishing vessels introduced by the UK’s Merchant 
Shipping Act 1988. The Court found, in an action brought by the Commission, 
that the nationality requirements o f the Act were contrary to EC law.164 The 
applicants then claimed compensation from the UK for the losses and expenses 
they had incurred during the period in which they were unable to fish.
The applicants in both cases relied on the principle laid down in the Francovich 
judgment, that Member States could be liable in damages to individuals who 
had suffered damage as a result o f the State’s infringements o f Community law.
163 Case C -213/89  Factortame I [1990] ECR 1-2433; Case C -221/89 Factortame II [1991] ECR  
1-3905.
164 Case C -246 /89  Commission v United Kingdom [1991] E C R  1-4585.
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The national courts, doubtful about the interpretation of this principle, made 
references to the European Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling under the 
Article 177 (now 234) procedure. They asked, in essence, whether the 
applicants were entitled to damages from Germany and from the UK in the 
particular circumstances of their cases.16S
A chain novelist must find “some coherent view of character and theme such 
that a hypothetical single author with that view could have written at least the 
bulk of the novel so far”.166 Law as integrity requires Hercules, deciding 
Brasserie du Pêcheur, to think of himself as an author in the chain of European 
Community law. He must find some coherent theory about legal rights to 
compensation for damage suffered at the hands of Member States who breach 
EC law such that a single political official with that theory could have reached 
most of the results the precedents report.167
There will be various candidates for the best interpretation o f the precedent 
cases, and Hercules may set out possible interpretations of the Community law 
relevant to the claims in Brasserie du Pêcheur. His initial short list may resemble 
the following: (1) No one has a moral right to compensation for damage caused 
by a Member State that has breached an obligation of EC law; (2) People have a 
moral right to compensation from a Member State that has breached an 
obligation of EC law, but only if the breach relates to provisions without direct 
effect; (3) People have a moral right to compensation from a Member State that 
has breached any obligation of EC law, no matter how minor that breach is; (4) 
People have a moral right to compensation from a Member State that has 
breached any obligation of EC law, but only if the breach is serious; (5) People 
have a moral right to compensation from a Member State which has seriously 
breached any obligation of EC law, but not in circumstances where recognising
165 See [1996] ECR 1-1029, pp. 1036-7 and pp. 1040-1.
166 LE, p.240.
167 See LE, p.240.
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such a right would impose massive and destructive financial burdens on 
Member States out o f  proportion with the breach.
All of these possible interpretations contradict each other: no more than one can 
figure in a single interpretation of the non-contractual liability of the Member 
States. (O f course, Hercules may need to construct an interpretation from 
competitive rather than contradictory principles - that is, “principles that can 
live together in an overall moral or political theory though they sometimes pull 
in different directions”168 - which is a more complex case.)169 It is also only a 
very limited list o f  the contradictory interpretations someone may need to 
consider: it focuses particularly on the possibility o f the nature of the Member 
State’s breach being used as a condition for liability, for example, and ignores 
issues such as the type of damage, the causal link between breach and damage, 
Member States’ autonomy in the provision o f remedies, and all their 
permutations and combinations.
It does make a great difference which o f the five principles he decides provides 
the best interpretation of the cases. If he settles on (1) or (2) it is clear that he 
must decide that the applicants are entitled to no compensation; if he settles on 
(3) he must equally clearly answer that Germany and the UK are in principle 
liable. The other two require further thought, but the reasoning in each is 
different. (4) requires a judgment about the seriousness o f the Member States’ 
actions, and the criteria with which to judge them, whereas (5) requires a 
judgment both about the seriousness o f the breach and the wider consequences 
of the financial responsibilities of the Member States.
Hercules will begin testing each interpretation according to its ‘fit’ with the past 
cases. He asks “whether a single political official could have given the verdicts of 
the precedent cases if  that official were consciously and coherently enforcing the
168 LE, p.241.
169 Dworkin discusses competing principles in LE, p,241 and pp.271-275.
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principles that form the interpretation”.170 Obviously a single political official 
could not have answered as the Court of Justice did in the Francovich case if he 
or she were enforcing the principle in (1) that no one has a moral right to 
compensation for damage caused by a Member State that has breached an 
obligation of EC law. So Hercules would immediately dismiss interpretation (1), 
just as the Court did in fact do.171 172
Interpretation (2) was at the basis of the German, Dutch and Irish governments' 
observations in Brasserie. The three governments argued that Community law 
contains no general principle of state liability, and that the Member States 
should pay compensation only when there has been an infringement of 
Community provisions which are not directly effective, as in the case of the 
provisions of the directive at issue in Francovich. O n  this interpretation of 
Community law, the Court had decided Francovich according to the need to 
"close a lacuna in the system for the safe-guarding of rights”,173 limiting the 
non-contractual liability of the Member States to those particular circumstances 
and precluding compensation in situations such as those in Brasserie and 
Factortame.
The Court in Francovich defined the non-contractual liability of the Member 
States as the principle whereby they are obliged to make good loss and damage 
caused to individuals by "breaches of Community law for which they can be 
held responsible”,174 not specifying that only breaches of provisions with direct 
effect gave rise to this obligation. However, the court’s decision in Francovich 
related to a provision with indirect effect only, and Hercules has to cast his net
170 LE, p.242.
171 Brasserie du Pêcheur, para. 17 o f the judgment.
172 Observations o f the German government (Brasserie du Pêcheur, p. 1047), of the Irish 
government (p. 1051) and o f the Dutch government (p. 1052).
173 Observations o f the German government. Brasserie du Pêcheur p.1047.
174 See Brasserie du Pêcheur, paras. 35 and 37 of the judgment.
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wider in order to decide whether (2) is correct. He will move on to the next 
stage of his investigation: he will widen the range to include other judicial 
decisions, decisions in which the interpretive principles o f (2) may have been 
engaged. He will ask, for example, if  past decisions distinguish between 
provisions with indirect and direct effect, as (2) advocates, by providing different 
protection for people’s rights according to whether those rights were conferred 
directly or indirectly by Community law.
Having asked this question, Hercules would almost certainly agree with 
Advocate-General Tesauro in Brasserie that the principle o f the non-contractual 
liability of the Member States cannot be limited to breaches of provisions of 
Community law that are only indirectly effective, since to do so would 
contradict the far more comprehensive protection afforded overall to directly 
effective rights as opposed to indirect. In widening the range o f his investigation 
Hercules would quickly find that in cases o f infringement o f directly effective 
provisions Community law already gives protection and a remedy:175 indeed, if 
the Court in Francovich had found that the directive at issue had direct effect, 
the plaintiffs would have been able to rely upon it before their national courts. 
As Advocate-General Tesauro says, “it is the Francovich situation itself which 
represents possibly the furthest which the case-law of the Court can go”.176
So Hercules would come to interpretations (3), (4) and (5), all of which are 
based on the principle that people have a right to compensation from a Member 
State that has breached Community law, while disagreeing about the extent of 
that right. All of these interpretations could have been at the root of the 
decision in Francovich, which does not explicitly discriminate between them. 
Hercules must now continue to explore the wider context in which these 
principles have been engaged, asking whether any of the three must be ruled
175 Case 26/62 , Van Gend en Loos v Nederlands Adminstatie de Belastingen [1963] ECR. 1.
176 Brasserie du Pêcheur, Opinion of the Advocate General, p.1087.
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out because it is incompatible with the bulk of legal practice more generally.177 
If he discovers, for example, that past decisions provide that the Community 
itself must make good damage and loss it causes to people by breaching the law 
only if there was a deliberate intention to do so, he must rule out (3) unless he 
can find some principled distinction between the Community and the Member 
States.178
O ur European Hercules is thus required “to test his interpretation of any part of 
the great network o f political structures and decisions of his community by 
asking whether it could form part of a coherent theory justifying the network as 
a whole”.179 Although it is an impossible enterprise to fully interpret a 
community's law at any one time, judges must attempt this Herculean task as far 
as possible, by “[allowing] the scope o f his interpretation to fan out from the 
cases immediately in point to cases in the same general area and department of 
law, and then still farther, so far as this seems promising”.180 An experienced 
judge will in fact have enough of a sense of the context o f his immediate 
problem to be able to distinguish which interpretation of a small set of cases 
would survive if the range it must fit were expanded.
Interpretation (3) entails an approach to liability which requires compensation 
by a Member State for any act that is ultra vires per se. In the Community legal 
system Hercules will look for the principles underlying the conditions on which 
the acts of governmental entities give rise to an obligation to compensate loss 
and damage. This search will immediately lead him to the case-law of the Court
177 LE, p.245.
178 See LE, p.245.
179 LE, p.245.
180 LE, p.245. Dworkin describes this approach as giving a “local priority” to “departments” 
o f  law: for example, if  Hercules finds that the accidental damage cases o f  his community do 
not distinguish between two interpretive principles, he expands his investigation into, say, 
contract cases (see LE, pp.250-251).
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interpreting Article 288 of the EC Treaty, which provides that the Community 
itself must pay compensation in the case o f its non-contractual liability.
Hercules will be aware that the possibility of linking the tests for the non­
contractual liability o f the Member States to those already established for the 
Community has been discussed in academic and judicial circles, with some 
controversy.181 However, law as integrity asks him to assume that the law “is 
structured by a coherent set o f principles about justice and fairness and 
procedural due process“,182 and he has also a duty to apply these principles in 
fresh cases before him. He will therefore begin from the assumption that (3) is 
to be ruled out unless it is applied as a principle also in the case-law on the non­
contractual liability o f the Community; that is, unless there is another principle 
that would enable him to differentiate between the Community and the 
Member States in this case.
The case-law on the non-contractual liability of the Community rejects a strict 
liability test such as (3) and instead requires tests which limit liability. Hercules 
must then confront the arguments that the rejection of (3) in relation to the 
Community should not be accepted for the Member States: arguments, for 
example, which claim that the types o f Community action which breach EC 
law are unlike the types o f Member State action in that the Community has to 
make complex discretionary choices regarding economic policy.183 If he finds 
that these arguments do not justify the damage that would be done to integrity 
by introducing contradictory principles, he must reject (3).
If he does reject (3), he must tackle interpretations (4) and (5), which both 
argue that the liability of the Member States must be limited, (5) according to
181 See Craig, “O nce More Unto the Breach: The Community, the State and Damages 
Liability”, pp.78-79.
182 LE, p.243.
183 Craig, “Once M ore Unto the Breach: The Community, the State and Damages Liability”,
p.81.
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the seriousness of the breach, while (6), on the contrary, according to the 
burden liability could place on the Member State responsible. (5) suggests that 
liability might be unlimited in amount, as long as the breach is serious, while (6) 
limits liability precisely because of the frightening sums it might otherwise 
reach.184
The necessity to balance the competing interests o f the individual who has 
suffered loss at the hands of a Member State and the public interest in the 
Member State being free to make difficult legislative choices unencumbered by 
the risk of burdensome claims for damages is clear from Hercules* immediate 
circle of reference. Community law evidently limits in various ways the 
potential liability o f public bodies, but Hercules will most probably need to 
widen his search once more in order to assess (4) and (5). His widening circle of 
fit will encompass also the law of the Member States: the case-law on the non­
contractual liability o f the Community has been developed by the Court 
according to the rule in Article 288 itself that non-contractual liability be based 
on the "general principles common to the laws o f the Member States*’. If 
Hercules finds that one of the two interpretations is consistently contradicted, 
he must reject it.
Suppose, however, that he finds a mixed pattern. He may find, for example, 
that agricultural producers who have claimed for damages against the 
community have in some cases been denied compensation, apparently because 
the Court was concerned not to impose too heavy a burden of liability upon 
the Community, while in others the finding of a serious breach was not limited 
by concerns about the consequences. Hercules must attempt to balance the 
weight of the cases engaging each principle against each other - not merely 
numerically, but also by assessing the relative importance and reach o f the 
decisions.
184 See Dworkin, LE, pp.246ff, where he discusses comparable interpretations o f tort liability 
in emotional injur/ cases.
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Hercules’ examination of fit may still not furnish him with an answer; he may 
find himself with such a mixed record that he is unable to judge which of 
interpretations (4) and (5) best fits the law o f the Community. It is at this point 
that he must move questions of fit behind and move on to justification. Either 
the Community enforces the principle o f ‘serious breach’ as its test of liability, 
but has often lapsed, or it applies the principle of ‘serious breach’ limited by 
some overall ceiling on liability -  although, again, it has often lapsed from it. 
Which shows the Community “in a better light, all things considered, from the 
standpoint o f political morality”?185
The answer H ercules gives to this question depends on his convictions about 
justice and fairness. As Dworkin puts it:
“It will depend, that is, not only on his beliefs about which of-these 
principles is superior as a matter of abstract justice but also about which 
should be- followed, as a matter of political fairness, in a community whose 
members have the moral convictions his fellow.citizens havellJ86
For example, Hercules may think one o f the two interpretations better on 
grounds of abstract justice, but know that this is a radical view in that it is “not 
shared by any substantial proportion of the public and unknown in the political 
and moral rhetoric o f the times”.187 Hercules must balance the opinions of the 
community and the demands, as he sees them, of abstract justice, all within the 
context of the circumstances of the case.
Dworkin argues that Hercules is not here making a fresh, ‘clean-slate’ decision 
about what the law is according to his own view o f what the law ought to 




188 See Dworkin, A Matter of Principle, p.161, and LE, pp.260-261.
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discussed above. Hercules must bring política] morality to the heart of his 
decisions about law,189 but he cannot judge the law on the non-contractual 
liability of the Member States as expressing a particular principle or 
interpretation, however much that principle appeals to him personally, unless he 
finds it consistent in principle with the structural design of non-contractual 
liability and the Treaties as a whole, and also with the dominant lines of past 
interpretation by Community judges.190 The constraint on Hercules becomes 
clear if we return once more to the allegory of the chain novel. Neither of two 
crude descriptions, o f total creative freedom, or of mechanical textual constraint, 
captures the position o f the chain novelist:
“You will sense creative freedom when you compare your task with some 
relatively more mechanical one, like direct translation of a text into a foreign 
language. But you will sense constraint when you compare it with some 
relatively less guided one, like beginning a new novel of your own“.191
In deciding Brasserie dit Pécheur Hercules is therefore ultimately constrained not 
by “external hard fact or...interpersonal consensus”,192 but is, rather, subject to 
“the structural constraint of different kinds of principle within a system of 
principle, and it is none the less genuine for that”.193
5.6 Legitimacy in law and legitimacy in politics
H ow  is this ‘system o f principle’ to be understood, however? Pescatore has said 
that the judges of the European Court o f Justice have “une certaine idee de
189 This wjjj be particularly so in the case o f constitutional decisions. See Dworkin’s defence o f  
“the moral reading”, the way he advocates for reading and enforcing a political constitution, 
in Freedom's Lam, Introduction (pp.1-38).





l’Europe” of their ow n .194 The extent to which the judges of the Court of 
Justice will find Dworkin’s theory o f law as integrity useful in deciding cases and 
interpreting EC  law depends on the ‘certain idea’ of the European Community 
that they hold. We have already seen, for example, that the European Union 
does not unequivocally embrace the principle of integrity in its political life.
Dworkin’s theory is based on a view o f law which regards it primarily as the 
expression o f values which derive from the life and practices o f the community 
to which it belongs. As he says, we should understand law as “flowing from the 
community’s present commitment to a background scheme of political 
morality”,195 while law as integrity requires an interpretation of contemporary 
legal practice “seen as an unfolding political narrative”.196 The law, as the 
manifestation of authority, cannot be correctly applied by the judge without 
some concept o f the way in which the authority of the legal system and thus her 
own authority can be rationally and morally exercised.
However, I argued in Chapter Four that the recent extension o f the concept o f 
flexibility into the European Union shows that integrity is not given the same 
value within the Union as Dworkin, with his ‘community o f principle’, would 
expect. Up to now the judges of the Court o f Justice have treated the European 
Community as a legal order in which coherence and integrity are paramount: 
the teleological method of reasoning is emblematic of a technique which 
extrapolates particular decisions from a ‘background scheme of political 
morality’. Where, as now, that background scheme is fractured by a clear 
preference for co-operation which, although it is exercised within certain 
defined limits, expressly contradicts integrity, all European judges should be 
aware that European law must be interpreted in accordance with this 
preference.
1 194 pescatore, “The Doctrine o f Direct EfFect: An Infant Disease o f  Community Law", p.157.
195 LE, p.346.
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The difficulty facing all judges who are faced with the interpretation of the law
of the European Union is that the various authorities at the source of that law
are not clearly defined or justified. The theme running through this chapter has
been legitimacy - the justification of the authority of judges within the
*
European Union. That theme will be continued into the next chapter, w'hich 
asks upon what grounds the authority wielded over the citizens o f the European 











In this, the last chapter of the thesis, I return to that crucial question: the 
legitimacy of the European Union. I argue that the basis of a political authority, 
and the basis of the authority of the Union, should be a task; that no political 
authority, including the authority of a state, can be justified as an end in itself 
but only according to its capacity to resolve co-ordination problems and to 
realise the greater good within a community. I argue that the sceptical point of 
view, which suggests that legitimacy is a mere myth, is ultimately a dead-end. 
More risky but more fruitful is having the courage to think big, be idealistic, 
and think about the ways in which our communities and our own participation 
within them may realise the potential for good of human co-operation.
Ia  Chapter Four I distinguished three conceptual ways in which authority may 
be justified. These three types of legitimacy I termed social, legal and normative 
justifications o f authority. Social legitimacy relates to the efficacy of a system of 
governance - the actual acceptance it receives amongst the governed. Legal
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legitimacy was defined as arising from the system of governance being 
constituted in accordance with law. Normative justification, lastly, refers to the 
conditions under which an authority may be regarded as legitimate. I noted the 
way in which normative legitimacy plays a part in both social and legal 
legitimacy, and I offered a lightning sketch of normative political authority in 
the EU as containing elements o f democracy and concern for the general 
welfare. However, the chapter then had to set aside the question of the form 
that a normative justification for the legal and political authority of the 
European Union might take, in order to consider the question of the various 
perspectives from which legitimacy might be viewed. This chapter therefore 
returns to the question o f the normative justification of authority in the EU.
Once I have set the scene with a brief survey of some of the most interesting 
and original approaches to the normative justification o f authority in the Union, 
I will divide justifications of authority into four categories: authority justified 
through its accomplishment of a task; authority justified through myth; 
authority justified by its adherence to particular values; and authority justified by 
its exercise in accordance with the consent of the governed. For convenience 
these four categories of justification shall be termed task, participation, 
community and myth. I make no claim to attempt linear arguments here. 
Instead I shall explore each justification using a particular theory as a 
springboard - Finnis on task, Schlag and Derrida on myth, and Dworkin on 
community and participation.
6.1 The normative justification o f authority in the 
European Union
The question of the normative justification of authority in the EU has rarely 
been posed explicitly in the literature. One exception is an article by Weiler, 
Haltem and Mayer in which the authors ask: “By what authority, if any - in the 
vocabulary of normative political theory - can the claim of European law to be 
both constitutionally superior and with immediate effect in the polity be
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sustained?”.1 They go on to warn that this is “a dramatic question, since 
constitutionalisation has taken place and to give a negative answer would be 
subversive. One can, it seems, proclaim a profound democracy deficit and yet 
insist at the same time on the importance of accepting the supremacy of Union 
law”.2
As the reference to the process of constitutionalisation shows, the question of 
legitimacy in the EU has undergone a sea-change in the years of the European 
Community’s existence. Mancini and Keeling point out that the debate about 
the democratic deficit in the European Union ignores one fundamental fact: 
that the European Community was originally never intended to be a democratic 
organisation.3 They point to the preamble and the first part of the Treaty of 
Rome (in which the word ‘democracy’ does not appear) and to the guiding 
principles of the original ‘constitution’. Tracing the historical evolution of the 
European Communities, Wallace and Smith argue that “all those engaged in the 
processes of European integration accepted that the eventual legitimation of 
European union would have to rest on popular consent...[although they] 
differed..over how that consent should be registered, and over what time-scale it 
should be sought".4 European integration started as an “elite process” to which 
the questions of legitimacy and justification, hitherto considered within the 
context of the study o f the modem State, simply did not appear to apply.
As the European Union’s competences have expanded and its reach lengthened 
into ever increasing spheres of activity, the jssue-of legitimacy has taken on 
greater urgency. However, discussions o f the possible bases of legitimacy are 
often muddled; one common mistake, for example, is to confuse the way in
1 Weiler, Haltem and Mayer, “European Democracy and its Critique”, p.10.
2 Ibid,
3 Mancini and Keeling, “Democracy and the European Court o f Justice”, p.175.
4 Wallace and Smith, "Democracy or Technocracy? European Integration and the Problem o f  
Popular Consent”, p.144 (emphasis added).
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which authority is exercised within the EU (various models o f governance are 
proposed in this respect) and question of the legitimacy of that authority (the 
conditions under which those models may be justified). Models of governance* 
while constituting a crucial step in identifying the nature of the authority that 
must be justified, are not normative justifications o f authority in themselves but 
simply offer descriptions and analyses o f that authority.
I shall not give a detailed survey o f the literature focussing on the legitimacy of 
the EU. However, in order briefly to set the scene I will turn to four examples 
o f work where reflections on the question o f the legitimacy o f the European 
Union have gone further than a characterisation o f the European polity. Firstly, 
Weiler, Haltem and Mayer take well-known models of governance and attempt 
to fit particular forms of accountability to those models.5 .Secondly, joerges 
considers specifically justificatory models as possible answers to the ‘Community 
legitimacy problem’.6" Thirdly, MacCormick presents his analysis o f the 
European Union as a mixed commonwealth containing a ‘reasonable element’ 
o f democratic rule.7 Fourthly, Craig suggests that a republican model of 
democracy provides a basis on which to build upon the operation of democracy 
within the sphere of the Community.8
Three approaches to European governance and legitimacy have, according to 
Weiler, Haltem and Mayer, become most prominent.9 They are termed 
intergovemmentalism, supranationalism and infranationalism.
Intergovemmentalism is typified by the work of Andrew Moravscik, who 
claims that the EC can be analysed as “a successful intergovernmental regime
5 Weiler, Haltem and Mayer, op. cit.
6 Joerges, “European Economic Law, the Nation-State and the Maastricht Treaty”.
7 MacCormick, “Democracy, Subsidiarity and Citizenship in the ‘European 
Commonwealth’”.
8 Craig, “Democracy and Rule-making Within the EC: An Empirical and Normative 
Assessment".
9 Weiler, Haltem and Mayer, op. cit., p.24ff.
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designed to manage economic interdependence through negotiated policy co­
ordination”.10 1As this claim shows, the Member States are the key players in this 
model. By contrast, the supranational model, found particularly in Weiler’s 
work, emphasises the existence of the independent institutions and structures of 
the Union.11 The third approach, infranationalism, views the EU as a forum in 
which interaction takes place at every level and where politics and ideology take 
second place to such factors as technical expertise and economic interests.12
Weiler, Haltem and Mayer then go on to attempt to match up these three 
models with models o f ‘democratic theory’. They suggest that infranationalism 
shares common features with the neo-corporatist model of democracy, that the 
supranational mode of governance may be analysed with reference to 
‘competitive elites’ models, and that intergovemmentalism may be an example 
o f the ‘consociational’ power-sharing model, at least in relation to certain areas 
o f Union governance. In identifying the ‘democratic problems’ inherent in the 
models of democratic theory, they are identifying the problems inherent in the 
models of governance associated with them.
Unfortunately, although the authors claim that the models of democracy justify 
the models o f governance, the reasons why this is so are not spelled out. For 
example, they claim that if, as they suggest, the intergovernmental model were 
consociational, “this would be a justification not from an efficiency and stability 
perspective but from a normative representational one as well”.13 Clearly they 
are assuming that authority may be justified according to the stability it creates
10 Moravscik, “Preferences and Power in the EC: A Liberal Intergovemmentalist Approach”, 
p.474.
11 See, for example, Weiler, “The Community System: The Dual Character o f  
Supranationalism”.
12 See, for example, Majone, “The Development o f  Social Regulation in the European 
Community”.
13 Weiler, Haltem and Mayer, op. tit., p.31. O n the relationship between the consociational 
model and legitimacy see further Chryssochoou, “Democracy and Symbiosis in the 
European Union: Towards a Confederal Consociation?”, p.6ff.
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and the level o f efficiency with which it undertakes its task, but there is no 
discussion as to how these may be weighed up against the ‘anti-justificatory* 
effects of the consociational model, such as its tendency to focus power in the 
hands of elites, to favour the social status quo, and to undermine the ability of 
the individual citizen to influence decision-making.14 The consociational model 
as they present it is, for example, far more focused upon a descriptive analysis of 
the way in which power is wielded by groups o f elites than upon the conditions 
under which the model may confer legitimacy upon the form o f authority it 
describes or advocates.
Christian Joerges similarly presents three theories of the EC legal order, and 
explicitly draws out the mode of justification that each assumes. Weiler’s 
suprationational model features in his list, which also includes the neo-liberal 
tradition (‘Ordnungstheorie’) which interprets the EC Treaty as an ‘economic 
constitution’, and the theory which identifies the communities as ‘special 
purpose associations o f functional integration’. Interpreted as an economic 
order, the justification for the authority of the European legal system is said to 
be its nature as an order constituted by law, and its commitment to economic 
freedoms; these two elements protect it from attacks “based upon democracy 
theory or constitutional policy".15 The justification for the EC’s authority as a 
special purpose association, by contrast, is its ability to achieve certain functions 
that are best assigned to a supranational bureaucracy.16
The ‘order constituted by law’ justification is not what I termed a normative 
justification: it falls squarely within the category of legal justification described 
earlier. The notion that authority may be legitimate because of its commitment 
to economic freedoms, on the other hand, bases itself on the assumption that an 
authority may be legitimate because it promotes and is committed to certain
14 Ibid.
I 15 Joerges, “European Economic Law, the Nation-State and the Maastricht Treaty”, p.38.
16 Ibid., p.39.
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values. This approach to justification also arises frequently in writings discussing 
the possibility or existence of a constitution for the EU: for example, the ‘main 
foundation' for democratic legitimization in the EU is said to be the protection 
of human rights and individual liberties,17 or the commitment to equal 
treatment of individuals.18 The justification for the model of the EC as being 
the achievement of certain functions is an example of another common type of 
normative justification: that an authority may be justified by its capacity to 
undertake specific tasks. Thus, for example, the Community is said to be 
legitimised by its ability to create open markets and undistorted competition,19 
or to secure stability, continuity and peace.20
While the intergovernmental, infranational, neo-liberal and special purpose 
concepts only recognise supranational structures which cannot and need not be 
legitimised by any notion of democratic governance, Weiler's supranational 
model is significantly different: the dependence of the Union order upon 
intergovernmental co-operation and consensus is not the defining attribute of 
the EU but the price to be paid for acceptance of the Union regimes by the 
Member States and their electorates. For the supranational conception, it is thus 
democracy that is and should be the basis o f legitimacy o f authority in the EU.
Democracy is also the focus of MacCormick’s consideration o f the legitimacy of 
Community law. His work is original in that, as opposed to the above authors’ 
use of “off-the-peg democratic wares“,21 he chooses the ‘ambitious course’ they 
decline and takes steps towards fashioning a tailor-made democratic theory for 
the Union. Having established that the European Union is a commonwealth, in
17 Hauser and Müller, “Legitimacy: The Missing Link for Explaining EU-Institution 
Building”, p.25.
18 Petersmann, “Constitutionalism, Constitutional Law and European Integration”.
19 Mestmäcker, “On the Legitimacy o f  European Law”.
20 Eleftheriadis, “Aspects o f  European Constitutionalism".
21 Weiler, Haltern and Mayer, op. of., p.28.
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the sense that it comprises “a group of people to whom can reasonably be 
imputed some consciousness that they have a ‘common .weal*”,22 he turns to the 
democracy (legitimacy) o f  that commonwealth. He begins by clarifying the 
question: “the issue about Europe ought not...to be whether it is totally or 
completely democratic, but whether it is adequately so given the kind of entity 
we take it to be”.23
MacCormick argues that the Union has a constitution which contains different 
elements and manifestations of democracy. It contains oligo-bureaucratic 
elements, in that a few rule over the many, but these elements are also subject 
to democratic controls, either through a form of direct representative 
democracy or through indirect representative democracy. He argues that while 
this is “by no means democracy perfect or democracy complete...it is not a 
system wholly lacking in democratic elements or democratic spirit”.24 He 
concludes, therefore, that it is a case o f  what he terms a ‘mixed constitution’ - 
mixed both as to constitutional types and normative sources.
MacCormick’s work is instructive since the loud calls for ‘more democracy’ in 
the EU are rarely accompanied by any recognition that democracy may appear 
in many guises other than State-oriented models, and that consideration must be 
given to the combination of elements that may justify the nature of authority as 
exercised in the EU. ‘More democracy’ in the EU could take the form of, 
amongst many other suggestions, enhanced participation in decision-making for 
Union citizens, procedural safeguards on power, transparency, and subsidiarity. 
A blanket application o f the model of democracy we may be accustomed to in 
our own or any other Member State is clearly inappropriate for a polity in





which the authority that should be legitimated may itself alter from one sphere 
of competence to another.
Weiler, Haltem and Mayer’s analysis of governance in the EU is based upon this 
belief - that authority in the EU manifests itself in different ways which 
therefore may (and should) be justified accordingly. Craig, the last author I will 
present, accepts their tri-partite division o f theories of governance and builds 
upon the thesis that different models of democracy may best capture different 
aspects of the operation of the EU. He hives off what Weiler terms the 
supranational aspects o f the Community, “which covers the basic structure of 
political authority and the making of primary laws within the EC itself’,25 and 
addresses himself to justification of these alone. The ’normative model of 
democracy’ which he argues best fits the empirical data is a form of 
republicanism which includes the twin elements of institutional balance and the 
premise that democratic deliberation should be designed to achieve the public 
interest rather than narrow sectional desires.26 What I wish to draw from Craig’s 
work is firstly the emphasis on the need to clearly identify the sphere of 
governance and authority that is being justified, and secondly his general 
approach which, like MacCormick’s, is to side-step labels such as ’federal’ or 
‘constitution’ and instead to consider the elements of justification that may be 
applicable to the unique combination of types of authority to be found within 
the EU.
These four views demonstrate, I hope, the difficulty inherent in tackling an 
entity such as the Union with tools which have been fashioned in order to 
understand the ethno-national state. This difficulty is exacerbated by the 
tendency to assume that the nation state is legitimate and to equate ‘the state’ 
with justified community authority. Weiler argues that the “abuse of the




boundary between nation and state is most egregious when the state conies to 
be seen not as instrumental for individuals and society to realize their potentials 
but as an end in itself’.27 MacCormick’s argument, that we should first decide 
what kind of entity our political community is before assessing whether or not it 
is democratic, holds good for the Member States and not just for the Union.
In his recent work MacCormick also introduces a four-part distinction which 
may clarify the approach taken in this thesis to the questions of system, authority 
and legitimacy. He writes that the relationship between law, as an institutional 
normative order, and politics, as an order of power, has been understood in four 
particular ways: (i) that the state is a creation o f law; (ii) that the state is a 
producer of law; (iii) that the state is coexistent with law but not identical with 
it; and (iv) that state and law are essentially identical, being the same object 
viewed differently,28
The first possibility is usually given the label of ‘natural, law’: it is the Lockean 
view that even in a ‘state of nature’ - outside any form of political organisation 
-  people would have rights and owe each other corresponding obligations. On 
this view state institutions will be legitimate if they fulfil conditions which are 
perceived as anterior to the state itself.-The second thesis is the Hobbesian 
counter-argument: that the only rights humans can have are the rights that 
governments confer upon them; The third view is based on the argument that 
the first two take no account of the evolution of society, state and law. 
MacCormick puts it thus: “the tendency to establish monopoly over law should 
not.blind us to the deeper underlying reality, of law rooted in the usages and 
practices o f humans in social coexistence”.29 The fourth is epitomised by 
Kelsen’s work on law and state: the^state is the territorial legal order personified.
27 W eiler, The Constitution of Europe -  Do the New Clothes have an Emperor?, p.249.
28 MacCormick, Questioning Sovereignty, p.18.
29 Ibid., pp.20-21.
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It is the fourth view which was taken up in Chapters Two and Three of this 
thesis, which attempt to demonstrate that legal validity and the idea that 
authority can be established legally take us only part of the way toward 
understanding legitimacy as justified authority. The application of Kelsen’s 
theory helped us clarify the issues; but, as MacCI^nruck comments, “at .the 
interface of law and politics, Kelsen’s austerityis unproductive’’.̂ 0
MacCormick himself adopts the third thesis: he explicitly sets his work on 
Europe within his theory of  law as institutional normative order.30 1 The 
approach I wish to focus on in this chapter probably comes closest to the first 
and it is the work o f a natural lawyer—John Finnis -  which is at the root o f this 
chapter’s argument that authority should be justified by its achievement o f a 
task.
6.2 Task
Hauser and Miiller claim that the original justification of the Union was “the 
containment of communism and the safeguarding of peace between France and 
Germany”,32 a role of which little remains today. However, a legitimation for 
authority within the Union based upon its ability to fulfil particular tasks is still a 
recurring theme in the literature. Hrbek argues that due to growing 
interdependence the nation state has lost its ability to properly solve problems 
and respond to the demands of its citizens.33 He suggests that a component of 
legitimacy in the EU is the existence of tasks and functions “which can only be 
solved and performed efficiently and convincingly with the help o f the EU*’.34,
30 Ibid., p.23.
31 See, for example, the preface to Questioning Sovereignty.
32 Hauser and Miiller, “Legitimacy: The Missing Link for Explaining EU-Institution 
Building”, p.17.
33 Hrbek, “Federal Balance and the Problem o f  Democratic Legitimacy in the EU”, p.47.
34 Ibid., p.65.
O ut o f three of Weiler’s ‘visions’ of the way the Community might develop in 
the future, two are based on a task-led justification* »The first vision 
conceptualises the Community as a “technological instrument, an agency, for 
the resolution of post-industrial problems such as environmental protection, 
transnational trade, transport and the like which transcend national 
boundaries“.35 The second envisages the Community as finding its ‘prime 
historical mission’ in its responsibility towards Eastern Europe, providing 
structures for peace, prosperity and a ‘supranational ethos’ which would “blunt 
the excesses of nationalism run amok’’.36
However, others question the extent to which task-based justifications can 
confer legitimacy upon the Union. Hauser and Müller argue that 
“legitimization by results...may be an important factor o f short term political 
stability, but it would be a weak foundation for developing the EU into a 
federal structure’’.37 Joerges agrees, commenting that a closer look at suggestions 
such as those of Hrbek reveals the “normative (and factual!) limits of such 
purely functional arguments”.38. Legislative policy, he says, cannot be simply 
functional; “it remains tied to the legal systems of the Member States and must 
respect the standards of justice which have won recognition in them”.39 Weale 
goes further: functional capacity “may be necessary for legitimacy but...cannot 
be sufficient”.40
35 W eiler, “Europe after Maastricht - Supranationalism, Nationalism and the State”, p.329.
36 Ibid., p.330.
37 Hauser and Müller, “Legitimacy: The Missing Link for Explaining EU-Institution 
Building”, p.24.
38 Joerges, “The Impact o f  European Integration on Private Law: Reductionist Perceptions, 
True Conflicts and a N ew  Constitutional Perspective”, p.39I.
' 39 Joerges, “Taking the Law Seriously: On Political Science and the R ole o f Law in the 
I Process o f  European Integration”, p.127.
40 W eale, “Democratic Legitimacy and the Constitution of Europe”, p.89.
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These objections are correct in that they highlight the limitations of the idea 
that the Union may be justified by its capacity to complete specific tasks. 
However, those who propose that the justification o f the Union may be based 
on ‘task’ are on the right track; they are simply not ambitious enough in their 
claims about what those tasks or that task may be. The ground of any sort of 
authority is most often a task.41 Authority arises from the necessity o f a task 
whose performance requires a certain sort and extent of obedience on the part 
of those for whom the task is supposed to be done.42 The right to rule (whether 
in a state which is a member of the EU, or in the EU itself) can only arise from 
the need to be ruled, a need arising from the needs of the community and its 
members and in the community’s interest in pursuing the common good. 
Authority, then, wherever and in whoever it is situated, is only legitimate to the 
extent that it serves those needs and interests.43
Therefore the achievement of one task, however great or small, such as greater 
material prosperity for the members of the European Union, plays a part in the 
legitimacy of the Union insofar as it falls within the wider task of securing the 
best life possible for all those people who constitute it. This can be the only 
foundation for normatively legitimate authority. Other elements will be just that 
- elements which may be necessary but are not sufficient. Consent, for example, 
is not enough, since consent can justify authority only up to a certain limit: 
unlimited authority is never legitimate.44
Authority, exercised through law, has the function of solving co-ordination 
problems. Whenever people come together in a group, there are only two ways 
of co-ordinating their common action: unanimity or authority. We see
41 There are types o f  authority which have other bases, such as the authority o f  an expert, but 
these are minor incidences o f  authority. See Raz, Authority, pp.2-3.
42 Anscombe, “On the Source o f  the Authority o f  the State”, p.147.
43 See Raz, Authority, p.5.
44 Raz, Authority, p.12.
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unanimity in the operation of international law, for example, where an 
exchange o f promises is made by treaty. But where there is no unanimity about 
the desirability o f respective schemes, the final selection between those 
alternatives must be treated by the parties as authoritative in order that the 
group may move beyond the impasse. The ultimate basis o f a ruler’s authority 
is, then, “the fact that he has the opportunity, and thus the responsibility, o f 
furthering the common good by stipulating solutions to a community’s co­
ordination problems”.45
The concept o f co-ordination problems is to be distinguished from the game- 
theoretical concept o f co-ordination problems and their solutions. Finnis 
explains that there are various differences between the concept of co-ordination 
problem used by himself and others in relation to political and legal philosophy, 
and that used in game theory. Co-ordination problems as he understands them 
are “neither more nor less than the ‘problems of united action’ (i.e., ‘common 
action’ for the ‘common good’)”.46 Finnis also argues that while it is correct to 
explain authority in terms of what is needed for securing human good, it is 
wrong to treat the human good as producible, as if it were a bridge or omelette 
that could be made or completed.47 An authority is not following a route to a 
definite goal; it must order a society “for the greater participation of its members 
in human values”.48
W hat is the ‘common good’? Finnis defines it as follows: “the common good 
simply is the good o f  individuals living together and depending upon one 
another in ways that tend to favour the well-being of each”.49 Thus ultimately
45 Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights, p.351.
46 Finnis, “Law as Co-ordination”, p.100. See also Finnis, “The Authority o f  Law in the 
Predicament o f  Contemporary Social Theory", pp.124-133 for a discussion o f  game theory 
and social choice theory and their relation to legal and political theory.
47 Finnis, “The Authority o f  Law in the Predicament o f  Contemporary Social Theory", p.121.
48 Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights, p.280.
V*9 Finnis, “Law as Co-ordination”, p. 103.
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all the arguments for legitimacy which might be proposed in relation to the 
European Union -  democracy, protection of human rights, community -  only 
have value to the extent to which they figure in the answer that might be given 
to the question: what, in the European Union, is the common good? This 
question can only be answered using what Finnis terms practical reasonableness, 
and from the perspective of the person who is practically reasonable.
Balkin, the chosen critic of Chapter Four, dismisses the ‘ideal observer’ 
approach as a ‘misguided’ attempt to avoid problems of subjectivity in rational 
reconstruction. His argument is that 'ideal observer theory’ (which I am 
assuming would include Finnis’ central case of the practically reasonable 
perspective) fails to grasp the nature o f legal knowledge because it attempts to 
empty the subject.50 The appeal and conviction o f Finnis’ conception of the 
perspective of the practically reasonable person, however, lies in the fact that it 
does precisely the opposite. It is the mature as opposed to the underdeveloped, 
the flourishing rather than the corrupt, the full rather than the empty.51
If  from the practically reasonable perspective the common good of political 
community is, as Finnis suggests, “the securing of material and other conditions 
which favour the realization by each individual...of his or her personal 
development”,52 how does the European Union match up? It is tempting 
simply to note that the legitimacy of the Union depends on the extent to which 
it furthers the common good o f its citizens and leave it at that; however, having 
concluded that all other arguments are worthwhile only insofar as they play a 
part in the common good, I shall attempt to make a few comments on what, 
from this perspective, will contribute to the Union’s legitimacy.
50 Balkin, "Understanding Legal Understanding: The Legal Subject and the Problem o f  Legal 
Coherence", pp. 142-3.
51 Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights, pp. 10-11.
52 Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights, p.154.
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Firstly, it is important to spell out that the constitutional models of governance, 
democratic structures, constitutional principles and all the trappings of individual 
Member States are affected just as much by the existence o f authority at the 
Union level as their own authority affects the Union. The Member States are 
not inherently legitimate. The jauthority o f the Member States is justified only 
to the extent that the holders o f that authority ensure that their citizens’ well­
being is promoted by Union authorities, not only through national means of 
co-ordination. The different authorities within the Union and Member States 
must co-operate in seeking the common good of all those subject to their 
combined power. Thus, for example, Italy’s failure to promote consultation of 
the Italian parliament on issues o f EC law affects the legitimacy o f the 
authorities at both the national and European level.53
Secondly, since authority in the Union and Member States is now fragmented, 
law takes on an even more important role. We saw that there-are two ways of 
legitimately co-ordinating action in a group: either by unanimity, pr by 
authority. Where there is something approaching unanimity as to the scheme of 
co-ordination to choose, the authoritativeness of the eventual choice is less 
important, since there is already the will to act together. Where, however, there 
is great diversity of values and opinions, the authority of the choice is crucial, 
since co-ordination is conditional upon the choice being accepted as binding. 
Ladeur argues that the process o f ‘pluralisation and fragmentation’ in the Union 
has resulted in law losing its ‘central importance!.54.. Quite the opposite is true. 
Where there is a lack of consensus, clear and binding rules offer a neutral tool to 
build structures of compromise: the authority of law brings the possibility o f co­
ordination out of conflicting values and interests. This, to return to the 
previous chapter, also has implications for the decisions of Union judges, who
53 See Cartabia, “Il pluralismo istituzionale com e forma della democrazia sovranazionale”, 
pp.217-8.
54 Ladeur, “Towards a Legal Theory o f  Supranationality: The Viability o f the Network 
Concept”, pp.33 and 45.
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should not impose one voice where the law chooses to respect difference rather 
than force unity.
Thirdly, the practically reasonable perspective offers a point from which to 
evaluate propositions for justification of the authority of the Union. Weiler’s 
visions of a European Union as ‘unity’ or ‘community’, for example, must be 
measured against the yardstick of the common good. Calls for increased 
democracy must be considered in relation to the contribution to the general 
well-being made by the different ways in which individuals can exercise some 
control over the decisions that affect them. The test has changed from 
resemblance to state-like models of political organisation to resemblance to the 
central case of a polity in which justice is secured for all.
I will shortly move on to those propositions for the justification of the authority 
o f the Union. However, let us remember at which point we find ourselves: we 
have ripped up the roots, we are are looking at that point where detachment 
can aid us no longer, where Kelsen’s theory demonstrated that we have to choose 
our point o f view. I cannot fairly choose practical reasonableness without 
balancing the picture of legitimacy I am drawing by considering the other end 
o f the spectmm from the practically reasonable point of view: the sceptical 
perspective.
6.3 Myth
Let us remind ourselves once more exactly what is at stake when we consider 
the authority and legitimacy o f the European Union. Notwithstanding the fact 
that it does not match familiar models and structures of centralised authority, it 
is clearly what Anscombe terms a ‘civil authority’. In order to understand this, 
we must distinguish there being a government which exercises civil authority 
from two contrasting things: * firstly, large-scale voluntary co-operative 
associations, and secondly, control by bandits -  “a smooth sophisticated
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Mafia”.55 Civil authority is distinguished from the first:by government's exercise 
o f coercive force, and if it is distinguished from the second, it is by 
government’s authority in the command of violence,56 which authority is 
usually exemplified by the association o f  that government with a system o f 
administration ofjustice.57
“Since a distinctive thing about civil government, as opposed to people’s having 
dominant positions in common enterprises, is actual or threatened violence, it is 
either an evil or a necessity based on evil”.58 The fact that cooperative 
enterprises and procedures may be needed for the enhancement of lite does not 
alter this; if  there were no evil, there would not be authority but a voluntary 
association run by unanimity. “If someone holds in a sufficiently radical fashion 
that government is a refined and grandiose banditry, it is hardly possible to 
convince him of error...No political theory can be worth a jot, that does not 
acknowledge the violence of the state, or face the problem of distinguishing 
between states and syndicates”.59
Derrida further separates out two elements o f the coercion inherent in any civil 
government. There is not only the violence that maintains, conserves, confirms 
and insures the permanence and enforceability o f law, but also the founding 
violence of law.60 This founding violence is “the originary violence that must 
have established this authority and that could not itself have been authorized by 
any anterior legitimacy, so that, in this initial moment, it is neither legal or 
illegal”.61 Thus law is always authorised force, “a force that justifies itself or is





60 Derrida, “Force o f Law: The Mystical Foundation o f  Authority", p.31.
61 Ibid., p.6.
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justified in applying itself, even if this justification may be judged from 
elsewhere to be unjust or unjustifiable”.62
In Chapter Two I tried to show that the detached normative perspective of the 
Kelsenian legal scientist brings us to the apex of the legal system, the 
Grundnorm, but can take us no further. Kelsen’s..explicit adoption of the 
detached normative point of view disavows any claim to offer an account of the 
normative legitimacy o f the legal system it describes: it limits itself purely to the 
legal validity of the laws of a political community. The Grundnorm was 
explained, in Chapter Two, to be what Kelsen termed a ‘fiction1 - a construct 
which is of service to discursive thought. We have now returned to that point: 
that place at which the detached normative perspective must posit the 
Grundnorm is where, from the critical point of view,: the foundation and 
normative justification of authority which underpins the efficacy (social 
legitimacy) and validity (legal legitimacy) of a civil authority is to be found.
It is at this point where the categories of argument I have been considering 
come into play; and at which, for writers such as Derrida, is found nothing 
more substantial than myth:
‘‘Since the origin o f authority, the foundation or ground, the position of the 
law can’t by definition rest on anything but themselves, they are themselves 
a violence without ground. Which is not to say that they are in themselves 
unjust, in the sense of ‘illegal’. They are neither legal or illegal in their 
founding moment”.63
62 Ibid., p.5.
63 Derrida, “Force o f  Law: The Mystical Foundation o f  Authority", p.14.
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The founding and justifying moment that institutes law has a ‘performative 
force’ that is itself the ‘mystical limit’: law’s ultimate foundation is by definition 
unfounded.64
The answer to the question of law’s ultimate foundation will depend upon the 
subject responding. Later on we will see Dworkin’s answer: authority is justified 
if the community is a principled community that satisfies the conditions o f 
moral membership. W e have seen other answers, such as the functional theory 
according to which European law is understood as a legal order committed to 
economic freedoms and market building. Let us look now at Schlag’s argument 
that theories such as these are the product o f particular types o f legal thought 
which are “conceptually, rhetorically, and socially constituted to avoid 
confronting the question of who or what thinks or produces law”.65 They fall 
foul of the ‘problem o f the subject’.
I would suggest that models such as the functional theory o f European law are 
prone to the same recurring flaw as the type of legal thought that Schlag calls 
‘Langdellian formalism’. Any meaning is located in the law itself; “ [law] is stable, 
self-identical, foundationally secure and bounded; it is, in other words, just like 
an object”. And once meaning has been located in the ‘transcendental order of 
the object’, “ the individual subject emerges only as a potential threat...[T]he 
individual subject often features as the misguided ‘activist’judge who derails the 
law by imposing his ‘own personal values’”.66 We can see this taking place in 
the language used to describe European law: it is the legal order that is committed 
to market-building; it is the legal order that is justified by its adherence to 
particular values. The law itself is operating as the subject: in this kind o f
64 Ibid., pp.13-14.
65 Schlag, “The Problem o f  the Subject”, p.1629.
66 Ibid., p.1636.
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thought, “law...does some amazing stuff - and, what’s more, does it all by 
itself\67
Alternatively, we have ‘rule of law thought’, including theories such as that of 
Dworkin, which represents law as a craft, and holds that law works fairly well: 
“illegitimacy, indeterminacy, or incoherence are largely illusory”.68 This type of 
thought always views law from the internal, committed, normative perspective 
identified with that o f the judge. “The space of the external perspective serves as 
a rhetorical dumping ground for misguided, irrelevant, and threatening lines of 
inquiry about the rule of law”.69 It is the rule of law vision which has 
“systematically and unconsciously assumed the perspective o f a normative and 
epistemically competent agent and, in turn, reduced the agent to a certain 
idealized image o f the appellate judge”,70 without any consideration of the 
question: “How is the legal subject rendered epistemically and normatively 
competent in the first place?”71
The third type of thought Schlag considers is critical legal thought, which, he 
argues, reverses rule o f law thought: it liberates the subject but constrains the 
legal object.72 The result of this type of thought is that the subject is constructed 
and channelled as a choosing being, which is oppressive and absurd.
“Much of its absurdity can be seen in the normative visions that routinely 
issue from the legal academy urging us to adopt this utopian program or that 
one - as if somehow our choices (I like decentralized socialism, you like 
conservative pastoral politics, she likes liberal cultural pluralism) had any
67 Ibid., p.1646.
68 Ibid., p.1663.
69 Ibid., p.1668. On the internal-external distinction as Schlag understands it, see also his 
“Nonnativity and the Politics o f Form”, pp.916-26.
70 Schlag, “The Problem o f the Subject”, p.1667.
71 Ibid., p.1673.
72 Ibid., pp. 1697-8.
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direct, self-identical effect on the construction o f our social and political 
scene...To tell people that they are already empowered to make political 
value choices is, in effect, to bolster the dominant culture's representation 
that we are free-choosing beings and to strengthen the forces that lead to our 
own, repeated, compelled affirmation o f (meaningless) choices".73
For Schlag the mistake at work here is “the presupposition that arguing about 
political values is somehow synonymous with engaging in politics".
The myth at the core o f the authority o f governance therefore may not only be 
the veil between the community and the violence o f the constitution o f the 
community but also a construction o f those who set out to justify that 
constitution. Schlag argues that in the United States o f America the practice of 
the justification of the state is “shaped by, and organized around, the aspirations 
and problems of a popular constitutional mythology".74 This mythology is based 
upon a narrative which revolves around certain key ‘ontological identities’: ‘the 
Constitution’, ‘the Founding’, ‘the People’ and ‘the Consent of the People’. 
This narrative “ostensibly establishes the authority of the Constitution, justifies 
that authority through reason, and achieves both tasks in such a way as to 
demonstrate the consent of the governed to constitutional rule".75 The drive is 
“ to persuade the consumers of the liberal myth that, informed by reason, they 
freely choose an authoritative, constitutional liberal state".76
Liberalism, says Schlag, refurbishes the popular mythology in order to make the 
myth seem intellectually more convincing. Thus we find ‘Constitution’ replaced 
by ‘paramount norm’, a norm which is preferably “abstract, capacious and even 
mystical", such as Dworkin’s paramount norm of integrity - that of making the
73 Ibid., pp. 1700-1.




law the best it can be .77 The practice o f liberal justification also attempts to 
rework the subject who consents to the paramount norm, using “moral flattery, 
the promise o f communal belonging, the incentive of self-interest, and a certain 
amount of rhetorical bullying”78 to prompt identification with the ‘mythic 
subject* - ‘W e the People* (Ackerman), or ‘Persons in the Original Position* 
(Rawls), or ‘Hercules* (Dworkin).79 All four identities of the constitutional 
narrative are refashioned in a way which reconciles authority, reason and 
freedom.
The ‘empty circle o f justification* is the circle into which the consumer must be 
persuaded to enter:
“The circle of justification must be constructed so that the circular motion 
operates smoothly - so that the mythic subject does indeed consent to the 
paramount norm, so that the paramount norm becomes authoritative in a 
founding moment, so that the political and legal entailments o f that 
paramount norm sustain the mythic subject”.80
How is this consent elicited from the consumer? Schlag argues that “it is 
through the medium of emotion - through fear, shame, seduction, and romance 
-  that the consumer of liberal justification is induced to enter the circle of 
justification*’.81
Let us move back to Europe for a moment and consider Schlag*s arguments in 
relation to the European Union. It is striking how the popular constitutional 
mythology identified by Schlag in America has begun to be mirrored in a pale 
way here in Europe. There is the process of ‘constitutionalisation’; there is the






introduction o f citizenship; there is the symbolism o f subsidiarity. However, 
whereas in the States the popular mythology' is well-established, in the Union 
the weakness of its public face is eclipsed by the strength o f the circles of 
justification that are gathering force. Castiglione suggests, following Ackerman, 
that a ‘constitutional moment1 is needed to legitimate the European polity;82 
Weale proposes a constitutional convention.83 Weiler flatters and seduces us 
into agreeing with his supranational model: “the Community ideal of 
Supranationalism is evocative of, and resonates with, Enlightenment ideas...[It] 
is heir to Enlightenment liberalism1’.84 He uses the spectre of fascism to frighten 
us into turning away from the ‘unity1 model85 and romances us with the “bold 
challenge” of new visions of the future of Europe.86
Europe clearly demonstrates the ‘rhetoric o f the circle1, which is not just one 
circle of justification, but circle upon circle:
“What is promised is an examination o f the gap between the ideal and the 
reality. What is delivered is an examination of the gap between a higher 
order ideal (liberal justification) and a lower order ideal (popular liberal 
mythology)11.87
Myth becomes meta-myth and vice-versa: justifications of the Union through, 
for example, conceptions of a ‘civic demos’ or models of the economic 
constitution vie with each other to be adopted at the lower order level. What is 
offered as a justification of ‘reality’ is then adopted as ‘reality’; “while claiming
82 Castiglione, “Contracts and Constitutions”.
83 Weale, “Democratic Legitimacy and the Constitution o f  Europe”.
84 Weiler, “Europe After Maastricht -  Supranationalism, Nationalism and the State”, p.326.
85 Ibid., pp.328-9.
86 Ibid., pp.329-330.
87 Schlag, “The Empty Circles o f  Liberal Justification”, p.33.
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to be argument - a progression of reasoning - [liberal justification) is instead a 
circular activity”.88
There are two ways of reacting to this conclusion. For. Schlag the modernist 
belief that legitimate authority and the exercise of power can be distinguished is 
false,. For Weber-too,-argues Lukes, despite Weber's talk o f the ‘voluntary’ 
acceptance of maxims, the prevailing principles o f legitimation (especially 
democratic ones) are no more than myths injected into the masses by elites.89
Yet Schlag himself offers a different view:
“The social existence of a shared legal and political world is, in part, a 
creation of myth. To put it perhaps too strongly: If we are going to have a 
legal and political world at all - liberal or not - it will be, at least in part, a 
construction of myth. In a sense, then, it would be bizarre, even perverse, to 
begrudge a legal and political system simply for its use of myth”.90
To the extent that law and politics are socially constructed, therefore, myth is 
“an extremely effective vehicle for the creation and sedimentation” of particular 
beliefs and practices.91
The construction o f a myth o f European legitimacy is perhaps a necessary step 
in the exercise o f co-operation that the Member States have embarked upon. 
However, Schlag's objections that the three common types of normative legal 
thought result in process o f ‘politics o f form’92 - the system whereby subjects are 
shaped by a mode o f thought and then unconsciously replicate it - are harder to 
deal with. Schlag argues that the problem for all normative thought, which
88 Ibid., p.39.
89 Lukes, “Perspectives on Authority”, p.207.
90 Schlag, “The Empty Circles o f Liberal Justification”, p.19.
91 Ibid.
92 Schlag, “The Problem o f  the Subject”, p.1742.
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would included normative justifications o f authority, is the implausibility o f the 
premise that sovereign individual subjects are controlling the levers of social 
machinery.
“ [N]ormative work...falsely represents
instrumentalist strategies as within the control of individual subjects 
the unfolding o f bureaucratic logic as the choices of individuals 
the discursive mechanisms o f coercion as normative dialogue”.93
The result o f this normative work is that “ [rjather than contributing to our 
understanding or to the realization o f the good or the right, all this normative 
argument simply perpetuates a false aesthetic of social life”.94
The key to an answer is to be found in this last sentence: the understanding or 
the realization of the good or the right. The problems with normative thought 
identified by Schlag are either inadequate attention given to the subject or an 
exaggeration o f the power of the individual subject to choose. As Ward says, 
“complacency and sycophancy are the two greatest dangers in today’s Europe, 
not scepticism or critique”.95 I would argue that by filling the subject, not 
emptying it, we can think most fruitfully about the legitimacy of the European 
Union. This means firstly to have faith:
“any ‘legal vision o f the new Europe’ has to be recognised as resting upon an 
act of faith, and not merely reason -  faith that despite epistemological 
difficulties, understanding is possible (if accompanied by a realisation of its 
own limitations), faith that the European legal venture is worthwhile”;96
93 I b i d p.1739 (visual presentation Schlag’s own).
94 Ibid., p.1740.
95 Ward, The Margins of European Law, p.ix.
96 Jackson, ‘“Legal Visions o f  the N ew  Europe’: lus Gentium, lus Commune, European Law”,
p.34.
264
and to have ideals:
“ [the type of ideals which the E.C. encapsulated] require a community for 
their practice, in fact they are constitutive of a Community — they create the 
community on whose existence they depend”.97
In Chapter Four I cited writers who criticise Dworkin’s theory as being 
impossibly romantic and idealised. I will now turn that impossible idealism on 
the European Union.
I will take two particular aspects of Dworkin’s work: his theory of principled 
community and his theory of participation. What I wish to do is avoid the 
approach noted at the beginning of the chapter, which is to propose models 
(such as Weller, Haltem and Mayer’s consociational model, or Joerges’ 
economic constitution) which might fit the Union. Instead I will try to break 
down the possible justifications for the authority of the Union into smaller parts. 
Essentially, our Western notions of democracy are based upon a particular 
concept of the form a state should take, and the way in which its citizens should 
be able to participate within it. Dworkin considers exactly these two issues: in 
what form do we want our political community to be fashioned, and how and 
to what extent to we wish to be involved in the exercise o f authority which is 
needed to act as a group?
The kernel o f legitimacy is this: for each person, the exercise o f authority upon 
him will be justified if the group adheres to values with which he largely agrees, 
and if the group allows him to affect and be involved in the exercise o f that 
authority. The next two sections consider these elements under the headings of 
‘community’ and ‘participation’.
97 Weiler, The Constitution of Europe — Do the New Clothes have an Emperor?, p.255.
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6.4 Community
As I noted above, it has been argued that the HU’s authority is justified by its 
protection of human rights and its commitment to equal treatment, and that 
legitimacy comes through adherence to substantive political principles and 
particular forms of government such as constitutional democracy. Although 
writers such as Ladeur doubt the possibility o f a political constitution in Europe 
based on shared values on the ground that it is ‘somewhat vague’ (“a mere 
desire to avoid the distressing side-effects of nationalism furnishes no clear values 
upon which an alternative and functioning institutional and decisional system 
might be based”),98 others call for a ‘principled moral basis’ for the community 
based upon understanding, acknowledgment and accommodation of difference, 
and upon the fundamental concepts of equality and freedom.99
Aq good example o f an argument which focuses upon the nature of the form o f 
association of the EU is Weiler’s identification of a recent movement toward a 
model of European integration which emulates the self-legitimising presentation 
o f the nation state. Weiler identifies two competing visions of European 
integration. One, the ‘unity’ vision, sees as its aspiration a statal Europe: it 
wishes to “redraw the actual political boundaries o f the polity within the 
existing nation-state conceptual framework”.100 The second, the ‘supranational’ 
vision, is “the notion of community rather than unity” . It seeks to “redefine the 
very notion of boundaries of the State, between the Nation and State, and 
within the nation itself’.101 It is the second vision that has historically held sway, 
and which Weiler prefers, but post-Maastricht it is the first that has come into
98 Ladeur, “Towards a Legal Theory o f  Supranationality -  The Viability o f the Network  
Concept”, p.37.
99 Ward, “In Search o f  a European Identity”, pp.322-323.
too Weiler, “Europe after Maastricht -  Supranationalism, Nationalism and the State”, p.324. 
Weiler also construes these two competing visions in “After Maastricht: Community 
Legitimacy in Post-1992 Europe”, pp.35-41.
101 Ibid.
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ascendancy. “In its rhetoric Maastricht appropriates the deepest symbols of 
statehood: European citizenship, defense, foreign policy - the rhetoric of a 
superstate...[T]hey undermine the ethics ofsupranationalism”.102
In Chapter Four I argued that Dworkin’s theory of law as integrity does not fit 
the political practices of the European Union or Community. The 
interpretation of Community law as committed to integrity failed the initial test 
o f fit, which, on Dworkin’s terms, precludes any consideration of the second 
test, that of justification. However, Dworkin’s arguments in support o f the 
justification limb of the test of integrity are based upon a detailed analysis o f the 
nature of a legitimate community which, uncoupled from the related claims 
about integrity in law, offers a stepping-stone for this chapter’s objective to 
bring a new perspective to this type of legitimation o f authority. The concept of 
principled community that he develops is an ideal model; the value we can 
ascribe to it is its utility as an aid in reflecting what type of community we may 
wish our own community to develop into.
Dworkin builds up his argument through a discussion o f the nature of 
associative obligations and of the community within which such obligations 
may arise. His premise is that political obligation is a form of associative 
obligation, which, if certain conditions are fulfilled, can take on the close 
’fraternal’ form. If these conditions are fulfilled in a political community it 
becomes a particular model o f community, ‘true associative community’, or 
‘principled community’, which is the only type of community which has 
legitimate authority.
102 Weiler, “Europe after Maastricht -  Supranationalism, Nationalism and the State”, p.327.
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6.4 .1  A ssociative ob ligations and the conditions o f  principled  
co m m u n ity
In order for a political community to be legitimate, “its constitutional structure 
and practices [must be] such that its citizens have a general obligation to obey 
political decisions that purport to impose duties on them”.103 W hat exactly must 
those “constitutional structure and practices” be like, therefore, in order to give 
rise to this “general obligation” of its citizens? Various answers can be given to 
this question, and Dworkin touches on several - the idea of a social contract, for 
example, and the argument from fair play.104 Yet none of these, in Dworkin’s 
view, seem to give any positive reason why a member o f a political community 
should accept its rules as binding upon her. Instead, he looks to communities in 
which people do, in their everyday lives, feel some kind of obligation: 
communities such as families, friends, and neighbours. These obligations arise 
not because we, as individuals, explicitly choose or consent to join the group, 
but simply because as a matter o f practice we are members. For example, 
obligations o f friendship are not obligations that we have assumed: on the 
contrary, “it is a history of events and acts that attract obligations, and we are 
rarely even aware that we are entering upon any special status as the story 
unfolds”.105
O f course, these associative obligations do depend on the actions of the other 
members of the group, and there is an element of choice in the extent of the 
obligations. They depend, for example, on reciprocity: my special
responsibilities toward a brother or neighbour are sensitive to the degree to 
which the brother or neighbour accepts special responsibilities toward me. 
However, Dworkin warns that reciprocity does not mean “each doing for the 
other what the latter thinks friendship concretely requires” . If it were so,
103 LE, p.191.
104 Dworkin discusses these alternatives in LE, pp. 190-195.
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friendship would become “more a matter of people checking in advance to see 
whether their conceptions [of friendship] matched well enough to allow them 
to be friends’*.105 06 Reciprocity must be more abstract, in the sense that we must 
be ready to allow our own conception o f friendship to be vulnerable to the 
wider interpretive test o f the group as a whole.
The associative obligations of an individual thus depend on the nature o f the 
group. A group may be a ‘bare’ community if it meets the “genetic or 
geographical or other historical conditions identified by social practice”,107 but 
further conditions must be met for it to give rise to associative - fraternal - 
obligations between its members. Those conditions relate to the members’ 
attitudes about the responsibilities they owe one another, and Dworkin 
identifies four of them:
Firstly, they must regard the group’s obligations as special holding distinctly 
within the group, rather than as general duties its members owe equally to 
persons outside it. Second, they must accept that these responsibilities are 
personal: that they run directly from each member to each other member, 
not just to the group as a whole in some collective sense. [...] Third, 
members must see these responsibilities as flowing from a more general 
responsibility each has of concern for the well-being of others in the group... 
[...] Fourth, members must suppose that the group’s practices show not only 
concern but an equal concern for all members”.108
If these particular conditions are met, the bare community is also a ‘true’ 
community, in which people have corresponding obligations, whether or not 
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“most members recognize and honor these obligations”.109 However, it is 
important to note that a true community must be first a bare community: “1 
would not become a citizen of Fiji if people there decided for some reason to 
treat me as one of them”.110
Notwithstanding the importance of the concept of a ‘bare community* in 
Dworkin’s argument, he devotes not more than a few lines to it, writing that 
“we have no difficulty finding in political practice the conditions of bare 
community” .111 Unfortunately, this is not so in the case of the Union. One of 
the most trenchant critiques of authority in the EU is to be found in the debate 
over ‘demos’, which shows that the fulfilment of the conditions o f bare 
community within the Union is not clear cut.
The ‘no-demos’ thesis might be crudely characterised as the theory that direct 
democracy can only exist within a community that has a certain level o f 
cohesiveness and certain criteria o f what it is to belong to that community; 
demos is said to be absent at the European level. The thesis found expression in 
the German Federal Constitutional Court’s decision in the Brunner case,112 and 
this aspect o f the judgment is analysed in particular detail by Weiler, who offers 
a ‘composite version’ of the no-demos thesis, “culled from the decision of the 
Court itself’. According to this version, the ‘subjective manifestations’ o f the 
demos “are to be found in a sense o f social cohesion, shared destiny and 
collective self-identity which, in turn, result in (and deserve) loyalty”.113 They 
are a result o f the following ‘objective elements’: common language, common 




112 BVerfGE 89, 155; English translation [1994] 1 CM LR 57.
113 Weiler, “Does Europe Need a Constitution? Demos, Telos and the German Maastricht 
Decision”, p.225.
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ethnie origin and common religion.114 The Court argues that as a matter of 
empirical observation, based upon these ‘organic cultural-national criteria’, there 
is no European demos. The implications o f this, notes Weiler, are that “absent a 
demos, there cannot, by definition, be a democracy or démocratisation at the 
European level”.115 The no-demos thesis has an “implicit and traditional 
solution: Cooperation through international treaties... covering well-
circumscribed subjects”.116
The no-demos thesis is harshly criticised by Weiler. He summarises his critique
as follows:
“My challenge...is not to the ethno-cultural, homogeneous concept of Volk 
as such. It is, instead, to the view which insists that the only way to think of 
a demos, bestowing legitimate rule-making and democratic authority on a 
polity, is in these Volkish terms. I also challenge the concomitant notion that 
the only way to think of a polity, enjoying legitimate rule-making and 
democratic authority, is in statal terms. Finally, I challenge the implicit view 
in the decision that the only way to imagine the Union is in some statal 
form...Noteworthy is not only the ‘enslavement* to the notion of State, but 
also...the inability to contemplate an entity with a simultaneous multiple 
identity”.117
Weiler’s proposal is a demos understood in “non-organic civic terms, a coming 
together on the basis not of shared ethnos and/or organic culture, but a coming 




117 Ibid., p.238 (emphasis in original).
271
societal duties and shared rational intellectual culture which transcend organic- 
national differences”.118
I have quoted extensively from Weiler here because his challenges mirror the 
exhortation I drew from Balkin’s critique of legal understanding in Chapter 
Four: to shift the focus of study from the properties an object (the European 
Community legal system; the Union polity) is thought to have to the nature o f 
the subject who apprehends it. Balkin’s elaboration o f his ‘critical perspective’ 
gave us three elements: understanding is a purposive activity o f subjects, not the 
apprehension of existing properties o f the object; understanding is shaped by the 
subject’s values, beliefs, knowledge and commitments; and the act of 
understanding an object will influence the subject. Clearly, the third element 
has assumed particular importance in the case of understanding the Union, 
which demands a freedom of thought to match its sui generis nature. As Philip 
Schmitter has suggested, our familiarity with the model of the nation state has 
affected us to the extent that it actually limits our capacity to envisage political 
entities which do not match our experience: “It seems self-evident to us that 
this particular form o f organising political life will continue to dominate all 
others...enjoy a unique source o f legitimacy and furnish most people with a 
distinctive identity”.119
The German court’s understanding o f demos is linked to its state-bound 
assumption that loyalty must be exclusive: that, as Weiler, puts it, an entity 
cannot have a ‘simultaneous multiple identity’. This view is pithily put by 
Mestmäcker: “there are limitations to the democratic legitimacy of European 
law as long as we are Europeans who simultaneously owe and accept obedience 
to the authorities o f our home country”.120 Mestmäcker, however, is not 
correct. In Chapter Three I attempted to show how it is perfectly possible for
118 Ibid., p.243.
119 Schmitter, “Representation and the Future Euro-polity”, p.381.
120 Mestmacker, “On the Legitimacy o f  European Law”, p.629.
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there to exist multiple demoi and allegiances so long as one system does not 
exercise its authority in such a way as to force a conflict o f norms which 
presents its subjects with an unavoidable choice between competing systems. 
There may exist limitations on the effectiveness of European or national law 
which will arise in the case of a collision of authority, but the normative 
justification o f European law is unaffected by the need for dual loyalty.
It is also crucial to recognise the purposive element of understanding at work in 
any approach to the EU: as Weiler comments, the German court, 
notwithstanding its doubts, “is forced, for political and other reasons, to accept 
and ‘whitewash’ the Community and Union...which suffer from very serious 
democratic deficiencies’’.121 Writers, unlike judges, are less subject to practical 
considerations such as the wider effect one’s decision may have upon the polity 
itself. Yet commentators participating in the demos debate cannot avoid taking 
up a particular perspective and a purposive position. The dialectic between the 
two approaches of rational reconstruction and deconstruction common to the 
committed, normative point of view is, as the next paragraphs show, clear.
On the one hand, writers such as Weiler and MacCormick defend a 
constructive model o f European demos based on a civic conception of 
community membership. Civic nationalism, according to MacCormick, 
identifies the nation in terms of its members’ shared allegiance to certain civic 
institutions, understood in broad terms.122 On the other hand, writers such as 
Grimm, while agreeing that collective identity may be rooted in bases other 
than ethnic, argue that the creation o f a civic demos in the Union is not 
possible. Grimm claims this to be so given the lack of a common language
121 Weiler, “Does Europe Need a Constitution? Demos, Telos and the German Maastricht 
Decision”, p.222.
122 MacCormick, “Liberalism, Nationalism and the Post-sovereign State”, p.150.
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through which to establish the Europe-wide ‘communication media’ that is a 
pre-condition such a conception of community.123
The ball comes back into the reconstructive camp once more with Habermas’ 
comment on Grimm: “ [g]iven the political will, there is no a priori reason why 
[Europe] cannot subsequently create the politically necessary communicative 
context as soon as it is constitutionally prepared to do so”.124 Gerstenberg is on 
the same side: “what is required for democracy to be possible in multicultural 
societies is the weak constraint that citizens who know that they disagree on 
moral, religious, and political issues, nevertheless share a commitment to the 
idea of conducting political argument on common ground”.125 Yet the 
deconstructive team weigh in once more: Habermas is said to “ [overestimate] 
the problem of generating collective bonds”.126 “Legally and politically, nothing 
at all speaks...in favour o f the assumption that a constitution can be founded on 
the mere ‘political will* to communicate. The state cannot be reduced to a mere 
set of discursive processes”.127
The movement to and fro between these two approaches shows that we have 
reached the point where claims about the properties o f the European polity are 
not sufficient: the question becomes, more pertinently, what sort of demos do 
we wish to build. The debate over bare community mirrors, as I hope shall 
become clear, the question of legitimacy. The committed, normative 
perspective will, necessarily, be engaged in circles o f justification that will 
oscillate between the reconstructive and deconstructive. Both the categories o f 
arguments based on community and participation, like the debate on bare
123 See Grimm, “Does Europe Need a Constitution?”, pp.292-297.
124 Habermas, “Remarks on Dieter Grimm’s ‘Does Europe Need a Constitution?”’, p.307.
125 Gerstenberg, “Law’s Polyarchy: A Comment on Cohen and Sabel”, p.350.




community summarised above, stem from this perspective. Similarly, arguments 
based on myth and on task can be found in relation to the demos question. The 
no-demos argument skates over the element of coercion and the exercise of 
pure will and power in the creation o f ‘homogenous* communities. “Any view 
which is nostalgic about the shelter of the nation state should remember Ernest 
Renan’s insight that it is the loss of memory or even deliberate historical error 
that creates a nation: the loss of memory about past atrocities and violence 
toward minorities or underprivileged social groups”.128
While the dialectic between the ‘demos* and ‘no demos* camps would, for those 
such as Pierre Schlag who take up the critical perspective, be condemned as 
sterile - an ‘empty circle of liberal justification’129 130- the view that a collective 
identity could be formed through the construction of a myth of community 
does not negate the value of the perspective of the ideal observer. As we saw, 
Schlag argues that the practice o f liberal justification of the American state is 
shaped by and organised around the “aspirations and problems of a popular 
constitutional mythology”,120 and concludes that the practice of liberal 
justification cheats the members of a community into believing that they freely 
choose an authoritative, constitutional liberal state.131 Following Schlag’s 
arguments, we are flattered, cajoled and bullied into accepting the myth of an 
authority which legitimately exercises power over us. Yet as the demos/no- 
demos debate shows, we are capable o f considering the form o f communal life 
that best furthers the common good, whether it be based on ‘organic cultural-
128 Gerstenberg, “Law’s Polyarchy: A Comment on Cohen and Sabel”, p.349, citing Emest 
Renan, Qu'est-ce qu'une nation?, (1882) (Presses Pocket 1992) at p.41: “L'oubli, et je  dirai 
même Terreur historique, sont un facteur essentiel de la création d’une nation, et c'est ainsi 
que le progrès des études historiques est souvent pour la nation un danger. L’investigation 
historique, en effet, remet en lumière les fait de violence qui se sont passés à l’origine de 
toutes les formation politiques, même de celles dont les conséquances ont été les plus 
bienfaisantes. L’unité se fait toujours brutalement...”.




national criteria" or civic nationalism. We should similarly be capable of using 
our best endeavours to create and further that form o f communal life. 
Therefore, let us move on from the question of demos and bare community, 
and reflect further on the way in which governance within a community may 
have legitimate authority.
6 .4 .2  P o litica l ob ligations: three m o d e ls  o f  co m m u n ity
Dworkin presents three general models o f political association,132 each of which 
describes the attitude the members o f the community model would self­
consciously take toward each other. These models are: (i) *de facto’ community; 
(ii) ‘rulebook’ community; and (iii) principled community. The first model 
supposes that members o f a political community “treat their association as only a 
de facto accident of history and geography”, and see no further distinction 
between their community and others. The second model supposes that the 
community members accept and obey rules that they have negotiated. 
However, they have no sense that the rules emerge from some common 
commitment; on the contrary, they take them merely to represent a 
compromise between antagonistic interests and opinions. It is on this question 
that the second model differs from the third; in a community of principle 
people accept that they are governed not just by rules but also by principles, 
common principles that express the commitment o f the community to a 
particular scheme of justice, fairness and due process.
O f all three models, only the third, according to Dworkin, satisfies the four 
conditions o f true associative community. The de facto model violates even the 
first condition o f ‘specialness’ and adds nothing to the circumstances that define 
even a bare political community. The second, rulebook, model is initially more 
promising, as the members do manifest some level o f special and personal 
concern toward each other - concern that the protection and obligation that the
132 See LE, pp.208-215.
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rules create will be borne and enjoyed by all. However, this level cannot fulfil 
the level required by the third condition, as the concern it displays “is too 
shallow...to count as genuine concern at all”.133 We thus come to the third 
model which, “at least as well as any model could in a morally pluralistic 
society”,134 fulfils all four conditions. It “makes the responsibilities of citizenship 
special”, it “makes those responsibilities fully personal”, “the concern it 
expresses is not shallow”, and “it...assumes...that each [person] must be treated 
with equal concern”.135 A community o f principle is therefore a true associative 
community and can “therefore claim moral legitimacy - that its collective 
decisions are matters of obligation and not bare power - in the name of 
fraternity”.136
Dworkin’s hypothesis that political obligation, including an obligation to obey 
the law, is a form of associative, or fraternal, obligation, seems difficult to 
reconcile with our experience of large and impersonal political societies. 
However, Dworkin points out that a prima facie case is made for his account of 
obligation in that our ordinary political attitudes seem to satisfy his first 
condition:
“We suppose that we have special interests in and obligations toward other 
members of our own nation. Americans address their political appeals, their 
demands, visions, and ideals, in the first instance to other Americans; Britons 
to other Britons; and so forth. We treat community as prior to justice and 






questions o f what would be fair or just within a particular political 
group.”.137
Dworkin is correct that this prima facie case is made out in relation to our state 
political communities, but as the discussion of the demos debate above 
highlights this is not clear at the European level. However, as 1 explained 
earlier, I do not wish to consider Dworkin’s claims that only in a ‘principled’ 
community is integrity accepted in relation to the Community or Union. 
Dworkin himself notes that these models are ideal: “we cannot suppose that 
most people in our own political societies self-consciously accept the attitudes of 
any of them”. Instead, Dworkin “constructed them so that we could decide 
which attitudes we should try to interpret our political practices to express”.138
The rulebook and principled models correspond in many ways to the 
intergovernmental and supranational models o f the EU discussed earlier. As we 
saw, the intergovernmental conception emphasises the power o f the Member 
States in dictating the decision-making o f the Community and Union. As 
Weiler writes, “ [t]he political scientists of the realist school never tire telling us 
that the evolution o f European integration was driven by national self-interest 
and cold calculations o f cost and benefit to its participating Member States”.139
This image of the political practices of the EC resonates with Dworkin’s 
descriptions o f the rulebook community: for example, he says that each person 
in a rulebook community “can use the standing political machinery to advance 
his own interests or ideals”.140 The difference between a rulebook and a 
principled community is brought most sharply into relief by their respective 
members’ attitudes toward the community’s law: the members of a rulebook
137 LE, p.208.
138 LE, p.214.
139 Weiler, “Does Europe 
Decision”, p.319.
140 LE, p.212.
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community “have no sense that the rules were negotiated out of a common 
commitment to underlying principles that are themselves a source of further 
obligation; on the contrary, they take these rules to represent a compromise 
between antagonistic interests or points o f view”.141
The Council o f Ministers is the main Community and Union ‘legislator, and its 
political practices would seem to match far more closely the rulebook model 
than the principled. Mancini graphically describes the Council as resembling “an 
intergovernmental round table often characterised by all the warmth of a love 
match in a snake-pit. In other words, its members regularly speak, and no doubt 
think, in terms of negotiating with their partners much as they would do in any 
other international context”.142 Similarly, Weiler comments that the Member 
States have often acted as if the Community (let alone the Union) were an 
instrument for the furtherance of their national policies, not an independent 
political and legal system.143 It seems that the members of the European Union 
should identify far more with the idea that they are governed by “rules 
hammered out in political compromise”144 rather than by common principles.
O n the other hand, the ‘supranationalist* elements in the Union reflect the 
picture of principled community that Dworkin draws. Supranationalism 
emphasises the existence of independent policy-making structures and the idea 
o f the EU as an independent order.145 This vision of the EU relies on the 
Community as created by the so-called “constitutionalisation” o f the 
Community order. This is, famously, the process through which the
141 LE, p.210.
142 G. Federico Mancini, “The Making o f a Constitution for Europe”, p.598.
145 “[B]y virtue o f  the near total control o f  the Member States over the Community process, 
the Community appeared more as an instrument in the hands o f  the governments rather 
than as an usurping power” - Weiler, “The Transformation o f  Europe”, p.2449.
144 LE, p.211.
145 See, generally, Weiler, “The Community System: The Dual Character o f  
Supranationalism”, p.267.
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Community is said to have mutated from a community o f relationships between 
States essentially governed by international law (merely a “compact among 
States”)146 to a community founded on the rule of law and with a “basic 
constitutional charter, the Treaty”.147 Weiler charts the metamorphosis of the 
Community by dividing the constitutionalisation period into three. He shows 
how the Court o f Justice, during the first, ‘foundational period’ (the 1960’s and 
70’s) established the four doctrines o f direct effect, supremacy, implied powers 
and human rights protection which have rendered the relationship between the 
Member States and the Community “indistinguishable from analogous legal 
relationships in constitutional federal states”.148
A community o f principle is committed to a scheme o f principle which informs 
and restricts its political decision-making. This commitment is also found within 
the European Union. The Union’s scheme of principle is founded on the 
principle of the rule o f law, but includes such principles as democratic 
representation, respect for national identity, the protection of fundamental 
rights, and judicial protection.149 New principles have also been added to this 
scheme: the Maastricht Treaty introduced the principle of subsidiarity, which 
informs and restricts the legislative powers of the Union according to the 
principle that action will be taken only “if and in so far as the objectives o f the 
proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States”.150
Similarly the Member States and the “peoples of Europe” share long-term aims 
and goals within the common project of “an ever closer union”. The preambles
146 Koen Lenaerts, “Some Thoughts About the Interaction Between Judges and Politicians in 
the European Community", p .l.
147 Parti ecologiste ‘Les Verts' v European Parliament, Case 294/83, [1986] E C R  1339, at p.1365,
148 Weiler, “The Transformation o f Europe”, p.2413.
149 xhese principles are to be found in the Declaration on European Identity adopted by the 
Member States in 1973 (EC Bull. 1973-12, 130). See further Carlo Curti Gialdino, "Some 
Reflections on the Acquis Communautaire,\  pp. 1112-1114.
150 Article 5 o f  the EC Treaty.
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of the TEU and EC Treaty set out this common project: to promote economic 
and social progress and a high level of employment; to constantly improve living 
and working conditions; and by thus pooling their resources to “preserve and 
strengthen peace and liberty”. Weiler describes how, at least at its foundation, 
the “very idea of the Community” was associated with “three principal ideals”, 
peace, prosperity and supranationalism,151 which formed the basis of a new, 
principled model o f  co-operation within Europe.
The process of constitutionalisation has breathed life into the scheme of 
principle and the common project to which the Union was committed, on 
paper at least, right from the start. It has removed the trappings of international 
political practice, such as the notion of exclusive state responsibility and its 
associated principles of reciprocity and countermeasures, from the political 
sphere of the Community and Union.152 It has supplied the basis for the 
supranational vision of the Union as an autonomous and, in some respects, 
quasi-federal international order. However, it remains the case that the political 
practices of the Union can still be described as a “two-level game” in which the 
decision-making even within the Community, let alone the Union, is reduced 
to inter-state bargaining of the form “national preference formation > interstate 
negotiation > outcome”.153 How, then, can it be argued that the European 
Union fits anything but the rulebook model of community, “which takes 
politics...to be a kind of game”?154
The recent growth of differentiation in the Union, with its inroads into the 
Community, has shaken the supports o f a principled construction of the EU. In 
Philippart and Edwards’ opinion, the closer co-operation procedure in Article
151 ’Weiler, “Europe after Maastricht -  Supranationalism, Nationalism and the State”, p.320.
152 Ibid., p.2422.
153 Moravcsik, "Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal 
Intergovemmentalist Approach”, pp.482 and 517.
154 LE, p.213.
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11(2) of the EC Treaty is “a major blow to the Community-method by the 
clear primacy given to national interests over the ‘European interest”’.155 
However, the cornerstones of principled community still remain. The members 
o f the Union share a common project, common goals and a common scheme o f 
principle. This commitment demands sacrifice, which the Member States have 
made and will continue to do so in the future.156
Most of all, however, it is the strength of the protection o f the principle of 
equality, or as Dworkin calls it, equal concern, in the Union which assumes a 
community o f principle. Equality is enshrined in the prohibition o f 
discrimination on the ground of nationality in the EC Treaty,157 but is also to 
be found in other provisions of the Treaties158 and has also been developed as a 
genera] principle o f Community law by the European Court o f Justice.159 The 
commitment to equality within the Community runs deep: as Joseph Weiler 
says, the concept o f  the single market itself is a “highly politicized choice” 
which is “premised on the assumption of formal equality of individuals”.160 Yet 
it must be allowed that its politics can oscillate between a “theater of moral 
argument and commitment based in the responsibilities of community”161 and a
155 Philippart and Edwards, “The Provisions on Closer Co-operation in the Treaty o f  
Amsterdam: the Politics o f  Flexibility in the European Union”, p.97.
156 As Weiler puts it, the “Member States thus face not only the constitutional normativity o f  
measures adopted often wholly or partially against their will, but also the operation o f  this 
normativity in a vast area o f  public policy” (“The Transformation o f  Europe", p.2463).
157 Article 12.
158 For example, Article 141 (equal pay for men and women for equal work) and Article 34(2) 
(prevention o f  discrimination between producers and consumers within the Community).
159 See, for example, Firttta Albert Ruckdeschel & Co v Hauptzollamt Hamburg-St Annen, Case 
117/76, [1977] ECR 1753, where the Court established that “similar situations shall not be 
treated differently unless differentiation is objectively justified” (p.1769).
160 Weiler, “T he Transformation o f Europe”, p.2477.
161 Dworkin, “Foundations o f  Liberal Equality”, p.38.
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“market for discovering passive revealed preferences”,162 where the parties aim 
to secure every possible advantage at the others’ expense.
Dworkin argues that we should interpret our politics as constituting a principled 
community if  we value the particular consequences that such an interpretation 
would bring. Those consequences may be practical, moral, and expressive. One 
practical consequence is the effect on the legitimacy of the community: political 
obligation is no longer a matter o f obeying the discrete political decisions of the 
community one by one, but instead “fidelity to a scheme o f principle each 
citizen has a responsibility to identify, ultimately for himself, as his community’s 
scheme”.163 However, in a polity such as a rulebook political community, 
where rules are hammered out in political compromise, we would not wish the 
consequences of an interpretation which claimed it to be a community of 
principle: rules are the product of a bargaining process in which each side has 
tried to compromise as little as possible, and it would be unfair to claim that the 
final agreement contained anything not explicitly agreed. It is possible to point 
to several viewpoints which seem to take up the view that the European 
Community should be interpreted to be a rulebook community. Hartley, for 
example, is horrified at the thought that the Court o f Justice should interpret 
Community law “contrary to the natural meaning of the words used”164 - 
exactly the understanding of judicial responsibility corresponding to a rulebook 
conception o f the European Community.165
It is however time to underline a theoretical distinction that has force within the 
Community context: the justified use of coercive power is one thing, and
162 Ibid.
163 LE, p.190.
164 Hartley, “The European Court, Judicial Objectivity and the Constitution o f  the European 
U nion”, p.95.
165 o f  course, the implications o f  which model we prefer to interpret the Community as 
expressing go beyond the immediate question o f legitimacy. If the rulebook model is
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authority is another. Raz gives an example: “I do not exercise authority over 
people afflicted with contagious diseases if I knock them out and lock them up 
to protect the public, even though I am, in the assumed circumstances, justified 
in doing so”.166 All political authorities do use coercion, but all legal authorities 
do much more -  they claim to impose duties and confer rights. Whatever the 
method of decision-making, as soon as a legal right or duty is created the 
question o f legitimacy takes on a greater urgency, since this creation of a legal 
norm brings with it a particular relationship of responsibility toward those 
members o f the community subject to it. This is because in most democracies 
there exists a concern that individuals are treated justly and fairly.
Where the Union is concerned, the rulebook model is fine in so far as those 
rules ‘hammered out in political compromise’ have effects only upon those that 
thrashed them out. This is not the case within the Community, and has not been 
since the introduction of the doctrines o f direct effect and supremacy by the 
Court of Justice. It is at this point that the separation between the first pillar and 
the Union becomes clear. Article 34 of the TEU expressly states that decisions 
made under the Union umbrella but outside the first pillar shall not entail direct 
effect.
Weiler shows how the doctrine o f direct effect, introduced in the celebrated 
Van Gend en Loos167 case and one o f  the foundations o f the process o f 
constitutionalisation, has actually exacerbated the problem o f  legitimacy within 
the Union.168 In Van Gend the Court found that:
adopted by a community’s judges, this will manifest itself in the way those judges decide 
cases.
166 Raz, “Authority and Justification”, p.116.
167 Van Gend en Loos v Nederlandse administratie, Case 26/62 [1963] E C R  1.
168 See Weiler, “European Neo-constitutionalism: In Search o f  Foundations for the European 
Constitutional Order”.
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“Independently o f the legislation o f Member States, Community law...not 
only imposes obligations on individuals but is also intended to confer upon 
them rights which become part of their legal heritage”.
As Weiler says, this phrase sharpens the issue, for here are “obligations imposed 
on individuals independently of the legislation of Member States*'.169 But why should 
individuals treat the decisions of the Community which impose duties upon 
them as authoritative? How can the Community claim to have legitimacy to 
make these decisions?
As we saw above, members of a community have a duty to obey the 
community’s rules if the community has certain characteristics that give rise to 
these obligations among its members. Who are the members of the European 
Community? The Court of Justice in Van Cend replies:
“ [the] Community constitutes a new legal order...the subjects of which 
comprise not only Member States but also their nationals”.
Thus the ‘subjects’ of the EC are not only states, but also individuals. The 
doctrine of direct effect therefore seems to be given authority on the ground 
that individuals are elevated to the status of full subjects alongside Member 
States.170 Yet this is “highly problematic”, in Weiler’s words. Individuals 
became subjects, or members, of the Community, only as a consequence of the 
direct effect of the obligations which were imposed upon them. “[T]o the 
extent that the High Contracting Parties retained the prerogatives to make the 
obligations bestowing rights on individuals...[Van Gend] accentuated the problem 
o f legitimacy”.171




The Community would have had a good claim to legitimacy as a rulebook 
community if the obligations it created had effect only upon the Member States 
that negotiated them. However» as soon as individuals became subject to those 
duties that claim lost its force. Given the impact of the exercise of Community 
authority upon Union subjects, which is comparable to that of a state, the 
justification of that authority must also be comparable to that of a state. This 
does not mean that the constitutional structure o f the Union or even the 
particular values it adheres to must necessarily be comparable to that o f a state. 
The ideal o f principled community can only be applicable to the Union in part 
-  in relation to the Community, where governance is comparable with 
governance in those political societies.
O n this analysis, the crux of the question of legitimacy within the European 
Union is whether a particular norm or body of norms has direct effects upon 
individual citizens. The difficulty this creates is that we are accustomed to 
authorities which have either power to affect individuals (e.g. state bodies) or 
power to affect states (e.g. international organisations), not both. It leads to the 
conclusion that to ask whether ‘the Union1 or ‘the Community1 or ‘the 
Commission1 is legitimate is to ask the wrong question. Instead, we must ask 
whether the particular authority which an institution is exercising is legitimate. 
The Dworkinan test of ‘scheme of principle1 can only apply to areas of 
competence.
Therefore, according to Dworkin’s ideals, and so long as only authority 
exercised through the first pillar has direct effect, we should view the 
Community as a community of principle, and the rest of the Union as a rule- 
book community. This distinction also holds for the nature of citizens1 
participation in authority, which I will consider next. However, before moving 
on a few words on the ‘ideal1 of a community of principle are necessary. As we 
saw in Chapter Four it is arguable that Dworkin’s theory is too highly 
rationalised: “it attempts to do away with the inconsistencies that inevitably 
inhere in the particularization of right and to principle in any social order. The
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result is a very strained coherence, which...carries within it the danger of 
perpetuating pretense in the name o f rational order”.172 Cornell argues that 
whereas, for Dworkin, “ [to] speak in different voices would be to undermine 
the personification of the community, as it would also supposedly defeat the 
community's claim to authority as a community of principle”,173 in reality “a 
complex community can never speak in a single voice”.174
In Chapter Four I argued that the expansion of the concept o f flexibility into 
the Community shows that although the integrity and coherence of the 
Community is viewed as an ideal to be upheld, we do not give it the overriding 
weight that Dworkin suggests is necessary. As Raz says, the reality of politics 
leaves the law untidy175 -  and we may wish, especially within the Union, to 
leave it that way.
6.5 Participation
By ‘participation’ I mean the arguments that commonly fall within the so-called 
‘democratic deficit’ debate. Such arguments are based upon the theory that 
authority is justified if it is democratic - ‘democratic’ generally being understood 
to mean that citizens in some way give their consent to the laws which affect 
them. Thus we find claims that the Union’s legitimacy will be improved if the 
European Parliament is strengthened,176 or if there is efficient exercise of 
collective decision-making,177 or if there is greater transparency in order to give 
citizens better information in their participation in decision-making.178 There
172 Cornell, “Institutionalization o f  Meaning, Recollective Imagination and the Potential for 
Transformative Legal Interpretation”, p.1176.
173 Ibid., p.1158.
174 Ibid., p.1177.
175 Raz, Ethics in the Public Domain, p.314.
176 Hrbek, “Federal Balance and the Problem o f  Democratic Legitimacy in the EU”, p.63.
177 Eleftheriadis, “Aspects o f  European Constitutionalism”, p.41.
178 Petersmann, “Constitutionalism, Constitutional Law and European Integration”, p.261.
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are also more sophisticated examples: Gerstenberg, for one, suggests that Cohen 
and Sabel’s idea o f ‘directly-deliberative polyarchy’ offers a unique way to 
consider the possibility of widespread participation in a large scale political 
system such as the EU, the achievement o f equal treatment for citizens and the 
fulfilment o f normative preconditions for democracy.179 Joerges agrees that new 
forms of democratic governance, including direct democratic governance, 
should be extended to transnational arenas.180 Gerstenberg writes: “by creating 
and fostering those communicative environments which are required by radical 
democracy in the form of directly-deliberative polyarchy, European 
supranational law could gradually bootstrap itself to legitimacy”.181
Dworkin’s theory o f community is closely aligned to his theory of what it is to 
be a member of a community. It is dear that in discussing a legitimate political 
community Dworkin presupposes that that community will have citizens: “A 
state is legitimate if its constitutional structure and practices are such that its 
citizens have a general obligation to obey political decisions that purport to 
impose duties on them”.182 To interpret a community as a principled political 
community makes, therefore, the “responsibilities o f citizenship special: each 
citizen respects the principles o f fairness and justice instinct in the standing 
political arrangements o f his particular community”.183 Dworkin argues that we 
should therefore interpret our politics as accepting integrity because integrity 
thus promotes the ideal that citizens are the ‘authors’ of political decisions that 
impose obligations upon them.
179 See Gerstenberg, “Law’s Polyarchy: A Comment on Cohen and Sabel”, pp.350-355; see 
also Cohen and Sabel, “Direcdy-Deliberative Polyarchy”.
180 joerges, “The Impact o f  European Integration on Private Law: Reductionist Perceptions, 
True Conflicts and a N ew  Constitutional Perspective”, p.379.
181 Gerstenberg, “Law’s Polyarchy: A Comment on Cohen and Sabel” , p.355.
182 LE, p.191.
183 LE, p.213 (emphasis added).
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Although the necessity of a particular kind of membership of a political 
community is touched upon only obliquely in Law's Empire, Dworkin develops 
the theme in later work, where he argues that “self-government is possible only 
within a community that meets the conditions of moral membership» because 
only then are we entitled to refer to government by ‘the people’“.184 By ‘moral 
membership’ he means “the kind of membership in a political community that 
engages self-government’’.185
Before setting out the conditions o f moral membership and asking whether they 
exist within the Union, I have to take several steps backwards and colour in the 
context of the concept of moral membership, for it slots into a wider panorama 
of reflections by Dworkin on the nature o f democracy. The flip-side of the coin 
o f membership is the concept of collective action. “Government by thé people” 
means democracy - but there is deep disagreement about what democracy really 
means. One vision, for example, as we have seen, argues that democracy as rule 
by the people, or demos, demands that there be a common sense of belonging 
expressed in such things as a common press and media, common political 
parties, common political debate. On these criteria, the European Union is not 
a democratic entity. Moral membership fits, therefore, into a wider debate 
about the nature of democracy and the sort of democracy - if any - we wish to 
interpret the Union as constituting.
6 .5 .1  C onceptions o f  dem ocracy
Dworkin believes that underneath the debate on what government by the 
people ‘really’ requires in order to count as democracy there lies a fundamental 
philosophical dispute about the “fundamental value or point” of democracy.186
184 FL, p.24.
185 FL, p.23.
186 FL, p. 15 (author’s emphasis). In this section on moral membership I draw particularly from 
Dworkin’s discussions o f  democracy, collective action and moral membership as set out in
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One account of democracy is based upon what he calls the ‘majoritarian 
premise*, which is a thesis about the correct outcomes o f a political process. The 
majoritarian premise insists that political procedures should be designed so that, 
“at least on important matters, the decision that is reached is the decision that a 
majority or plurality o f citizens favors, or would favor if  it had adequate 
information and enough time for reflection**.187 Dworkin argues however that 
we should reject the majoritarian conception of democracy. He defends instead 
an account o f democracy that he calls constitutional, and which denies that the 
defining goal of democracy is to fulfil the will o f the majority. On the 
constitutional conception of democracy, the defining aim o f  democracy is that 
“collective decisions be made by political institutions whose structure, 
composition and practices treat all members o f the community, as individuals, 
with equal concern and respect’’.188
We shall see how integrity as a political principle is rooted in the constitutional 
conception of democracy. On the very basic definitions given above, though, it 
is difficult to see why we should reject the majoritarian premise, which seems to 
reflect so closely our political institutions and procedures. Dworkin’s argument 
steps sideways, however, away from discussions of constitutions and decision­
making, and toward the question of what people actually do when they 
‘practise’ democracy. He begins with a “benign but important observation: that 
democracy, like almost any other form of government, involves collective 
action’’.189 In considering what collective action is like, we can decide which 
kind of collective action we take democratic government to require.




189 Dworkin, “Equality, Democracy, and Constitution", p.329.
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6.5 .2  The nature o f  collective action
Dworkin distinguishes two kinds of collective action - ‘statistical’ and 
‘communal’. Here is the definition of statistical collective action:
“Collective action is statistical when what the group does is only a matter of 
some function, rough or specific, o f what the individual members o f the 
group do on their own, that is, with no sense of doing something as a 
group”.190
W e might say, then, that yesterday the foreign exchange market drove down 
the price of the Euro. This is collective action in that only a large group of 
bankers and dealers can affect a currency in this way, but our reference to the 
“foreign exchange market” does not point to any actual collective entity. We 
could just as well make the more overtly statistical observation that yesterday the 
combined effects o f individual currency transactions were responsible for the 
lower price o f the Euro at the latest trade. The statistical reading of collective 
action, therefore, leads to a particular reading of the idea that democracy is 
government ‘by the people’: that “in a democracy political decisions are made 
in accordance with the votes or wishes of some function -  a majority or 
plurality - of individual citizens”.191
I would suggest that the ‘intergovemmentalist’ conception of the European 
Union discussed earlier lends itself to the statistical view of collective action. 
The situation is complicated by the fact that government ‘by the people’ in the 
EU is not direct - due to the limited powers of the European Parliament - and 
is translated to a large extent through the medium of the Member States, but it 
is clear that the intergovernmental view emphasises decision-making as reduced 
to a function of the individual actors involved, whether Member States or
190 Dworkin, FL, p.19, and “Equality, Democracy, and Constitution”, p.329.
191 FL, p.20.
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Union institutions. This means» further, that the intergovernmental model 
embraces a majoritarian conception o f democracy, since the majoritarian 
premise presupposes a statistical appreciation of collective action.
What is the alternative? The second kind of collective action identified by 
Dworkin is communal.
“Collective action is communal...when it cannot be reduced just to some 
statistical function o f individual action, because it is collective in the deeper 
sense that does require individuals to assume the existence o f the group as a 
separate entity or phenomenon”.192
As an example of a paradigmatic form o f communal collective action, Dworkin 
describes an orchestra:
“An orchestra can play a symphony, though no single musician can, but this 
is not a case o f statistical collective action because it is essential to an 
orchestral performance not just that a specified function o f musicians each 
plays some appropriate score, but that the musicians play as an orchestra, 
each intending to make a contribution to the performance of the group, and 
not just as isolated individual recitations”.193
Translating this form o f action to the political sphere, we can see that 
democracy, on the communal reading, will mean that political decisions are 
taken by a distinct entity - the people as such - rather than by any set o f 
individuals one by one .194
How can people become a ‘distinct entity’? Dworkin himself admits that this 
idea may seem “at best a matter of Hegelian mystification, and at worst an
192 Dworkin, “Equality, Democracy, and Constitution”, p.329.
193 Ibid., and see also FL, p.20.
194 See Dworkin, “Equality, Democracy, and Constitution”, p.330, and FL, p.20.
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invitation to totalitarian oppression”. It obviously echoes the equally mysterious 
proposition he makes in Law’s Empire that a community can be ‘personified’, 
and must be so if the argument that a community can accept and commit itself 
to particular principles - including integrity - is to be sustained.195 Yet as his 
example of the orchestra demonstrates, collective action in this communal sense 
is not so incomprehensible to us. It is by examining the important features of 
these familiar kinds o f communal action that we can understand how a 
community - and the European Union - might be understood to be an entity 
beyond the sum of its members.
6 .5 .3  C om m unal collective action
As we saw in the example o f the orchestra, the musicians’ self-conscious 
intention to play together as a group was essential to the orchestra becoming a 
‘distinct entity’. This intention, suggests Dworkin, is the key to making sense of 
communal action: “communal action depends not on the ontological priority of 
community over individual, but on a certain kind o f shared attitudes among 
individuals”.196 When we act self-consciously, “we implicitly make two 
assumptions about the unit of action in play”.197 First, we assume a particular 
unit of responsibility, by which Dworkin means “the person or group to whose 
credit or discredit, achievement or failure, the action rebounds”.198 Secondly, 
we assume a particular unit of judgment, by which he means “the person or group
195 See, in particular, LE, pp. 167-168.
196 Dworkin, “Equality, Democracy, and Constitution”, p.335.
197 Ibid, (emphasis in original).
198 Ibid. In "Liberal Community” Dworkin changes terminology slightly: the “person or 
group or entity treated as the author o f  and held responsible for the action", which seems to 
me to be practically synonymous with the definition in “Equality...”, becomes the ‘unit o f  
agency. I will treat them as one and the same, retaining the term ‘unit o f  responsibility*, as I 
believe it to be clearer.
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whose convictions about what is right or wrong are the appropriate ones tor us 
to use in making that assessment”.199
Most of the time we assume ourselves, acting as individuals, to be the unit of 
responsibility. The statistical conception o f collective action does not change 
this: the individual remains responsible. However, let us look again at the 
musicians in the orchestra. They do not view themselves responsible 
individually for the success or failure o f the orchestra: the ‘orchestra’ itself 
becomes the new unit o f responsibility. As Dworkin puts it, “ [i]t is the orchestra 
that succeeds or fails, and the success or failure of that community is the success 
or failure o f each o f its members” .200 In this case “the attitudes of individuals 
create and presuppose a new unit o f responsibility: the group” .201
So the change in the unit of responsibility is the criterion distinguishing 
statistical from communal collective action. A change in the second unit, 
however, the unit o f  judgment, further distinguishes two forms of communal 
collective action: ‘monolithic’ and ‘integrated’.
“In the case o f integrated collective action, while the shared attitudes of 
participants create a collective unit of responsibility, they do not create a 
collective unit o f judgment: the unit o f judgment remains thoroughly 
individual. In the case of monolithic action, on the contrary, both the unit 
of responsibility and the unit o f judgment become collective. Once again, 
this is a matter o f  shared attitudes”.202
To continue our example, it would be as if the orchestra’s conductor tried to 
dictate what standards o f taste and virtuosity his violinists should cultivate.203
199 Dworkin, “Equality', Democracy, and Constitution”, p.335,
200 Ib id ., p.493.
201 Ibid., p.335-336.
202 Ib id ,, p.336.
203 See FL, p.25-6.
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The effect of the collectivisation of the unit of judgment in the case of 
monolithic action is, of course, to deny the importance o f the individual within 
a community, and Dworkin defends integrated communal collective action 
against it.
And so at last we can return to the argument from moral membership, for moral 
membership and communal collective action in its integrated form come hand- 
in-hand. Unfortunately, however, the connection between the ‘entity* created 
by the shared attitudes o f the members o f the community, and the conditions of 
membership of that community, is not clear. Does moral membership constitute 
the integrated community, or does the integrated community constitute its 
membership? Jo Shaw suggests that community and citizenship are part of a 
virtuous circle of reciprocal reinforcement:204 I shall adopt that position here in 
relation to Dworkin’s theory, and consider both moral membership and 
integrated community together.
6 .5 .4  Moral m em bership and integrated political com m u n ity
We have suddenly jumped from discussing action to discussing community, and 
political community at that, but the connection is simple. We began with two 
concepts of democracy. In a constitutional democracy, the form that Dworkin 
favours, and which accepts integrity, the people govern communally. They treat 
their community as a collective unit of responsibility, which means that they, as 
moral members, share the responsibility for whatever their government does. 
But while in this communal democracy the people may form a distinct unit of 
responsibility, they do not form a collective unit of judgment. Each member 
insists that “his political convictions are in every important sense his 
business”,205 in that he is free to judge on his own terms the success and failure
204 J o  Shaw, “Interpreting European Union Citizenship: A Contribution to European 
Identity?”, p.24.
2°5 Dworkin, “Equality, Democracy, and Constitution”, p.337.
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o f his community. The constitutional community is a political fornì o f 
integrated communal action.
The idea of integration is ambivalent in Dworkin’s work. Integration seems to 
refer to two aspects o f communal collective action, linked by the idea inherent 
in the ‘personification* o f community that “the lives o f individual people and 
that of their community are integrated”.206 Firstly, he discusses integration troni 
the point o f view o f an individual who ‘integrates* with a community, by which 
he seems to mean that the individual recognises that as a member o f the 
community his concern for his own well-being must extend to a concern for 
the life of the community as a whole.207 Secondly, ‘integration’ is approached 
from the angle o f the community: an integrated community is integrated 
because of the practices and attitudes o f its members: social practice must have 
created an integrated, or “composite”, unit o f responsibility.208
It would be nonsense for someone to claim to be a ‘integrated* member of an 
‘integrated’ community “by personal fiat” , which is to say, “simply by declaring 
and believing that he is part o f it” . Dworkin comments that he cannot just 
“declare himself integrated with the Berlin Symphony Orchestra and thereafter 
share in that institution’s triumphs and occasional lapses” . O f  course, this is also 
true from the other side: the Berlin Symphony Orchestra cannot just declare me 
to be a member o f the orchestra and blame me - or praise me - for lapses and 
triumphs. “There must already be a common unit o f agency,209 to which I am 
already attached, for it to be appropriate for me to regard myself as...integrated
206 Dworkin, “Liberal Community”, p.491.
207 Ibid., p .4 9 2 .
208 See ibid., p.494.
209 Or “unit of responsibility”. See the discussion of terminology above.
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with its actions”.210 Equally, there must be integrated members, to be able to 
regard them as members o f that particular community.
Let us just recap the initial ‘argument from moral membership* that is being 
considered here. Dworkin argues that we should interpret our politics as 
accepting integrity because integrity thus promotes the ideal that citizens are the 
‘authors* of political decisions that impose obligations upon them. We have 
followed the steps in Dworkin’s argument, from the idea of “government by 
the people*’ to the requirements o f a particular type of membership o f a political 
community (moral membership) and a political society which is a particular type 
of community (integrated community). We can now return to the European 
Union. Are the “peoples of Europe** moral members o f the European Union? 
And is the Union itself an integrated community?
6 .5 .5  The m em bers o f  the European U nion -  ‘m oral members*?
W hat are the conditions of moral membership, and does the European Union 
fulfil them? There are two kinds o f conditions.211 The first set is structural, and 
describes the conditions that the community as a whole must meet if it is to 
count as a genuinely communal political community. For example, the 
community must have generally recognised and clearly established territorial 
boundaries. The second set is relational: the conditions “describe how an 
individual must be treated by a genuine political community in order that he or 
she be a moral member of that community” .212 A community must give each of 
its members a part in any collective decision, a stake in it, and independence from 
it.
210 Dworkin, “Liberal Community”, pp.494-495.
211 Dworkin, FL, pp.23-26, and "Equality, Democracy, and Constitution”, pp.337-342.
212 FL, p.24.
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6.5.5.1 The structu ra l conditions
The set of structural conditions is not given in detail by Dworkin, and in fact 
the requirement of stable territorial boundaries is the only condition he 
establishes as necessary in Freedom’s Law. However, it seems that these structural 
conditions are the minimum conditions that determine how and when people 
share a social practice - here, a common political life. In Law’s Empire Dworkin 
explains that in order to share a social practice people must understand the 
world in sufficiently similar ways that they are able to recognise the sense in 
each others’ claims: they must share “what Wittgenstein called a form of life 
sufficiently concrete so that the one can recognize sense and purpose in what 
the other says and does” .213
It is not clear whether Dworkin would, under his category of ‘structural 
conditions’, include any requirement o f shared religion, ethnicity, or culture. 
He does assume that such consensus requires that the members o f the 
community must speak the same language,214 but then countries such as 
Switzerland which do not have one common language would obviously fulfil 
the structural conditions nevertheless. In discussing the possibility of a European 
political identity underpinning political community Anthony Smith argues that 
collective identities are “forged out of shared experiences, memories and myths” 
and that in the absence of cultural homogeneity within Europe no European 
identity can exist.215 This understanding of membership as requiring strong 
ethnic, linguistic, historical and cultural bonds between people emerges, as 
discussed earlier, in the debate on demos within the European Union.
As in the question o f bare community, Dworkin does not develop any detailed 
arguments regarding the structural conditions that he believes are necessary for a
213 LE, p.63-64.
214 LE, p.64.
215 Smith, "National Identity and the Idea of European Unity”, p.75.
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community to share a common political life. However, he insists that the 
communal life of a community is restricted only to those acts which, by social 
practice, are understood to be communal. I discuss this idea later but it will be 
useful to illustrate this idea now with the example Dworkin gives: musicians in 
an orchestra do not suppose that the orchestra has “headaches, or high blood 
pressure, or responsibilities of friendship, or crises over whether it should care 
less about music and take up photography instead”.216 It is perfectly possible 
then, in turning to a political community, to conceive of membership and 
community as encompassing purely political bonds, as suggested by 
MacCormick’s concept of a civic demos, that is, “one identified by the 
relationship of individuals to common institutions of a civic rather than an 
ethnic or ethnic-cultural kind”.217
6 .5 .5 .2  The relational conditions
The principle o f  stake
If a community is to be understood as communal, collective decisions must 
reflect equal concern for the interests of all its members, which means that 
“political decisions that affect the distribution of wealth, benefits, and burdens 
must be consistent with equal concern for all”.218 It is this principle which 
underlines the requirement of reciprocity within an integrated community: a 
person is not a member unless he is treated as a member by others, and treating 
him as a member means “accepting that the impact of collective action on his
216 Dworkin, “Liberal Community”, pp.495-496.
217 MacCormick, “Democracy, Subsidiarity, and Citizenship in the ‘European 
Commonwealth’”, p,341. See also Weiler, “European Neo-constitutionalism: In Search of 
Foundations for the European Constitutional Order”, pp. 113-116, where he discusses a 
European demos understood “in non-organic terms, a coming together on the basis...of 
shared values, a shared understanding of rights and societal duties and a shared rational, 
intellectual culture” (p. 113).
218 FL, p.25.
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life and interests is as important to the overall success o f the action as the impact 
on the life and interests o f any other member” .219
The principle of stake - of equal concern as a political ideal - permeates the 
political life o f the European Union and is enshrined in various provisions of the 
Treaties. Members o f the Union are treated equally in the sphere of political 
representation; discrimination against them on grounds of their nationality or ot 
their sex is prohibited. The members o f  the Union are treated with equal 
concern; as we saw earlier, the concept o f the single market itself is a “highly 
politicized choice” which is “premised on the assumption o f formal equality o f 
individuals”.220 However, the effect o f Union norms upon Union citizens does, 
again, depend upon the sphere o f competence: the level o f ‘stake’ is clearly 
higher within the Community pillar than the other spheres o f the Union.
T h e  princip le  o f  independence
It is the principle o f independence that distinguishes an integrated community 
from a monolithic. As we saw earlier, in a monolithic community the ‘unit o f 
judgment’ is not the individual but the community itself. In an integrated 
community, however, the members are allowed, even encouraged, to view 
moral and ethical judgment as their own personal responsibility, not the 
responsibility of collective unit. The community in this way respects the 
principle of independence, which “ therefore insists that a democratic 
government must not dictate what its citizens think about matters of political or 
moral or ethical judgment, but must, on the contrary, provide circumstances 
that encourage citizens to arrive at beliefs on these matters through their 
reflective and finally individual conviction” .221
219 Dworkin, “Equality, Democracy, and Constitution", p.339.
220 Weiler, “The Transformation of Europe”, p.2477.
221 Dworkin, “Equality, Democracy, and Constitution”, p.340.
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In the European Union the principle of independence may be more familiar in 
the form of a fundamental right, including freedom o f speech, freedom o f 
association, and freedom of religion. All these are included in the European 
Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, to which all the 
Member States are parties. The Community, however, is not; but the Court o f 
Justice has drawn on the Convention on various occasions in giving effect to 
the rule that Community law includes fundamental rights, including freedom of 
religion and expression.222 The Union is also bound to respect fundamental 
rights as guaranteed by the Convention by virtue of Article 6 o f the TEU,223 
which reads:
“The Union is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for 
human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule o f law, principles 
which are common to the Member States“.
It is clear, then, that the Union fulfils the condition of independence.
The principle ofparticipation
A community must give a moral member a part in any collective decision. 
Firstly, each person must have a role which allows him or her to make a 
difference to what the community does. Secondly, that role must be consistent 
with the assumption that every member o f the community is equal, and so 
cannot be “structurally fixed or limited by assumptions about his worth or talent 
or ability”.224 The principle of participation is democratic in virtue of its second 
part. It explains, for example, why an orchestra is not a democracy. The 
conductor is not normally chosen by the musicians of the orchestra, but
222 See respectively Case 130/75, Prats v Council [1975] ECR 1589, and Case C-260/89, 
Elliniki Radiofonia Tileorassi Anonimi Etairia v Citnotiki Etairia Pliroforissts and Sotirios Kouvelas 
[1991] ECR 2925.
223 O’Leary, The Evolving Concept of Community Citizenship, p.292.
224 Dworkin, “Equality, Democracy, and Constitution”, p.338.
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imposed upon them, and his power to define and dictate the orchestra's 
performance is given to him on the grounds that he has special talents ordinary 
members do not.225 Democracy cannot be like that.
It is the principle of participation that insists on universal suffrage, and structures 
o f representation that make political offices open in principle to everyone. It 
demands, in effect, effective representation for all on the basis of equality.226 
The principle insists, moreover, on the genuine freedom for each member of 
the community to make his voice heard: “he must be allowed voice as well as 
vote“ .227 Thus the participation principle includes political liberties, such as 
freedom of speech and protest, within the idea of democracy.
In the European Union, the principle of participation is probably the weakest of 
all the conditions o f moral membership. The lack of transparency in the 
decision-making procedures of the Union and the lack of control over the un­
elected institutions are said to give rise to a “democratic deficit”.228 For 
example, there is a lack of parliamentary accountability, a lack of electoral 
power (for example to replace those who govern), compromised national 
judicial control, an overall lack o f transparency, and a preponderance of 
bureaucratic structures and technocratic language.229 As Joerges says, “the 
triangle of administrative discretion, judicial control and political accountability 
which characterizes fully-fledged legal systems is still in its infancy at the 
Community level”.230
223 ib id .
226 Ibid, (and see also FL, pp.24-25).
227 Ibid.
228 Weiler sums up the ‘democracy deficit’ argument in “The Transformation of Europe”, 
pp.2466-2474.
229 See, for example, Weiler, Haltem and Mayer, “European Democracy and its Critique”, 
pp.6-9; Hauser and Muller, “Legitimacy: The Missing Link for Explaining EU-Institution 
Building”, p.27.
230 Joerges, "European Economic Law, the Nation-State and the Maastricht Treaty", p.61.
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However, the principle o f participation in the Union context must take account 
of the fact that the members of the Union are not simply individuals, but also 
the Member States. O n Dworkin’s arguments, the Member States are not 
merely the sum of their nationals, but must be viewed as separate ‘units o f 
responsibility*.231 There are thus various layers of participation in the Union’s 
political life, which should include both the involvement of the Member States 
in the Union but also the direct involvement of individuals in, firstly, the life of 
the Member States, to the extent and in those spheres that the Member State is 
their means of making a difference to what the Union does, and, secondly, the 
Union itself.
How can I, then, as a member of the European Union, make a difference to 
what the Union does? First of all, I can take part in the elections choosing 
members of the European Parliament,232 both as a voter and as a candidate for 
election. I can do so even if I am resident in another Member State, and on the 
same conditions as the nationals of my Member State of residence.233 Second, in 
participating in the national elections of the State of which I am a citizen, I can 
indirectly participate in my State’s involvement within the Union, and 
particularly in the Council of Ministers.
However, that participation in my Member State’s activities at the Union level 
is so limited as to negate any role that allows me to make a difference to what 
the Union does. The introduction of majority voting in the Council234 has 
meant that decisions may no longer be the fruit of the collective will of all the 
Member States, thus minimising further the role - already limited - o f an
231 I am assuming here that the nature o f  the Member States is such that their nationals are 
‘moral members' and they themselves are ‘integrated communities’.
232 Council Decision 76/787 , OJ 1976 L278/1, with the annexed Act on Direct Elections.
233 Article 19(2) o f  the EC Treaty.
234 Articles 122 and 205 o f  the EC Treaty.
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individual citizen.235 Further, the Council meets in private, and no records are 
published of the proceedings, which means that the position taken by a 
particular minister may not even be revealed, unless that minister does so 
himself. Dehousse argues that the Council ‘‘escapes all censure”,236 and clearly 
the secrecy of its proceedings offers little chance for public debate or 
accountability.
This lack of transparency is also keenly felt in regard to the intergovernmental 
conferences amending and creating Union treaties: Curtin, commenting on the 
secrecy in which the negotiations for the TEU were conducted, argues that 
“ [s]ome of the basic requirements of a democracy, namely transparency, 
information and public discussion were ignored”.237 The national parliaments of 
the Member States were eventually “presented with a fait accompli and could 
only say yes or no to the final overall ‘package*”.238 This, clearly, is not an 
adequate opportunity to ‘make a difference’ to the political life o f the Union.
Similarly, while it is true that a citizen of the Union can stand and vote in the 
elections of the European Parliament, the Parliament is the most feeble of the 
political institutions o f the Union .239 It has, first of all, no independent 
legislative powers.240 As La Torre points out, since its competences are so weak, 
“a right to participate in its decisions is not at all equivalent to the right to take 
part in the formation of the collective will o f the Union”.241 This judgment 
remains valid for the Community, although slowly the Parliament’s
235 See generally, Dehousse, “Constitutional Reform in the European Community: Are there 
Alternatives to the Majoritarian Avenue?”.
236 Ibid., p.122.
237 Curtin, “The Constitutional Structure o f  the Union: A Europe o f Bits and Pieces”, p.18.
238 Ibid., p.19.
239 See Dehousse, “Constitutional Reform in the European Community: Are there 
Alternatives to the Majoritarian Avenue?”, p.123.
240 See, generally, Weatherill, Law and Integration in the European Union, pp.71-78.
241 La Torre, “Citizenship: A European Wager", p.121.
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competences have been extended, and continue to be extended. Dehousse, tor 
example, argues that the influence o f the Parliament, which now has true joint 
decision-making power (with the Council) in some areas, and power to 
approve or reject the membership of the Commission, could transform the 
balance of power within the Community.242
Suggestions regarding the means through which to improve the quality of 
members’ participation in the Union vary greatly. Joerges, for example, notes 
that one should not be exclusively preoccupied with the role o f the European 
Parliament, and gives a package of ideas which range from the horizontal 
interaction between national agencies to the ‘juridification’ o f regulatory 
activity.243 Much more can be said about the political participation of the 
members of the Union in the Union’s life, but there is no room here.244 The 
question that faces us is whether the capacity given to the members of the 
Union to make a difference to what the Union does fulfils the criteria of 
participation that moral membership demands.
I would suggest, first o f all, that the principle of participation has to be read as 
participation up to the limits of the ‘life’ o f a community. O n one view of 
integration, a community may be understood as a ‘super-person*, its collective 
life embodying the features and dimensions of a human life.245 But Dworkin 
insists that a community’s life should be defined more narrowly, including “only 
the acts treated as collective by the practices and attitudes that create the 
community as a collective agent’’.246 Thus the communal life o f an orchestra is 
limited to producing music - it is only a musical life. This view will affect the
242 Dehousse, “Constitutional Reform in the European Community: Are there Alternatives to 
the Majoritarian Avenue?”, pp. 126-130.
243 Joerges, “European Economic Law, the Nation-State and the Maastricht Treaty”, pp.50 
and 61.
244 See, in general, O ’Leary, The Evolving Concept of Community Citizenship, chs. 6 and 7.
245 Dworkin, “Liberal Community”, p.495.
246 Ibid.
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members of the community’s understanding of the level of their participation in 
the communal life.
The level o f participation required to justify the exercise o f an authority in the 
European Union will therefore depend whether that practice is treated as 
collective. These practices (the limits o f the communal life of the Union) have» 
o f course, continually grown and evolved during the existence of the 
Community and Union. Milward has proposed the thesis that the Member 
States have never seriously contemplated a genuine European constitution: the 
sole purpose of the Community and Union has been to buttress the Member 
States.247 According to this thesis, Union democracy was the clearest threat to 
the hegemony of the nation states, and was therefore marginalised. European 
collective life has been and will be left consciously ill-defined, because it is in 
the interest of the Member States that it should be so.248 So let us consider 
further the question o f the identification o f collective acts within the European 
Union.
6 .5 .6  T he E uropean U nion: in tegrated  com m unity?
Is the Union an integrated community? Has social practice created an 
integrated, or ‘composite’, unit o f  responsibility? Dworkin offers three features 
that provide a common unit of responsibility, or agency, in paradigmatic cases 
such as a flourishing orchestra.249 First, “collective agency presupposes acts 
socially denominated as collective, that is, acts identified and individuated as 
those o f a community as a whole rather than of members o f the community as 
individuals” . Second, “the individual acts that constitute collective acts are 
concerted. They are performed self-consciously, as contributing to the collective 
act” . The orchestra performs a particular concerto only when the musicians play
247 Milward, The European Rescue of the Nation State, pp.2-3.
248 See Ward, The Margins of European Law, ch.3, for a discussion o f  Milward’s thesis.
249 See Dworkin, “Liberal Community”, pp.494-496.
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with a co-operative intention. Third, “the composition of the community - 
who is treated as a member of it - is tailored to its collective acts, so that a 
community’s collective acts explain its composition, and vice versa”.
All these three features are to be found within the Union, although there is 
tension as to their boundaries. Our social practices in general identify the formal 
political acts o f the Union as acts of a distinct legal person rather than of some 
collection of individual citizens or Member States - although there is contention 
over the extent to which that is so, and, officially, only the Community has 
legal personality.250 The political acts ‘internal’ to the European Community, by 
which I mean the acts, including law-making acts, of the Commission, 
European Parliament and Council, constitute a collective unit. However, the 
acts of the Member States resulting from intergovernmental co-operation under 
the umbrella of the Union are not viewed as collective.
This fraying of the edges is reflected in the second feature, since it is precisely 
the mixed intentions of the Union actors which confuses the collective nature 
o f the Union’s acts, even within the Community pillar. Again, the paradigm 
case is to be found: the Commission, Parliament and even Council, or specific 
members of the Council, do act self-consciously within a constitutional 
structure that transforms their individual behaviour into Community 
decisions.251 But it is obvious that this is not always true -  as we saw earlier, the 
members o f the Council often act self-consciously as representatives of their 
national community, not the Community.
The third feature takes us back to moral membership, and also to Dworkin’s 
argument that the life of a community extends only so far as the particular 
spheres that are viewed as communal. The third feature o f an integrated
250 See the discussion in Von Bogdandy, "The Legal Case for Unity: the European Union as a 
Single Organization with a Single Legal System".
251 Ibid., p.496.
community is that its membership reflects its collective acts. The citizens ot a 
political community, then, are those who are particularly affected by its formal 
political acts and who play some role in them.252 In the European Union, the 
exponential rate of change in the acts which are collective at the European level 
has not been matched by a comparative change in membership - understood as 
those who are affected by and who participate in those collective acts. In the 
first years of the Union, when it existed solely as the Community, its 
membership was comprised above all by the Member States, and its communal 
life was centred upon economic acts which affected the Member States as 
(internally) collective markets. The debate over the democratic deficit in the 
Union has arisen exactly because the level to which individual members o f the 
Union, as opposed to Member States, are affected by acts of the Union has risen 
greatly over the years, while individuals* opportunity to participate in those acts 
has not matched it.
6.6 Conclusion
To sum up, we have seen that there are various suggestions regarding the basis 
tor the legitimacy o f the authority exercised within the Union; the Union’s role 
as effective market-maker, its commitment to the protection o f human rights, 
and its provision for democratic decision-making were some of those 
mentioned. I have tried to make clear that the ways in which authority is 
exercised should not be confused with the ways in which that exercise may be 
justified. I also emphasised that the Member States are not inherently legitimate, 
and nor do the type of tightly knit community and direct participation 
commonly found in the political life o f states automatically justify their 
authority.
Dworkin’s principled community and moral membership may be ideas but not 
ideals for the European Union. However, I hope to have drawn out at least .two
252 Ibid.
308
things in my discussion o f community and participation, First, legitimacy comes 
down to the form of the community which a group of people have built and 
the participation of those people within it. A group can choose to come 
together as a community for particular purposes but this does not mean that 
those individuals need necessarily remain as a community for other-purposes. 
The key is identify the areas in which authority will be accepted in order to act 
as an integrated group, and to match the level of participation accordingly in 
order that the subordination of individual desires necessary to achieve the 
required consensus to be a community does not become intolerable.
This means that within the Union legitimacy. must .turn on the nature of the 
authority exercised. Authority which, when exercised, has direct effects upon 
Union citizens, must reach more stringent criteria of justification than authority 
which does not. In thinking about legitimacy within the HU we should put 
aside our familiarity with state structures and focus directly on the exercise of 
authority. This may mean, however, that a body which exercises authority with 
both direct and indirect effects should reach a level of participation and 
commitment to community values which justifies the greater impact of those 
direct effects.
As a practical suggestion, this conclusion supports the introduction of a model 
along the lines of Douglas Hurd’s, who argues that decision-taking within the 
EU, possibly for a temporary period (Hurd mentions 20 years), should fall under 
different defined areas of competence. Hurd sets out three categories of 
decision-taking, which are: first, those matters which will be decided on a 
community basis, sometimes on the basis of majority voting; second, those 
matters on which Member States accept a need to co-operate but where this 
co-operation should be by agreement between them; and third, those matters 
“which for the first time would be defined as remaining under national or
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regional power”.253 Hurd argues that “if  the limits o f European power were 
properly defined...[people] would no longer fear that they were faced with a 
process leading to the obliteration o f their national identity. Hurd warns that 
“the moment may be arriving when ambiguity hampers rather than helps the 
processes ofEurope”.254
This picture reflects the concerns highlighted by my application of Dworkin’s 
ideal models o f principled and rule-book community: it is not legitimate to 
apply the same requirements of community and participation to authorities, 
such as those outside the Community pillar, which have been established not on 
the basis of a background scheme of principle but through ami’s length 
negotiation. Each justification which may legitimise the exercise o f an authority 
within the Union must match the nature o f that authority.
Second, my questions - whether the Union ‘is’ a principled community, 
whether citizens of the Union ‘are’ moral members -  are only to be considered 
with an eye to the sections on myth and task. For as I have discussed earlier, the 
theories do not necessarily match reality; the theories compete to become 
reality. Neither should we underestimate the power of our models and theories. 
MacCormick said that we should ask whether Europe is adequately democratic 
given the kind of entity we take it to be. But we should be wary: if we take it 
to be a particular kind o f entity, and argue that it should be democratic in a 
particular way, it might just become that kind of entity, justified in that 
particular way. The task or the myth is the construction of those who set out to 
justify the community.
Legitimacy in all its three senses, legal, social and normative, is constituted by a 
blend of brute force, normative justifications, institutions, symbols and the 
endless reinterpretation and reconstruction o f history. Legitimacy is an emotive
253 Hurd, “Endstation Europa”, p.15.
254 Hurd, “Endstation Europa”, p. 14.
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concept, and a complex bundle o f choices. However, its trappings should not 
blind us to the reality that authority can only be justified by its subjects* need o f 
it. O ur Member States and the Union are not legitimate as ends in themselves, 
only,, insofar as they serve the needs and interests of their citizens in pursuing 




I began this thesis with Forster, who, in the words of old Mr Emerson, advises 
us: “Beware muddle” . Throughout the thesis I have struggled against muddle, 
seeking to question and to trace back to its origins every claim that an 
independent legal system, authority and legitimacy exist in the Union. It is 
ironic then that I am forced to conclude that while we should still try to beware 
muddle, we may well prefer it to the alternatives that have presented themselves 
in clearing it away. What do I mean by this muddling statement? 1 mean that 
the striking thing about the key chapters on perspectives, system, authority and 
legitimacy is that they boil down to choices between certainty and uncertainty, 
and that we may not always prefer uncertainty to certainty.
Perspectives
The quickest way to get into a muddle is to assume that a perspective is whole 
rather than partial, or to claim too much for one perspective. I argued that 
Dworkin makes this mistake, failing to see that his judge-centred view may 
support an excellent theory of legal reasoning but cannot engage with theories 
o f law. Instead, the first step is to identify the point of view from which to
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study -  for example, the detached normative perspective of the legal scientist, or 
the committed normative perspective o f the judge. This is what I did in 
Chapter Five with the Herculean judge, arguing that Dworkin’s program of 
adjudication can aid the judge in proceeding through steps of rational and 
reasonable decision-making, although ultimately the judge must ultimately grasp 
the nettle and choose.
However, this step is not_enough. It is necessary to be aware o f further aspects 
to the particular perspective chosen., First of all, understanding is a purposive 
activity: the subject may wish to reconstruct or deconstruct the legal order she 
studies. Secondly, understanding depends on features of the self: the subject 
may, when faced with a novel entity such as the European Union, be so 
conditioned by the constructs of the nation state that she can do no more than 
attempt to force what she sees into those familiar concepts. Thirdly, 
understanding has effects on the subject: it may reinforce the subject’s existing 
prejudices, or the subject may too easily accept the way in which the object of 
study presents itself.
I tried to show how we can use one perspective (the detached normative) to 
take the lid off sovereignty and expose the political choices that lie at the root o f 
the idea of a legal system, while embracing another (the committed normative) 
in order to explore the type of community we wish to develop and the ways in 
which we as citizens should participate within it. Throughout the thesis I have 
argued that clarity of perspective is desirable: to be certain o f our perspective 
and to be capable of using different perspectives for various ends is a powerful 
tool.
System
In Chapter Two I applied Kelsen’s concept of a norm to the law o f the 
European Union and identified the chain o f validity that, for Kelsen, is the 
essence of a legal system. Those linked norms form a unity if the validity of
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each o f them can be traced back to the ultimate norm» the Grundnorm. I 
identified three possible models, according to which Community norms are 
validated either by international law, or by law of the Member States, or by an 
independent Community norm. I argued that the strongest case could be put 
for the hypothesis that the Community had originally been validated by a norm 
of international law, but that a ‘revolution’ had taken place and an independent 
norm is now presupposed in relation to the Community.
Yet Kelsen’s theory did not enable me to conclude that this was so; in fact, it 
did_.not allow me to conclude anything at all. It is not possible, according to 
Kelsen, to verify the Grundnorm empirically. The Grundnorm. is simply 
presupposed when custom is interpreted objectively as a norm-creating fact. It is 
j  therefore possible to act as if the Community order were independent while 
others may act as if it were not. The Grundnorm is a fiction, an aid to thinking. 
On one hand, it clarifies the choices which are made when one adopts a view as 
to which model should be ‘correct’, but on the other hand it allows us to carry 
on without adopting a view; it allows us to maintain uncertainty.
Authority
As such, it also cuts through the doctrine of sovereignty and the conflicting 
claims as to the source o f the authority o f the Union. In Chapter Three I argued 
that whenever we identify a body or rule-maker as sovereign,, we are making a 
silent decision about the hierarchy of the norms which we regard as imposing 
obligations upon us. As individuals we have, for example, norms, ofmorality, of 
law, o f religion, o f the governing body o f our football club, which all make 
claims upon us. Whenever two or more norms require incompatible behaviour 
from us we must decide which norm takes precedence. The question of 
sovereignty where we are subject to norms originating from international, 
Community and Member State law calls, if conflict arises, for this same choice.
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This is monism:Tegal norms are identified in relation to other legal norms, no 
more, and while labels may be given to bodies of norms which are linked by 
territory, politics, history, or simple organisation, there can be, ultimately, only 
one normative order. O n this basis I set out .nine, hypotheses o f sovereignty and 
authority that can be drawn from the connection between international, 
Community and national norms. By implication, a normative order can only be 
understood as normative from one sole perspective; it is the detached perspective 
that allows us neutrally to view the nine different choices as to the hierarchy of 
norms which lie at the roots of the question o f sovereignty.
Yet from the detached perspective, each-of the nine models is equally correct 
and justified. As in relation to system, the choice between the different models 
may only be made on the basis of non-scientific, non-detached, political 
considerations. The detached normative perspective allows us to view all the 
possibilities without judging between them, and so long as norms do not come 
into head-to-head conflict through the different positions in which the 
Grundnorm is presupposed, different models can happily coexist in the minds of 
different people.
Legitimacy
The parts of the thesis on legitimacy throw up clarity and indeterminacy in a 
way which follows on from the question o f authority: I rejected the view that 
any attempt to demonstrate that a polity can be legitimate is no more than a 
myth, and argued instead that it is more fruitful to take up the practically 
reasonable perspective described in Chapter One and think about the way in 
which we would like our communities to be. Yet the almost embarrassing 
enthusiasm of this second approach does demand an appreciation o f the sceptical 
position of ‘myth*: the dampening uncertainty o f ‘myth1 can temper the effects 
o f an excess o f practically reasonable certainty.
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I argued that the legitimacy, of the Union depends on identifying the task we 
wish it to undertake, its nature as a community of people, and the level of 
appropriate participation. This requires definition of the acts of the Union 
which are ‘collective' (in Dworkin’s sense of requiring a 'principled community’ 
to legitimately carry them out), and it is precisely this need for definition which 
is subject to the oscillation between clarity and indeterminacy. I noted the 
argument that the Member States have consciously left and will leave European 
collective life ill-defined, because it is in their interests to do so, and the 
opposing argument that there comes a time (which time is now) when clarity 
may be safer than ambiguity, and when the limits of Member State and 
European power should be properly defined.
Conclusion
My introduction to these conclusions was therefore ingenuous: my argument is 
not that we may prefer muddle, but that once we have cleared away the muddle 
and laid our options we may well prefer uncertainty. It is clear that to avoid 
deciding on the ‘real’ roots of the authority of the Union may be to avoid futile 
conflict over insoluble differences. This is not only a negative judgment but a 
positive: I hope to have made clear that to maintain uncertainty can be a choice 
to respect difference and not to impose unity.
However, I stand by my argument that while we may make the choice not to 
choose, it is always best to know what our choices could be. Not to do so is 
dangerous, and Kelsen, survivor of the holocaust, tells us why:
“In social and especially in legal science, there is still no influence to
counteract the overwhelming interest that those residing in power, as well as
those craving for power, have in a theory pleasing to their wishes, that is, in 
a political ideology’*.1
Theory is important because what we see is constructed through it; the way we 
develop reality depends on what we decide reality to be. In the European 
Union, as in the rest o f life, best beware muddle.
1 GTLS, Preface, p.xvii.
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